

LEADING CHANGE IN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

Dr. Shalini



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CHAPTER 1

SENIOR LEADER'S ROLES IN LEADING CHANGE

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ABSTRACT:

Organizational change is an inevitable and often challenging aspect of contemporary business environments. Senior leaders play a pivotal role in navigating and driving change initiatives, influencing the organization's capacity to adapt and thrive. This abstract explores the multifaceted responsibilities and key competencies of senior leaders in the context of leading change. The paper delves into the dynamic landscape of change management, highlighting the significance of senior leaders as architects of transformational strategies. It examines the strategic vision and communication skills required to articulate a compelling narrative that inspires buy-in from various stakeholders. Furthermore, the abstract discusses the importance of fostering a culture that embraces change, where senior leaders act as champions of innovation and continuous improvement. Effective change leadership involves not only formulating strategies but also the ability to navigate resistance and uncertainty. The emotional intelligence and resilience necessary for senior leaders to guide their teams through the ambiguity associated with change. It also investigates the role of mentorship and collaboration in building a change-ready organizational culture

KEYWORDS:

Change Initiatives, Decision-Making, Leadership, Organizational Change, Senior Leaders, Stakeholder Engagement.

INTRODUCTION

Students at the U.S. Army War College are passionate about enacting change, and for good reason. There are many issues to resolve, protocols to enhance, novel concepts to present, and a constantly expanding and changing spectrum of state and non-state entities eager to confront the United States. Moreover, the military's methods and procedures seldom seem to effect change at the anticipated rate. This issue is not exclusive to the armed forces. Scholars studying organizational change have bemoaned the high failure rate of change initiatives in the business sector to meet their objectives. Scholars and professionals started offering models and frameworks for studying and applying change management as they saw potential. Every modification that is offered is done so in a succession of y stages or x steps. Then came books, classes, and formal credentials. These days, it costs a few hundred to a few thousand dollars to enroll in classes or programs focused on change, get a recognized credential, and maybe even work as a "change manager." One very well-known book has served as both a foundational reading on change for the Army War College curriculum and a model for change in Army leadership doctrine at one point. These kinds of books from popular business literature are usually simple to read, noncontroversial in the sense that there isn't much in the reasoning that can be clearly disputed, and seem like instantly useful reading. However, there is an issue. Typically, they focus only on the procedures involved in managing change, giving less consideration to pinpointing the issue or its resolution. These approaches demand that the change agent already understands what needs to change and why. This is supported by a landmark paper written by Andrew Pettigrew for the Journal of Management Science. Pettigrew questioned the prevailing change management paradigm in his analysis of a

transformational change initiative at a chemical company, arguing that it was purely process-oriented and ignored two important aspects of the circumstance. The organization's internal and external circumstances come first. The second is the effort's substance to effect change. This is how the organization sees the issue it has to address, the need for change, and the way forward. Over time, each of these elements changes and leaves the organization with its own historical mark defined, well-bounded endeavor in which the organization is led toward the new end state by a proponent or leader. Often referred to as the life-cycle approach to change, it offers a clear explanation of how change happens. It adopts the viewpoint that, while transitioning from the existing state to the intended future state, the organization should function as a cohesive unit, with the change effort being meticulously planned and closely overseen[1], [2].

But in a geographically dispersed and functionally diversified institution like the U.S. military, this is hardly the only way change happens. Sometimes its "bottom-up," meaning that the greatest concepts or methods seep throughout the company while localized change initiatives take place on their own. For a long time, military authors have advocated for the establishment of an innovative culture to support these kinds of bottom-up actions.

Second, resistance is seen by process models and a large portion of the literature on early change as a challenge that leaders must either conquer or repress.⁸ When a commander or senior leader is leading a change to handle a crisis or solve a recognized issue in spite of unit or member resistance, military commanders may find this point of view appealing. But opposition may take many other forms, particularly in institutions as big and intricate as the US military. Occasionally, resistance arises from the unit's belief that it can accomplish the desired results more effectively by implementing change from the bottom up. Confusion or indifference might result when a change attempt seems sensible from a strategic standpoint but fails to communicate to the individual level. At other times, members ask why the issue is so important and ask why all the work is being done "here" when, in our opinion, it should be done "there."

Third, hundreds of reform initiatives are being carried out concurrently by the US military. A change effort is any new weapon system program, organizational reorganization, consolidation of headquarters, increase or decrease in end strength, or initiative by the military business. Amidst a tumultuous ocean of continuous change, even at the 4-star level, top leaders are striving to bring about transformative change. Despite the organization's goal for a cohesive route toward a core vision, there is competition among these many change initiatives for limited resources and attention. These difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that any change endeavor is evolutionary. As a result, there are issues with U.S. military transformation initiatives that cannot be resolved by general-purpose process models. According to this expert, top military officials face a number of difficulties when it comes to transformation[3], [4].

Fear of Breaking the Group to Resolve

Think about building a new roadway. Since there was no roadway at first, building could start as long as there was land available. Now, after years of use, think of enhancing the same roadway. When there is disruption from change, the procedure must let the roadway to be used at reduced capacity. In addition to causing traffic disruptions and closing exits, it will also intensify law enforcement presence, redirect traffic, and necessitate strict respect to safety requirements. Due to their intricacy, these projects sometimes need many building stages spaced out across several years.

The same might be true of change inside a huge corporation. Change is uncomfortable and difficult, regardless of how many "pardon our dust while we improve your service" signs businesses put up. In order to remain competitive in their targeted markets, organizations need to make constant improvements. This also applies to militaries; after all, they provide a crucial professional service in ensuring the security of their countries. This limits the ability to make mistakes and curbs the desire to add new capabilities if doing so lowers readiness or carries risk.

Because they are government agencies, armies are also accountable for managing public resources responsibly. Reducing duplication might lead businesses to keep core processes sacrosanct and provide less leeway for experimentation or innovation. This is because government work requires a lot of administration and reporting. There is usually less interest in risking today's moderately efficient procedures in favor of chasing the uncertain promise of a better approach, especially for components that provide essential services or are subject to stringent timetables or other external limitations. Think about the unease that often arose when "new" IT solutions seemed to automate paper-based procedures and increase their efficiency, only to need significant workarounds when the system failed to take into account all the informal ways that members used the process. This implies that all options and hazards associated with change proposals must be properly considered and extensively explored[5], [6].

Seeking Efficiency but Ignoring Unexpected Expenses

It is a common misconception that extremely large companies are intrinsically too big, which causes discussions such as: What makes an organization with two million employees different from one with one million employees? Forty-five installations may be enough, so why fifty? Lowering the numbers is always alluring in a performance-driven atmosphere, particularly if savings can be reinvested in other important areas.

Prominent figures often use efficiency as a justification for change. At the strategic level, the pursuit of efficiency usually results in centralization of some kind, with the underlying assumption that combining a capacity lowers the total cost of delivering that capability. But since it depends on your point of view, efficiency is a phrase that may be applied incorrectly. For instance, centralizing the delivery of a common service might enable staff reductions while maintaining comparable levels of client response. Reduced productivity might be one of the consolidation's local repercussions, however. Users may be unwilling or disheartened to use the remote help desk, preferring to make fruitless attempts to resolve issues on their own. When a user's issue has to be "escalated" to a higher level of care personnel, they might get irate. The decision maker was primarily concerned with lowering the concrete cost of financing the capacity and offering all members constant and dependable service, therefore these expenses are often invisible to them. Even if all the numbers indicate to consolidation being more sustainable over time, the disparities in perception might foster skepticism among mid-level executives inside the business who see consolidation as neither efficient nor productive.

Furthermore, the mere notion of efficiency in military institutions runs the danger of provoking defensive reactions. Because they are professional institutions, armies place a higher priority on efficacy than efficiency. This causes conflict within the organization on specific change initiatives, as the operations community perceives risk in readiness levels, deterrent posture, and the lives of service men, while finance managers see risk in program cost overruns and blown budgets. Both are examples of hidden cost categories that are difficult to define, much less precisely measure.

DISCUSSION

The U.S. military uses programs a mix of authorized funds and related spending authority—to manage its organizational energies and resources. Two new obstacles to creativity are introduced by the programming process. The first is that organizational flexibility is limited since external stakeholder interests are often involved in projects. Even in cases when an initiative is obviously better than an existing program, enterprise executives are all too willing to write it off as a possible competitor. The availability of resources presents the second difficulty. Militarism may assign the majority of its resources in budgets for more discretionary, experimental reasons due to strict budgeting procedures and the general high demand for resources across all company operations.

Another widely used tool that has a similar issue is the so-called best practice, which illustrates an efficient or successful method of doing a job. Top practices may develop from the bottom up, spearheaded by a department or a single employee. Nevertheless, a best practice may lose its original quality and turn into a bureaucratic endeavor if it is accepted by leaders as the standard procedure. The best practice may not have the intended results if it is approved when it is still in its infancy and is not put to the test before being used more widely. These kinds of things might make members of the organizations more skeptical of change[7], [8].

Required Modifications as Micromanagement

It is inevitable that stakeholders may sometimes demand adjustments from military. One such stakeholder that could respond to something the military did or did not do is Congress. Congress could do this by enacting laws requiring additional reporting or other punitive or invasive administrative actions, voicing complaints in public through the media or other channels, or delaying unrelated administrative actions that military leaders have requested. The public is another important stakeholder, and trust is essential between the military and the people it serves. "Trust underwrites our relationship to the Nation and the citizens we protect," the U.S. Army said in its 2012 edition of Army Doctrinal Publication 1, The Army, is a good way to sum up this relationship. We could not continue to operate an all-volunteer force if the public did not have faith in us. Aligning with society norms is one way that military maintain confidence. There is a greater chance that society may come to distrust the military when military standards diverge. Take into account, for instance, how shifting public perceptions of homosexuality encouraged the military to accept and integrate homosexuals and lesbians into the ranks.

When an organization makes changes in response to external stakeholders, service members may object because they believe that the leaders are caving in to pressure. To increase the likelihood of support from both service personnel and civilians, leaders who take ownership of the change effort and legitimate it assist lessen the perception of stakeholders forcing change. This does not, however, ensure acceptance since members may oppose or have mixed feelings about it if they are aware of the roots of the reform initiatives[9], [10].

It may be difficult for leaders, especially during times of crisis, to strike a balance between the demands or expectations of external stakeholders and making the required changes that are best for the firm. An adequate internal reaction for a particular crisis might include instruction or training to reaffirm accepted standards, conventions, or practices. But depending on how serious the situation is, the public may need to take action, which might include making public declarations, enforcing new rules and procedures, or disciplining or dismissing certain individuals.

It may be difficult for leaders to deal with resistance or ambivalence regarding such externally driven changes. Hiding a leader's resistance to change is difficult. If the influence of the external event only reaches the Pentagon, remote subunits will find it difficult to comprehend the motivation. To position themselves as change agents and take the initiative away from the external stakeholder, leaders should repeat or modify the context. This raises the likelihood that the company will comprehend and welcome a change attempt, but it does not ensure it.

Competency to Lead Change

Organizational change expert Frank Ostroff conducted a comparative analysis of transformative change initiatives in the public and private sectors. He discovered that one inherent challenge faced by government organizations is that personnel are typically chosen and advanced primarily based on their technical proficiency and command of established policies, rather than their track record of spearheading change initiatives. This is especially true in the military, where most subordinate commanders prioritize following established doctrine and upholding rules and regulations. Changes that these leaders initiate and implement are often evolutionary, small-scale, limited, or transitory. The Joint Professional Military Education Doctrine does not mandate that officers learn how to be active change agents. Rather, it is enough to identify the shifts in the surroundings and guide their organizations through them[11], [12].

Structure

There are three sections to the primer. Part one focuses on the challenges of implementing change effectively in military organizations and describes two types of change: intentional or planned change and change that naturally occurs in the environment. Part One also explores the roles of senior leaders as change agents and is oriented toward the effective and efficient application of concepts related to change that align with the organization's situation and goals. Although the rest of the book focuses on planned change, it is crucial to comprehend both types in order to choose the best course of action for resolving organizational issues. Explains the obstacles that change agents often face and how leaders might overcome them. Much of this was based on my own experiences and readings on internal consultants—as opposed to external consultants brought in from outside to force change on behalf of a higher-up—who strive to improve businesses from inside.

The two types of "modification"

Change, according to eminent organizational scientist David Schwandt, is both a verb and a noun. This illustrates two possible interpretations of environmental change. Saying "we need to change" implies taking action or intervening; Schwandt referred to this as change as a verb. Alternatively, it may be said that because "change is everywhere," it is hard to halt or manage. In this context, the term "change" refers to an ordinary state of affairs; according to Schwandt, it is a noun. According to Schwandt, who contends that change is intrinsically both, change is the process of creating a difference and denoting that difference.

Change is more often seen by leaders as a verb, something they do on purpose to accomplish a goal. In fact, the focus of this primer will be on purposeful change planning, as implied by the title, *Leading Change*. Still, it's critical to recognize and accept change as part of the natural world. Whether acknowledged or not, change is a constant in complex human systems. As a result, the majority of this discussion will focus on change as a noun, or the kind of change that naturally happens in the environment without anyone's conscious participation or activity. We will also address the kind of change that may provide obstacles

to intended change. This does not aim to reproduce or condense all ideas of social or human systems change. Volumes could not be written on the topic. Instead, it offers four issues about social context change that may be usefully contrasted with change interventions, which are covered in the next sections of this primer. For the goal of examining military organizations, a single representative framework is used to address each subject and provide helpful suggestions for societal change. For a more comprehensive view, go to the To Learn More section of this primer for some more resources and opposing viewpoints.

Understanding a society or an organization as a whole does not follow from knowing all of its constituent parts since societies and organizations are intricate, adaptive systems. The concept of complexity pertains to the ability of people to interact in a way that results in a behavior that is distinct from the sum of the interactions, and it is also adaptive in the sense that the individuals may change their behavior in response to their surroundings. Next, it is claimed that new system behavior emerges as a result of the adaptations.

Open systems theory, first introduced by organizational researchers Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn in the 1960s, gave rise to complex adaptive systems theories. Unlike the closed systems methods of the period, which looked at organizations in isolation, open systems theory investigated the interaction of societies and organizations with their environment. Open systems theory explains, in layman's terms, how societies and organizations adapt to their natural settings and transform their behavior. A couple of the characteristics of open systems that Katz and Kahn described are clarified by defining "system" as either society or an organization.

Systems take in energy from the surrounding environment, convert it into something else, and then release it back into the environment. According to Katz and Kahn, "no social structure is self-sufficient or self-contained," and without external stimulation, systems would eventually fail or disintegrate. The reaction manifests as behaviors and mindsets that encourage the formation of novel conduct inside the framework. Negative environmental feedback is one kind of input; it gives hints about how well the system is in tune with the outside world. Systems aim to reach a steady state, sometimes referred to as equilibrium, in which they control inputs and outputs to preserve a feeling of consistency or predictability. By no means is there stasis; inputs and outputs are still flowing. Nonetheless, controlling the flow is necessary to guarantee the system's existence and maintain its integrity. In addition, the system manages its own integration, coordination, and growth and expansion. Growth encourages diversification into new contexts and capabilities, which may lead to a split into a distinct new system or alter the behavior of the system. This is all a sign of change. Although system behaviors may not seem to alter significantly to outside observers, those who are a part of the system may be aware of activity around them. They could be aware of their own behavioral shifts and alignment with the system, as well as the flows of inputs and outputs, but they might not have a common view of the system as a whole. As a result, they can see all of this behavior as random and not always focused on achieving a goal.

Equifinality, or the fact that a system may arrive to the same state in a variety of ways, is another crucial feature of an open system. Thus, it is difficult to identify the causes of occurrences in a system. When creating the idea and strategy for the change endeavor, this becomes crucial. A technique to bring the small-scale environmental changes together into something meaningful is necessary to distinguish between change and chaos. The main concept is that people replicate what they find appealing or positive. Some people may develop a common habit from this repetition. The behavior becomes increasingly pervasive. Up until it stops working, more people embrace and promote it; at that point, the cycle is restarted with a new, more beneficial habit.

A social system's structure explains how its members interact with their surroundings, how the environment reacts to them, and how the social system and its members remember these interactions. Anthony Giddens' work, which highlighted how societies' structures drove behavior and characterized their adaptive nature, is credited with establishing structuration. The structure was then modified and a recursive cycle was created based on the lesson discovered or the modifications made to the people carrying out the activity. As explained by Rob Stones:

Because they represent the material and social backdrop that agents draw from while engaging in social activities and use to plan for the future, structures function as the "medium" of action. They are understood via memory and knowledge of the present. But without this "medium," meaningful and well-organized social activity would be impossible. Structures are also the result of these agent behaviors. One may conceive of the word "culture" while considering customs and behaviors. "How things are done around here, which may or may not be what the organization wants," is what organizational culture explains.

A significant amount of writing has attempted to characterize culture as a conglomeration of institutions, customs, conventions, beliefs, and viewpoints. Edgar Schein's three-layered model of artifacts, norms and values, and underlying assumptions is one well-liked concept. He arranged them in order of least tangible and easiest to modify and most tangible and challenging. W. A more detailed understanding of culture can be gained by applying Richard Scott's formulation of institution theory, which breaks down various artifact types and demonstrates how they interact, create habits, and break them. Institutions are defined as "multifaceted, durable social structures, made up of symbolic elements, social activities, and material resources."

They represent ways of thinking about how collective bodies behave and how they should function. Institutions are dynamic and go through a life cycle of "creation, maintenance, change, and decline" notwithstanding their durability. Three categories—regulatory, normative, and cultural-cognitive—apply to these actions and behaviors. Regulations are formal structures such as laws, rules, and formal relationships that demand compliance or risk sanctions that force members of the organization to do or not do anything. These are referred to as regulative actions.

While normative activities focus on what members should do in an informal setting, cognitive activities address the members' common understandings.

The relationship between structuration and institution theories is simple: organizations form taught habits from the upheaval of daily contacts with their surroundings, which then embeds changes in the organization's behavior and impacts further interactions with the environment. Think about the example that follows. National budget cutbacks compel the agencies to look for ways to run more efficiently. In order to inform their routine answers to these cutbacks, the services have established a number of internal frameworks. For example, they have institutionalized a taxonomy of rebuttals or approaches to negotiated solutions into their service culture.

The services must decide whether to provide the required response or to hold their position if the national leadership demands responses that are different from their own. In either case, the stakeholder relationship is altered, which modifies the organization's future response to budget reduction. Regarding the creation and dissemination of information to higher authorities, maybe a new official policy or rule is required. Maybe the service has to establish new guidelines for how it justifies its resource needs. It could be necessary for the organization's members to come to fresh understandings on the state of the country's finances.

Oliver's de-institutionalization procedures

It goes without saying that not all habits are beneficial, and once harmful habits are identified, it is preferable for individuals to break them. However, in the typical social setting, all habits have the ability to dissolve over time as the initial motivators fade into oblivion or as new habits emerge. De-institutionalization is the term used by academics to describe this organic process of habit-breaking, which is characterized as habits that "weaken and disappear." Put differently, there is a "gradual erosion of taken-for-granted character" brought on by something in the surroundings, which finally results in individuals ceasing to exercise it and losing its significance.

Researchers have discovered that certain pressures, which may be purposely generated or naturally occurring in the surroundings, cause this kind of erosion. A number of these forces, including subpar organizational performance, competing internal interests, social fragmentation, and a decline in historical continuity, have been recognized by institutional researcher Christine Oliver. When these forces are present, an institutional practice fades or is rejected by the membership, making way for other, potentially substituting practices. Crucially, decriminalizing an institutional activity does not automatically de-institutionalize it; what really counts is the cognition that either accepts the behavior or permits it to go away. There are three kinds of pressures on the left side of 4 that might lead to the weakening or elimination of institutions. An institution's usefulness or validity are questioned due to competitive pressures. These pressures result from the practice's negative impact on the organization's performance or member commitment, which is why it is simply being abandoned even if it is still codified. When the benefit of institutional practice is outweighed by the growth in technological or administrative needs, functional pressures result. If the practice is too difficult or time-consuming, participants can stop. Lastly, societal pressures may "cause divergent or discordant" opinions among members due to disagreements over the worth or usefulness of an activity. An institution may be subject to two other kinds of pressures in addition to the political, functional, and social ones; some of these forces aim to maintain the institution, while others speed up its disintegration. An active intervention to keep the institution in place is the result of inertial forces. Oliver listed the following as potential causes of inertia: the institution's investments in fixed assets, which make stopping the practice expensive; the practice's facilitation of internal coordination, which makes stopping it uncomfortable; the need for predictability; the need to demonstrate steadfastness and purpose; and the fear of change or venturing into the unknown.

The institution's decline is being accelerated by entropic forces. Entropy is defined as "a tendency toward disorganization in the social system" that results in "erosion or decay in an institutional phenomenon." Put another way, if a habit is allowed to persist unchecked, it will eventually fade away and end on its own because its practitioners will either forget the purpose of the practice, how to carry it out, or fail to pass on the knowledge of the practice to new members. This approach implies that it is difficult to change harmful behaviors via leader edict alone. To persuade followers to break the habit, the leader must decide what messages to convey and what kinds of pressure to use. This may include discouraging outdated methods or offering appealing alternatives.

CONCLUSION

It is undeniable that senior executives play a crucial role in spearheading change and are essential to the success of organizations in dynamic settings. Successful change programs are mostly dependent on senior leaders' capacity to clearly explain a compelling vision, communicate effectively, and cultivate an adaptable culture. Their ability to navigate the

intricacies and problems inherent in the transition process is greatly aided by their strategic acumen, emotional intelligence, and perseverance. Furthermore, the conclusion emphasizes how leadership is changing in response to globalization and technology improvements. To remain ahead of the curve, senior executives need to maintain a constant state of skill improvement and embrace novel ways to change management. It becomes clear that mentoring and teamwork are essential for creating an organizational culture that is adaptable to change. Senior leaders in businesses need to be not just skilled strategists but also compassionate influencers who can motivate and inspire diverse teams as they navigate a period of unparalleled change.

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CHAPTER 2

BALANCING PLANNED CHANGES WITH OPPORTUNITIES

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ABSTRACT:

In the ever-evolving landscape of contemporary business environments, organizations face the dual challenge of implementing planned changes while remaining agile enough to seize unforeseen opportunities. This abstract examines the delicate balance required to navigate between structured change initiatives and the spontaneous emergence of opportunities. The paper explores the strategic considerations organizations must undertake to integrate planned changes seamlessly into their operations. It delves into the importance of strategic planning, stakeholder engagement, and resource allocation to ensure that planned changes align with organizational goals and priorities. Simultaneously, the abstract emphasizes the need for flexibility in these plans to accommodate unexpected opportunities that may arise. Furthermore, the abstract investigates the role of leadership in fostering a culture that encourages adaptability and innovation. It discusses how leaders can empower their teams to recognize and capitalize on unforeseen opportunities while ensuring that the pursuit of these opportunities does not undermine the stability of planned changes. The concept of strategic agility, defined by an organization's ability to pivot in response to changing circumstances, is explored as a key factor in achieving this delicate equilibrium.

KEYWORDS:

Adaptability, Balanced Approach, Change Management, Decision-Making, Leadership, Organizational Opportunities.

INTRODUCTION

A person may have sentiments of churn, believing that there is so much going on outside of their control that it is futile to attempt to influence it. This is caused by the accumulation of natural impacts of change within a social setting. However, this is untrue; instead, possibilities that may not otherwise arise might be brought about by churn!

Mintzberg's planned, developed, and implemented tactics

Leading expert on strategic management and planning Henry Mintzberg discovered that there are several methods for firms to execute strategies combinations of long-term objectives and action plans after doing study and working as a consultant for several decades. One approach, and usually not the one that is most often used in practice, was to construct a planned strategy that starts with predetermined objectives in mind and moves toward the goals by purposeful activities. Mintzberg provided a taxonomy of tactics in a 1985 paper that ranged from totally planned to entirely emergent. Although a comprehensive account of the taxonomy is beyond the purview of this book, three are pertinent to discuss here. There are two worth comparing right away. The organization's intended strategy is what it sets out to do, while its realized strategy is what it really does. Three requirements were put forth by Mintzberg in order for the intended strategy to be realized: the leader's intentions must be clear and well-understood, there must be little to no doubt about them among the group, and nothing internal or external could have thwarted them as the change effort moved forward. According to Mintzberg, these circumstances are uncommon in real life, therefore often the organization only achieved a

portion of its original objectives. Nonetheless, the organization may be able to take advantage of possibilities as a result of internal and external environment dynamics by implementing an emergent strategy. Pure emergent strategies, or ones that lack any kind of goal, are very uncommon, according to Mintzberg. On the other hand, stakeholder demands, internal organizational discussions, or localized activities may result in the development of such tactics. The takeaway is that there is no one ideal strategy for enacting change inside an organization, and that strategy may alter over time. However, it necessitates that leaders focus on looking for chances to advance corporate objectives. Stated differently, they must be agents of change [1], [2].

Senior executives acting as catalysts for change

The strategic leaders of the Army understand that, in order for the Army to carry out its purpose, it must proactively deal with the almost continual state of change that the institution endures. Strategic leaders protect their firms from unnecessary distractions while preparing for change. Strategic leaders understand that influence based on commitment is often needed for change, as opposed to coerced compliance.

Army Instructional

While it is simple to incorporate such ideas into dogma, doing so is much more difficult. All leaders are under tremendous pressure to deliver results, but top leaders⁵⁸ in the armed services confront the extra task of getting their troops ready for battle, which is a dangerous undertaking for both countries and service people. However, effective senior leaders manage to go beyond these obstacles and bring about change! The finest are adaptability specialists. They discover methods to draw attention to issues, put up solutions, clear the path for their execution, speak truth to power, and confront opponents and doubters. They are the organization's doers. They are the greatest critical thinkers, however, and they have an innate sense of what adjustments are beneficial and which would be too dangerous. They represent prioritizing the demands of the organization before one's personal. Stated differently, they are agents of change. Those that possess the drive and aptitude to improve their companies' efficiency, morale, performance, and/or environmental alignment are known as change agents. It goes beyond what is required by the job description. Senior military commanders may be discouraged from acting as change agents by some of the daily obstacles they face, which include an orientation, an attitude, and an aspect of the strategic leader's personality. Next, I'll go over how senior leaders may become change agents by acquiring the abilities, know-how, and mindsets that will enable them to push for the necessary organizational transformation. Since addressing this issue in its entirety may take a book, I will limit my discussion to a few examples of both internal and external causes of change-related obstacles. I am speaking solely to executives who want to enhance their companies but find it difficult or disheartening to make the required changes. People who are uninterested in or unable to adapt are a different story [3], [4].

External obstacles

Large, intricate bureaucracies, militaries are required to incorporate a variety of skills into their combat units and use them as needed for operations. This implies, presumably, that bureaucratic decision-making and procedures might be obstacles to change. The "valley of death," as the U.S. military procurement community calls it, is one instance when a legitimate capacity development endeavor does not succeed in being formalized as a program of record, or one for which Congress would or wants to provide cash. When efforts fall short of the budget, they are simply abandoned for lack of funding. The obstacle arises when the leader has to decide whether it is worthwhile to pursue the change if there is little chance that it will

become a program of record. The hazards are a concern for any organizations or businesses that might take part in these initiatives. An associated issue is when a suggested endeavor clashes with or rivals previous endeavors for change, like an established program of record. Higher authorities may decide that the demand is transient or of extremely low importance, or that the current effort adequately meets it. These viewpoints had an impact on the delayed procurement of the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected Vehicle in the middle of the 2000s. The protracted nature of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan was exacerbated by views that they would soon come to an end as well as worries about their enormous cost and waste. More broadly, local leaders may find it difficult to voice their concerns and have them taken into account if a bigger bureaucratic endeavor is doomed to leave an isolated issue unaddressed. A third obstacle may be defined as a zero-sum attitude, in which executives are forced to either carry out projects within the people and financial constraints that have been allotted to them or try to recruit staff from other companies. This relieves higher authorities of the responsibility to reallocate resources and deters leaders from pursuing extra resources to address significant issues. In my own Army council-of-colonels meetings, I saw situations when organizational representatives made good suggestions, but if they hadn't previously passed the hat and gotten the resources beforehand, the ideas would have been rejected out of hand [5], [6].

Org politics, defined as "a variety of activities associated with the use of influence tactics to improve personal or organizational interests," is another obstacle. Limited access to incentives and promotions, uncertainty about one's tasks and responsibilities, and the structures and decision-making procedures of the organization are some of the causes of politics. These kinds of things might cause people and their ideas to be marginalized; in reaction to possible military innovation, Hill and Gerrass described these groups as "shooting the messenger." But sometimes, leaders can obstruct their own path. The obstacles that leaders put in place to prevent or manage the changes that they would otherwise be accountable for are known as intrinsic barriers. The sources of these hurdles include their overall dread of failing, their arrogance about their chosen solutions when there are other options, and their discomfort with the components of their change ideas, such as their unfamiliarity with new technology or dependence on outside experts. While these are typical of organizational settings, I include some more that I personally experienced often as an officer and that are widespread in military organizations.

The first is the notion that the company can only manage so many transformation initiatives concurrently. Too much change is seen as dangerously disruptive, and disruption is problematic in the high-risk domains of preparedness and war. As a result, while allocating change, executives may decide to focus on seeing some projects through to completion before starting others. Although the strategy makes sense, I saw that these executives often projected their own personal tolerance levels for change onto the company. The dangers included the possibility that opportunities would have been lost and that the failure to address other organizational issues may have damaged or destroyed the priority initiatives. The second is letting oneself become so discouraged by unsuccessful attempts that one stops wanting to make changes in the future. Contrary to popular belief, military groups should, as stated in U.S. Army leadership doctrine, "leave the organization better than it was when they arrived."

DISCUSSION

Leading good change in companies is a contact sport that calls on leaders to cultivate abilities and mindsets that support environments of ongoing development. Driving change toward desired objectives or results never stops in circumstances where change is constant because new goals will always emerge. Change is thus a necessary component of leadership and

should not be seen as a disruptive occurrence by leaders. They have to be agents of change—those who encourage and facilitate constructive actions that advance their organizations. It takes both management and leadership skills to be a change agent.

The characteristics of quality change agents include well-defined quality problems. However, in actuality, this is quite difficult to do as, while the symptoms are obvious, it is challenging to identify the underlying issues they stand for. If there are issues inside the company, individuals may hide their whereabouts or withhold information to obfuscate the nature of the issues. Members might be eager to defend the status quo as well. Although they are aware of these worries, change agents choose not to let them stop them. Instead, they see member behaviors as warning signs that something is wrong and the organization isn't operating at its peak. Change agents follow such signals and do organizational diagnostics to find out whether there are procedures, policies, or practices that lower performance or endanger the organization's standing or the wellbeing, health, or morale of its constituents. They are aware, too, that organizational energy is finite, so setting objectives for change and expressing them are imperative. In contrast to leaders who limit or regulate the rate of change, change agents remain receptive to possibilities as they present themselves [7], [8].

A mental image or picture of the organization's ideal future state may be developed and articulated by change agents. But this vision does not mean that the problem's symptoms are no longer present or eliminated. A quick-fix attitude that leaves issues unaddressed and guarantees the recurrence of symptoms later is indicated by focusing only on the symptoms. The change agent asks inquiries regarding symptoms or variables that are being overlooked but may also be contributing to the issue while imagining the ideal state. Too often, visioning ends with establishing the ideal condition. The following phase is taken by change agents, who plan how to get to the desired state and make sure the necessary resources are available. This is especially important in military organizations, where failing to make the required changes or just completing half of the work may lead to unsuccessful operations and needless casualties. More is needed to effect change in military organizations due to their size and complexity than just images or catchphrases. The commander's objective, ideas, and tactics that inform members of the why, how, and what their responsibilities will be in the change are how change agents see the way to success.

Agents of change are aware that leaders do not always bring about change. It requires a strategy. It requires time, energy, and resources in particular. Perseverance is also necessary since the organization's purpose must be fulfilled as it seeks change. Modifying an organization takes longer than forming a new one, much like repairing a roadway without obstructing traffic. Well-thought-out metrics of success, sensible change pacing to keep the endeavor on track without interfering with other priorities, appropriate divisions of labor throughout the organization, and consideration for continuity in the face of frequently changing leadership are all components of good change plans. Few things work better than personal experience to foster a cynical attitude toward change. Although many change initiatives will fall short of their objectives, unsuccessful change initiatives are those that leave a sour taste in the mouths of individuals involved, who may believe that the change effort negatively impacted the organization's performance or reputation. Strong leadership may enhance a change's positive effects even if it is otherwise ineffective. However, a lackluster transformation is usually linked to some kind of leadership failure. Change initiatives may be unsuccessful if they are poorly planned or envisioned, if leaders terminate them suddenly or for no apparent reason, or if they continue long after they are no longer advantageous to the firm. Stakeholders may sometimes continue to be more dedicated to the transformation endeavor than the company is. At times, a committed minority within the

group shows a disproportionate amount of enthusiasm in maintaining the endeavor. Change agents understand that ending a change endeavor needs just as much planning and foresight as starting one. They make sure that even in cases when the entire endeavor is not successful, the organization still benefits from having made the attempt. They also make sure that the organization is aware that an endeavor is coming to an end, which clears up any confusion and aids in members rearranging their priorities.

Executives as in-house advisors

Both public and private sector businesses use consultants to provide executives advice and guidance, particularly when it comes to the need for change. Leaders may choose a preferred consultant who has shown success in a prior situation, or they may bring in outside consultants to do unbiased evaluations of the company. In this way, the consultant and the leader engage into a legal contract wherein the leader provides access to the organization and finances in return for analysis, recommendations, strategies, plans, or other results. Acquiring sufficient knowledge about the company to provide high-quality outputs is a part of the external consultant's job description. Internal consultants carry out same duties. They are employees of the company who act as consultants to the leaders, carrying out analysis, offering suggestions, or creating plans and strategies. The role of internal consultant has benefits and drawbacks. On the one hand, they have access because of their allocated roles and responsibilities, and they are already acquainted with the company. Compared to hiring an outside expert, the learning curve is not as high. However, they don't get many advantages and may not be relieved of other responsibilities.

It's critical to recognize the differences between consulting and giving advice. As a member of an organization, one usually gives counsel within the parameters of their defined tasks and responsibilities. Being technically and tactically proficient in one's role and able to provide sound counsel when required are frequent prerequisites. However, as it requires a more strategic viewpoint, internal consulting for the company often falls outside of one's regular responsibilities. Regardless of the issue or how it connects to the consultant's role, internal consultants assist executives in problem-solving, decision-making, and action. It might be difficult for consultants to take a stance that is detrimental to them personally or professionally. As a result, internal consultants cross boundaries and prioritize the requirements of the company above their own [9], [10].

Obligations in a military setting

As a natural fit, top executives advise their businesses internally, drawing on their vast military expertise. As stewards of the military profession, for instance, top leaders are in charge of making sure that military personnel and the organization—the DOD, joint community, and services—that apply the profession's area of specialist knowledge are professional. Senior leaders thus have a personal interest in maintaining the profession's culture of trust, independence, and capacity to carry out its purpose. Thinking critically and reflectively to distinguish between different types of information, recognize issues, weigh choices, and keep learning is another duty of a senior leader. At the strategic level, leaders need to be able to function well in situations where there is partial or biased information accessible. They also need to be able to critically assess the accuracy and dependability of the information they find and, when needed, go beyond it.

The third is to be a communicator and strategic adviser who has the moral fortitude to speak out when necessary, even if doing so puts the particular leader in danger. Speaking "truth to power," as Aaron Wildavsky put it, is the internal consultant's duty and responsibility as a stakeholder in the company to bring issues to the attention of the leadership. If the leadership

is the cause of the issue or is determined to ignore it and its repercussions, this might be a very challenging situation. Ultimately, however, top executives must also assess the organization's internal environment and identify any capacity constraints. They must be mindful of the military's can-do mentality and inclination for action in order to refrain from overtaxing personnel or assigning them to duties for which they are neither qualified nor prepared [11], [12].

The morality of working as an inside consultant

Whether internal or external, consulting raises a number of moral conundrums. The integrity of the consultant is crucial; if they seem to be consulting just for their own gain or if they provide mediocre results, the leaders should end the engagement. Additionally, consulting on a certain topic should have a limit. Put another way, their job is to make oneself redundant, for example, after the issue has been resolved or the leader has made the decision to act. The military's strong top-down ethos and hierarchical structure provide a number of specific ethical issues for internal consulting. Speaking truth to power first means putting the hierarchy, its power structures, and the status of its leaders under scrutiny all of which ultimately affect the internal consultant. The internal consultant must decide not only whether to speak, but also how and why to do so.

A further ethical dilemma pertains to an individual's position and connections inside the establishment. Members need to be careful not to allow such special attention go to their heads if a senior leader assigns a member from deep inside the company to look into a particular matter. Since the organization's success is at jeopardy, the consultant has to be as impartial as possible while yet acting professionally. Relationships inside the company may suffer if consultants take on a higher position. As a result, they have to refrain from getting in the way of routine business or sowing discord amongst members and their leaders. The consultant will have an additional ethical dilemma if they discover that executives are starting the study in order to push change on a set timeframe or if their main focus is purposefully narrow or has a short deadline. In a similar vein, internal consultants could also discover that, in spite of evidence to the contrary, they are being coerced by the leader into accepting prepared answers. Cynicism towards the change endeavor might result from such circumstances. Internal consultants, however, have to fight the urge to give up or leave. Rather, they need to understand and develop empathy for the leader's point of view, including what motivates the chosen answer and why. Is there a stakeholder mandate behind it? Furthermore, why alter now? What are the advantages and disadvantages of different schedules that meet the needs of stakeholders and leaders and maintain organizational continuity? I assembled a coalition that included the command's lawyer, a number of senior directors, and other people who had voiced concerns to me over the contractor in hopes that the consultant may be able to negotiate solutions that satisfied both leaders and members the requirement to have the contact finish at a set time. As a team, we convinced the commander of our position, and the consultant was freed. While change may not always be a good thing, complacency is not always the enemy. Senior executives have an obligation as change agents to maintain goal achievement while enhancing the company. It is simple to say, but difficult to accomplish. Senior executives who work as internal consultants need to identify issues and provide fixes from inside. Senior executives may find themselves in challenging situations as a result, and tensions and anxiety may rise inside the company. Senior leaders have the last say on how to handle change needs, interact with leaders and members, and implement change. Beyond being aware of the forces at work in the environment and the resources available for change, there is no secret formula for this. Never confuse continuity with complacency—that's the key. They are not interchangeable. Because they prevent or lessen

collateral harm to what the company needs to maintain for predictability, dependability, or stability while resolving issues, change agents are also continuity agents. A change agent must be able to distinguish between what has to be changed and what should be left intact, especially when advising from inside. When this border is blurry, they must constantly discuss their duties with senior executives.

CONCLUSION

Achieving the delicate balance between anticipated modifications and unforeseen advantages is crucial for companies looking to succeed over the long term in dynamic settings. The strategic factors and leadership requirements that are essential to successfully manage this balance have been emphasized in this abstract.

The need for companies to see transformation as a dynamic, adaptive journey rather than a linear procedure is emphasized in the conclusion. Strategic planning is still essential because it offers a path to accomplish corporate goals by making deliberate adjustments. It also takes both a culture of innovation and strategic agility to recognize, evaluate, and take advantage of unanticipated possibilities. In guiding the company through this intricate interaction, leaders are essential. The conclusion emphasizes how crucial it is for leaders to create an environment that prioritizes stability and flexibility because it allows teams to act quickly on new possibilities without sacrificing the integrity of planned improvements. It highlights how crucial risk management, communication, and ongoing observation are to effectively preserving this equilibrium.

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CHAPTER 3

ROLE OF LEADING AND MANAGING CHANGE

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ABSTRACT:

Organizational change is a constant reality in today's dynamic business landscape, necessitating adept leadership and effective management strategies. This abstract explores the dual roles of leading and managing change, dissecting their distinct yet interconnected contributions to successful organizational transformation. The paper begins by delineating the responsibilities of change leaders, emphasizing the importance of visionary leadership, strategic communication, and the ability to inspire and mobilize teams toward a shared goal. It delves into the emotional intelligence and resilience required to navigate resistance and foster a culture that embraces change. The abstract also highlights the role of change leaders in setting a compelling vision, aligning stakeholders, and driving innovation. Simultaneously, the abstract delves into the essential functions of change management, elucidating how effective planning, resource allocation, and structured processes contribute to the seamless execution of change initiatives. It explores the significance of communication in managing change, ensuring that stakeholders are informed, engaged, and equipped to adapt. The abstract also underscores the role of feedback mechanisms, monitoring, and flexibility in managing the intricacies of the change process.

KEYWORDS:

Leadership, Management, Organizational Change, Stakeholder Engagement, Team Dynamics.

INTRODUCTION

The processes of change are the main emphasis of the traditional change management approach. This will present a few of these process models before overlaying them with Pettigrew's time, context, and content structures. The end product will be a six-phase framework that is based on a generic methodology used by consultants. It starts with the change agent identifying that a situation is wrong and that it needs to be resolved. Continuing from point 2, this paradigm sees change as a verb, where it is an intentional action meant to accomplish a goal. As a result, the change initiative is an intervention to alter the status quo. However, this statement falls short since it encompasses insignificant actions like someone acting irrationally and disruptively for a goal that is only apparent to them. Has anything evolved? Of course, but for the time being at least, effective interventions need to have specific characteristics; otherwise, people can see them as a string of random actions:

keeping in mind the organization's identity, objectives, strategy, vision, and other elements results of logical thinking processes that take into account the issue, the organization's culture and environment, and the external and internal surroundings Considering the amount of time, money, and focus that may be allocated to changing resources, removing a task and giving up the skills that go along with it. Leaders must also expect that their efforts will meet with some resistance since the rewards and dangers of change initiatives never touch members evenly. A high-quality intervention makes the most of the chances for coordinated action, efficient planning and measurement setup, and effective member communication and consideration of their requirements. When circumstances change, the organization should be more equipped to

modify and adapt. Poor interventions might be the consequence of leaders' poor communication, a lack of commitment to the mission, or an impulsive decision made without taking the needs of the members or stakeholders into account. Interventions with these kinds of issues have a higher chance of failing and leaving a legacy of resistance to subsequent attempts at change. This closes with the six-phase framework utilized in this book to lead and manage change, from identifying the issue to starting the change effort and ending the effort. It also briefly addresses what it means to interfere in the environment to accomplish desired change [1], [2].

Work on Change Intervention

Disrupting the status quo, integrating new ideas, ensuring that the organization continues in its intended path, and reducing risk or damage are the fundamental intervention processes. However, starting the process is challenging, therefore the company need to appreciate the intervention. Many change management process models include Kurt Lewin as a common source.

Lewin's theory of change is still widely used today; his three stages of unfreezing, moving, and refreezing continue to serve as the cornerstone of organized change initiatives and can be easily mapped to a wide range of other authors' change models. these three phases. Initially, executives need to unfreeze the company to shake it out of its complacency. While more modern writers often link these forces as existing throughout the transition, Lewin identified both motivating and restraint factors that affected the organization in its current condition. Lewin's second step consists of progressing through the shift and then refreezing it to become the new normal in the culture. This is ideally the point at which the organization fights going back to its previous practices and the transformation becomes permanent. At every stage, the business must invest a significant amount of time and energy in implementing planned change. Unfreezing an organization and preparing it for change is undoubtedly challenging. Leaders often have to persuade followers that something is really wrong and that the existing course is unsustainable. Prior to, during, and after relocating to the new state, the company must also recognize its intended change management approach. Lewin's approach served as the basis or source of inspiration for several other change management methods. Lewin's three stages are mapped to John Kotter's eight-step model, for instance, in step 6.

The key takeaway is that, despite possible variations in the number of steps or activities, process-oriented models often include some parallel to Lewin's three phases. However, it would be incorrect to assume that these models are inherently top-down. This image might stem from the belief that only leaders are capable of carrying out or directing these tasks, particularly when it comes to vision, which is often seen as the domain of commanders. On the other hand, top-down or bottom-up change initiatives may make use of these and other process models. Who is spearheading the change distinguishes the two. While top-down planned change is given greater credibility by the commander, bottom-up change is more aggressively pushed by the change agents sometimes even without the leadership's official approval or authority. Therefore, more of the organization, if not the whole company, is often involved in top-down transformation. Although just a portion of the organization may be affected by bottom-up transformation, the whole company may benefit from the endeavor.

According to Pettigrew's Triangle, no two change initiatives are the same, even if they have comparable issues, solutions, and circumstances. Consequently, there isn't a secret recipe for success. Proponency and legitimacy, however, are two aspects that are included in almost all books and change models. They both have to do with who is leading the change effort the

change agent, the leader, or someone else and who is in charge of managing it that is, who is in charge of organizing and carrying out the change.

The implementation of the change initiative has to be overseen by someone, and in military organizations, this is usually a designated role. The assignment of primacy for a particular endeavor is facilitated by the common military staff paradigm. Advocates for personnel and administrative interventions may be J-1s or their equivalents in the military, J-2s for intelligence, J-4s for maintenance, and so on. The proponent has heavy burdens and needs to be well-prepared with the time and means to collect data, win and keep support, and design and carry out changes. It is vital to establish proponentcy in the early phases of the endeavor. Proponentcy begins the instant someone recognizes and expresses to another the need for change. Until the organization explicitly designates a proponent, assuming the organization does so, the change agent remains the proponent. If not, the change agent is promoting change from the bottom up. Proponentcy involves several duties, most of which are too difficult for one person to do alone [3], [4].

This is where the governing coalition idea put forward by Kotter becomes useful. A leading coalition is a group of people who act as the project's first proponent and have the ideal balance of organizational members to advance the project as a whole. Leaders are not always the leading coalition; in fact, Kotter makes a compelling case that having leaders as the sole members of the coalition would lead to ineffective change. A coalition that succeeds has the following: Enough important players, including employees and senior management, to prevent those left out from impeding development; who are believable inside the company so that the change initiative can be treated seriously; and With enough variety in knowledge and viewpoints to allow for better decision-making, additionally demonstrating enough leadership to advance the change endeavor; the designation of a formal proponent, such as a staff directorate or subgroup, does not lessen the significance of these attributes. Formal proponents might have more centralized control over coalition leadership, or they could be overburdened with other responsibilities and lack the motivation to maintain the momentum that the coalition helped to establish. To maintain the organization's commitment to change, change agents must therefore not only be aware of prepotency during the endeavor but also keep an eye out for shifts in proponentcy.

In addition, proponents should consider who else should be informed. It is usually preferable for individuals advocating change to be proactive and get in touch with others who could be impacted since attempts to bring about change can have second- and third-order effects on other people [5], [6].

Suchman's Handling of Legitimacy

Compared to businesses or companies, military organizations have a more hierarchical and top-down culture. The potential for the commander, chief of staff, or other important internal stakeholders to unilaterally decide to halt the reform effort in its tracks or put up obstacles to advancement is thus a worry for coalition leaders. They may not think the goals are realistic, feasible, or acceptable, or they could see the effort as worthless in comparison to other demands. Therefore, even though these people may not be in the steering coalition, their assistance or lack of interference could be essential to starting the change initiative.

Military organizations tend to focus on the final kind of legitimacy: personal legitimacy. This is because they believe that a commander's support is enough to justify an endeavor. Still, an endorsement of that kind doesn't always last. The leading coalition may have initially aroused the commander's attention, but he may not have had the time or desire to actively support the endeavor in the future. The commander is thus a crucial internal stakeholder that the coalition

has to consider. However, support alone from a commander does not always result in the defeat of opposition. Others may oppose the initiative on the grounds that doing nothing is the best course of action, that the methods being used to implement change are unacceptable, or that the risk of change is too great. These arguments are based on disagreements with the commander or the coalition along the other three lines of legitimacy. The coalition has to be ready to meet these obstacles, which are likely to arise again during the transformation endeavor.

Change agents could believe that their issue requires immediate attention from the organization. They must confront opposition to change head-on when issues are so pressing that doing nothing puts the organization at serious danger. In other cases, the issue may not be as urgent, in which case the change agent would have to wait for the ideal circumstances or chances to present themselves. However, since these moments might pass quickly, the change agent has to be ready to act right away.

DISCUSSION

Luckily, the change agent can use the collection of receptive contexts that Andrew Pettigrew devised to motivate the company to change. According to his hypothesis, the eight contexts have a tendency to support one another, thus the existence of one might promote the presence of another. The following eight elements are present:

Policy Coherence and Quality

An organization is more open to change if its rules and norms are clear, succinct, and actionable since this makes it simpler to explain issues in a way that is helpful.

Important Figures Driving Change

When important leaders exhibit receptivity and a readiness to adapt, organizations are more open to change. It is crucial that these leaders have positions that enable them to advocate for and spearhead change. Had they been in the incorrect position, the effect of their attempts to change may have been diminished [7], [8].

Environmental Pressures Are Present

These don't have to be widespread, onerous demands from society or stakeholders. Instead, the pressures may be minor in nature and originate from both within and outside the company. What matters is how they make the organization realize how dangerous the current state of affairs is. One specific kind of pressure that will be discussed in the following section is crises.

Collaboration between Important Internal Stakeholders and Leaders

Internal stakeholders are people who, because of their knowledge, experience, or unique membership trust and confidence, significantly contribute to the success of the company. These internal stakeholders may be excellent change agents if given the necessary authority. Internal stakeholders are less inclined to collaborate when their ties with leaders are damaged.

Cooperative Networks in addition to Other Establishments

An organization is more open to change when its members have strong, supportive, and change-friendly ties with their peers in other organizations, both vertically and horizontally. Improved mutual comprehension of the goal, purpose, vision, and success criteria of the company results from these. Members and change agents may then use these to identify what is good and incorrect inside the company [9], [10].

Harmony between Local Contexts and the Change Agenda

Every location in big, dispersed enterprises has a distinct perspective on the issue. This implies that for a change to be transformative, the issue and its resolution must make sense for every base/station, suborganization, and activity that is impacted. The one-size-fits-all strategy may need to be abandoned, or the change effort must be appropriately conveyed for each impacted area.

These elements provide a convenient list of methods by which change agents and executives might reshape the organization to increase its openness to change. These elements may not be visible in every particular issue, however. How these elements perform the environment depends on the nature and character of the issue. For instance, until the issue at hand arises, the organization's general objectives and priorities can be apparent.

Change agents, operating as internal consultants inside military organizations, have to strike a balance between their designated tasks and obligations and the need to drive and seek change. Change agents must include others in the diagnostic process due to the size of change initiatives in extremely big businesses. Change agents are seldom able to independently conduct a comprehensive diagnosis. Moreover, in order for the coalition or change agent to have access to the data required for accurately assessing the issue and creating solutions, personal legitimacy granted by a top leader may be necessary for the diagnostic endeavor. This might create a contradiction since the change agent might have to carry out some kind of preparatory investigation or study in order to clarify the change issue enough to get the leader's support. An investigation of this kind might spark opposition to the endeavor before it really had a chance to get going. The change agent may go forward with the required authorization via a sequence of phases in the consultation process, whether it is internal or external. Gordon and Robert Lippitt, seasoned business consultants, proposed stages in a senior leader-change agent dynamic that enable the diagnosis [11], [12].

First Communication

In a top-down scenario, the change agent is chosen and given authority by the senior leader who has recognized the issue. When a change is implemented bottom-up, the change agent finds an issue and notifies the senior leader, who then gives the change agent permission to carry out their work or chooses another change agent.

Agreement and connection

In a military organization, there is no written agreement rather, the "contract" is an oral directive with the same objective. The change agent is given the required resources and access by senior executives, who also determine the parameters and criteria for the diagnostic endeavor.

Gather and evaluate information

A change agent should follow a methodical process to identify the data required to identify the problem's symptoms and investigate its root causes. Although there is no assurance, the process should provide a basis of legitimacy that is more self-sustaining. The endeavor has the support of a top leader who has committed to it and has verified its goals and methods.

Combining Everything

Six overlapping stages of organizing, directing, and overseeing change initiatives are covered in the next sections of Part II. Even if a sequencing is provided, it's crucial to keep in mind Pettigrew's Triangle and recognize that the setting and nature of the issue will inevitably

affect the methods used. It can be necessary to update or modify past actions in order to execute subsequent ones. This is typical. In some cases, if the resultant strategy turns out to be unrealistic or unworkable, it could be essential to restate the issue. In other cases, the situation demands prompt response. To start the process, leaders may thus need to focus on the transformation narrative or vision.

Identifying the Issue

I want the organization to \pick one: grow, develop new products or services, perform its mission better, become more efficient, fix what's broken, do better at communicating with the public or stakeholders or customers." is how leaders intervene in that environment and bring about change for a specific goal in Phase I. Change agents are required to determine the aim, objective, and plan of action and see it through to completion. Even if the organization's head leaves while the project is still in progress, the replacement will carry on the work. It is the intervention itself that matters when leading change, not the leader in isolation. Change as a verb is the theme of this and everything that follows. The difficult topic of whether and how to interfere has led to a great deal of study. This is only an overview of the ideas and resources that have come out of this study. This technique consists of presenting a problem-defining strategy, followed by frameworks that assist the change agent in determining the value of an issue and how best to express it to others. Since Lewin's three-step model serves as the basis for many other change management models, I start with the original and most basic understanding of change as a verb.

Determine the Issue

The phrase has impact whether or not Einstein really uttered it. Leaders want things to happen, particularly in the armed forces. They may not always have the time to fully describe an issue so that change agents can create the best possible strategy. Regretfully, conventional process-oriented change management approaches tend to presume that the leader or change agent already understands what is wrong, so they pay little attention to issue description. That's a wrong presumption. It is very difficult to describe issues and much more so to communicate them to others in highly big organizations such as armies. A "problem" to one person may not be a problem at all to the leader or other group members. As a result, reaching consensus on the nature of the issue and its implications for the company may be difficult.

Here's a military illustration from actuality. General Eric Shinseki, the Chief of Staff of the Army, said in 2000 that the Army would be undergoing a transformation. Part of this effort included a directive to replace the patrol cap as the standard headgear with a black beret, symbolizing the Army's transition to a more expeditionary force. He pointed out that the Rangers, one of the Army's top units on an overseas deployment, wore black berets. When the beret is worn by every member of the force, it represents the broad acceptance of a crucial Rangers trait. However, what really was the issue? Was it the force's anti-expeditionary ethos or a lack of an expeditionary mindset? If new equipment had been deployed, wouldn't the other components of the change have ingrained expeditionary behaviors? Since the remedy was distinct from the issue, the shift to the beret did not have the desired effect. Not all of the appropriate questions were asked.

Dwayne Spradlin (2012) offers a set of five questions in a Harvard Business Review article to assist change agents in shifting from just determining the existence of an issue to precisely identifying it. He begins by giving an example of a poorly defined issue in the sector, such as the black beret example. A is the issue, while B is the result. The reason the worker

complains and seeks help with B is because B is observable and obvious. However, issue A still exists. According to Spradlin, defining an A entails posing questions like these:

The change agent has to set aside the need to find a fast fix and focus on identifying the true issue. In reality, it starts with admitting that something is wrong with the way things are right now. There's anything that's broken, superfluous, overdone, missing, etc. The inherent difficulty in determining causal relationships in complex adaptive systems is a barrier in huge military organizations, but persistently asking why might reveal underlying beliefs and behaviors that are more closely related to issue A than the symptoms that are being seen. It's helpful to consider the fundamental requirement as belonging to one or more of the following classifications:

The change agent should then take this information and put out the issue statement in their own terms. The problem statement's components are simple and should include the responses to the preceding questions, the members' discontent with the issue, and the problem's perceived relevance. It is crucial that the change agent formulates this problem statement. The problem will probably alter as a result of involving others and turning the issue into a change endeavor. However, what first motivated the change agent to look into the issue? The initial statement should be kept by the change agent since there are significant differences between it and the change issue the company chooses to take on. Is there a chance that this difference warrants pursuing as a second change effort? Once again, change agents should never give up on the original concept if it calls for change, even if it's for a different purpose. They should constantly be on the lookout for issues to fix.

Operating the Issue

Creating a feeling of urgency is the first stage in managing change, according to John Kotter. Since the environment has created circumstances that make the organization's present situation problematic, one might convey such urgency by drawing from either the external or internal contexts. The company runs the danger of slipping into an undesirable future state if it does nothing. It loses its competitive edge, at most. Worse yet, the group is shut down. Change agents thus use strong language to convey the need of action. The role of the change agent should theoretically be easier if the circumstances are external. The answer, however, is uniting leaders and members against the external "threat," as the change agent presents the current state of affairs and the desired future state. Naturally, the change agent has a difficult time persuading opposing parties of the extent and character of the "threat" if the issue is internal, especially if there are differing opinions on how dangerous the situation is. The change agent has to accomplish two things in order to explain what is causing the issue: First, have a clear understanding of how the situation is developing. Gundel's crisis typology will assist in achieving that. The change agent also has to ascertain which individuals inside the business are most likely to be open to the notion that there is a crisis. Since the change agent may need to alter the surroundings to increase such receptivity, this is the more difficult stage. Pettigrew offers suggestions for achieving this in his receptive settings for transformation.

CONCLUSION

A key element in accomplishing a successful organizational transformation is the interwoven dynamics of leading and managing change. The complimentary nature of management and leadership responsibilities in negotiating the complexity of change in dynamic situations has been emphasized in this abstract. The conclusion highlights that successful change initiatives need both professional managers who can carefully plan, allocate resources, and execute organized procedures, and visionary leaders who can inspire, express a compelling vision,

and drive innovation. In order to develop a unified and synergistic strategy, it emphasizes the significance of integrating the visionary components of leadership with the realities of management. Moreover, the conclusion acknowledges the importance of emotional intelligence, communication, and flexibility as essential traits that managers and leaders must all possess. A well-balanced combination of these attributes guarantees that change projects not only get traction but also maintain it in the face of unavoidable obstacles. Organizations may improve their ability to adapt, innovate, and flourish in the face of change by cultivating a culture that values both visionary leadership and effective management. This will put them in a position to succeed over the long run in a constantly changing business environment.

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CHAPTER 4

INTERPLAY OF LEADERSHIP, CRISIS TYPOLOGY, AND DIAGNOSING ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES

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ABSTRACT:

Organizations today face a myriad of challenges, demanding leaders who can navigate complex landscapes with finesse. This abstract explores the interplay between leadership, crisis typology, and the critical process of diagnosing organizational challenges. The narrative begins by addressing the delicate art of presenting organizational issues without instigating undue fear or resistance. It emphasizes the need for leaders to construct a rational storyline that demonstrates an understanding of crisis typology. Drawing from crisis scholar Steve Gundel's framework, the typology unfolds along axes of crisis predictability and organizational influence. Leaders are urged to communicate crises effectively, be they conventional, unexpected, intrac, or fundamental, to prevent dismissiveness and foster a culture of adaptability. The abstract further delves into the role of military organizations in responding to diverse crises, recognizing the nuanced expectations for senior leaders during and after these events. Conventional crises, often evidencing mission failure, require corrective action to avoid future repetition. Unexpected and intrac crises demand defense and explanation, with potential calls for change. Fundamental crises, representing doomsday scenarios, prompt military organizations to pursue transformative change, raising questions about roles and missions in collaboration with other government agencies.

KEYWORDS:

Crisis Management, Diagnosing Challenges, Interplay, Leadership, Organizational Crisis.

INTRODUCTION

Presenting this predicament without coming off as alarmist that is, without making the result seem implausibly bad in order to incite fear and it represents a problem for leaders. Others could just brush off the situation as a result of this.

Rather, leaders need to tell the tale logically and demonstrate that they know how crises work.

The typology of four crises that companies encounter, developed by crisis expert Steve Gundel, is a useful tool for achieving this. The crisis's predictability and the organization's capacity to alter it are the typology's two axes [1], [2].

Traditional

Normally, the organization would manage these kinds of problems without much assistance from leaders.

For instance, snow clearance in cold-weather cities is crucial; neglecting to deal with a snowfall occurrence would seem to pose serious challenges for the city. Narratives of such crises implying that the organization's issues do or would prevent it from managing everyday crisis circumstances. For leaders, the results are often harmful or humiliating.

Unexpected

Unexpected crisis scenarios occur when a threat is not anticipated or observed coming, which makes it difficult to take proactive precautionary action. Nevertheless, the organization retains the power to react in fresh or unexpected ways. However, a lackluster reaction might make the company seem unprepared and unadaptive. One unforeseen incident in the snow removal scenario may be the introduction of a large cargo that is being driven across a roadway during an unanticipated snowstorm. First responders and snow clearance personnel would be faced with a hazardous and complicated scenario in the aftermath of the incident, which would result in the roadways closing unexpectedly. These kinds of crises might be used by leaders as an excuse for an undesirable future condition in which the company lacks the potential to develop or adapt in order to fulfill unforeseen demands [3], [4].

Intractable

There are some crises that are predictable but that an organization is ill-equipped to stop or handle. Essentially, the company must respond to the issue as it develops unless cautious preparations are made. Natural catastrophes are included in this group. The majority of natural disasters, including earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, and the like, are predictable in the sense that they tend to occur in certain regions of the planet. In these situations, leaders may characterize the unfavorable future condition as a lack of capability—they are able to see these crises developing but are unable to take appropriate action.

Basic

These crises are the apocalyptic situations when the organization is unable to stop or alter the problem and the danger could not have been predicted. These would normally be very strong and uncommon. Strong earthquakes and tsunamis are examples found in nature. Another is the disastrous collapse of the Internet or the GPS, on which so much of society is dependent. Leaders should steer clear of this worst-case scenario when talking about the intended future condition since some people could find it unrealistic. But if a stakeholder's systematic negligence is the root cause of the organization's issue and has an impact on other businesses as well, executives could turn to this kind of narrative. Thus, the undesirable future condition is a confluence of deficiency in ability and potential on many levels [5], [6].

What kind of response are military groups supposed to give? It will, of course, depend on the circumstances. Critics of the organization, for instance, may utilize any crisis to exert social or political pressure on organizational leaders. Their comments might be entirely made up or accurate, emotive, or both. Senior leaders' probable expectations both before and after the crisis are shown by the gray boxes. Conventional crises are proof that the organization has either been prohibited from fulfilling its goal or has somehow failed to do it. Stakeholders will anticipate remedial action in any scenario to avoid a recurrence of the crisis.

Similar to unforeseen crises, intractable crises require the military organization to defend itself and inform stakeholders that while they were beyond of their immediate control, some adjustment may be necessary to prevent a recurrence in the future. Without the authority of their parent organization, military groups often lack the ability to alter their objective or the resources at their disposal. Stakeholders, whether internal or external to the company, are likely to demand change since internal crises are more predictable. Unexpected crises, on the other hand, may cause stakeholders to become resistant to change when it seems that the crisis is unique or rare, implying that change is required in order to prevent future crises.

Organizational reactions to fundamental crises might vary from acquiescing to the circumstances to vigorously pursuing transformative change. The latter is considerably more likely to be adopted by military groups, who will use the underlying crisis as a strong call to action to broaden the scope of their missions and secure complementary resources. But duties and missions between the military and other government institutions are a crucial concern.

Calculate the Problem's Impact

For instance: A taxonomy of military groups' competitive advantages

Militaries are readiness groups whose daily operations make sure the group is ready to carry out its task, not necessarily to carry out its mission itself. Military organizations maximize their capacity to fight and win wars, in contrast to the commercial sector and many other organizations that carry out their goal and gauge their performance on concrete, quantifiable criteria, such as profit margin. When called upon, their readiness to fight does not ensure success on the battlefield, but it does raise the odds. Thus, military organizations assess their comparative advantage against a possible adversary using metrics of preparation. A military has a comparative advantage over another military, for instance, if it has a crucial capacity that the adversary does not [7], [8].

Comparative advantage is, however, often used by one force against another at a different moment than it is by other armies. Put another way, a military will compare itself to a past period when its capabilities were strong and relevant in order to detect when its current capabilities are weakening or deteriorating. The military can clearly describe the effects of a situation thanks to this time-based approach. Thus, the language of readiness offers a series of metrics that enable characterizing the issue as relative disadvantages impacting the force's ability to fight in the next conflict. A number of characteristics of comparative advantage are provided by military readiness literature. These provide the following adjectives and adverbs to explain how an issue affects the military's capacity to engage in combat and prevail in it: Compliant with Assigned Tasks and Positions - To what extent do the organization's goals and organizational design align with what is necessary to fight and prevail? While an organization lacks the necessary fighting skills, such as having horse cavalry while armored cavalry was becoming more prevalent, this is known as an alignment issue.

Overconfidence

In order to maintain this overmatch, modernization includes new material capabilities, but there is also a human component. Overmatch is also provided by education, resilience, fitness, and leader development.

Enough

Does the organization lack the resources—people, equipment, knowledge, etc.—needed to carry out its duties when given a capability? Only a portion of the solution is provided by the quantity of available troops, which also includes how many of them can deploy where necessary to take the initiative and affect the situation [9], [10].

Adapt

To what degree is the organization inadequately organized, furnished, skilled, and prepared to manage ambiguity or the necessary range of tasks it could encounter? If, during the battle, the group finds itself unable to realign or Galvin, Thomas P., Military Is the organization ready to strike a balance between its immediate needs and its long-term goals, such as making sure it has enough people and equipment for today while constantly updating for the future? The

hazards involved in exchanging existing unit readiness for modernization are specifically addressed by this concept. Maintaining equilibrium is essential.

DISCUSSION

Humans are storyteller

We like excellent tales, and all good stories include change, usually in the form of the protagonist. Think about well-known tales such as the Harry Potter books. Harry Potter, the main character, was put in situations that required adjustment in every novel. Harry had immense development and maturation with every journey, from having to leave the Dursleys' house and enroll at Hogwarts in the first book to conquering self-doubt to confront Lord Voldemort in the last fight. The audiences adored them. In 2018, the 20th anniversary of the Harry Potter series, more than 500 million copies of the book had been sold. Yes, but it's not a simple task. Organizations are challenging characters. It is difficult to portray the same kind of tension and struggle in something so abstract. Therefore, the method used in this exercise is to humanize the need for change. As a result, the protagonist in a change tale will either be the change agent or the leader who will support the change endeavor. In a nutshell, the narrative places the protagonist in the present, which the aforementioned avenues of inquiry aid in defining. There are two possibilities reflected in the star, which represents the decision point that the organization must choose. One is to continue the organization along its current course, which is a direct path that eventually leads to a scenario in which the existing condition has deteriorated into a less desirable future state. The important thing to remember is that there is a worse version of every bad issue in the present state that is reflected in the desired future state. For instance, in the future, the same organizational skills might be seen as becoming more irrelevant to the point of obsolescence if the present condition contains an issue of misalignment with the environment, making them look no longer suitable or relevant. Without being unnecessarily alarmist or exaggerating the problem's extent, the change narrative must logically explain the linkages between the existing and desired future states. It would be unhelpful, for instance, to assert that the Army as a whole would collapse if a unit's decreased preparedness continued. Changing the organization's direction to a better condition where the organization fixes the issue is the ideal course of action. The intended future state is this. There are parallels between its components and the existing situation. The intended future state in the aforementioned example of irrelevance leading to obsolescence would include fixing the irrelevance issue, such as hanging and making clear the organization's duties and purposes or changing its capabilities to fit the surroundings. In order to persuade people to seek the desired future state and avoid the undesirable future state, the future states should starkly contrast from one another. The story's logical links strengthen its credibility by presenting a clear option that is difficult for others to reject as exaggerated or unrealistic. The effort invested in the narrative will also help in subsequent stages by providing an early advantage in thoroughly identifying the issue and defining the objectives of the change endeavor.

Identifying the Issue

It may surprise you to learn that diagnosing an issue requires first defining it. Before stating what the issue is, shouldn't one do some study on it first? In some cases, maybe, but in a big, intricate institution like the military, this is hard to do. Since the change agent's viewpoint is presumably constrained, the change narrative is better seen as a change proposal that needs to be developed. The change agent may need to get permission from leaders to gather enough information to identify the root causes of the issue. Leaders may not be happy until the whole company has been engaged or participated to some degree, even if gathering and organizing

the change agent's own views and experiences is sufficient to legitimize the change effort [11], [12]. But it's challenging to identify the underlying reasons and get beyond the evident symptoms. Luckily, there are a plethora of diagnostic models at our disposal. A lot of them have basic patterns that include arranging vast quantities of data some of which may be unclear or contradicting and methodically following leads that seem promising while eliminating leads that don't work. Members of the coalition may communicate with stakeholders, other members, and via observations and performance metrics. Issues, challenges, or disappointing encounters might be warning signs. The coalition decides what further information to get, where to get it, and how to get it if it decides to look into it. However, it's unlikely that the response will be clear-cut or even final. Similar to health issues, there are a number of conditions that might cause the symptoms that one observes, some of which may be difficult to rule out due to unclear evidence. Therefore, the goal of diagnostics performed by change agents is to determine the most plausible reason for the existing condition of the company and to advise leadership on the best course of action for implementing change.

The focus of this work does not extend to a thorough process model for diagnosis. Rather, this answers three fundamental queries about making diagnoses and provides a few scenarios for demonstration. The first question relates to typical problems and challenges encountered while doing diagnostics, and as such, what advice the coalition may benefit from from the senior leader. The second question concerns how to decide what information to gather. Organizational performance models aid in our comprehension of how various systems and processes from the concrete and measurable to the abstract and abstract fit together to produce an overall picture of the company. The last query focuses on data analysis and producing fresh leads for further investigation. This is in line with Activity Two in the Experiential Activity Book, which bases a diagnosis on the recently established Weisbord six-box paradigm. Still, the Activity is compatible with all diagnostic models.

Difficulties in Making Diagnoses

This divides the issue into two sections: actions to take and potential danger signs. Both are not always simple, particularly when the change agent starts the process from the bottom up or when the senior leader and change agent are not in agreement.

Harrison's three difficulties

But it's also unrealistic to think that a change agent and a senior leader have the same understanding of the diagnostic effort's objectives. Therefore, while bargaining for the conditions of a diagnostic attempt, change agents should take into account Harrison's three common problems that consultants encounter. First, the breadth of the endeavor is determined by the objectives issue. The change agent or coalition could want to look into the whole scope of the issue as it is described in the change narrative, but the senior leader might not want to go that far for a number of reasons. They will only agree to investigate a subset of the issue, such as a specific problem that might be identified fast and with little impact on the company as a whole. Bigger projects carry higher risk since they often cover a wider range of objectives and increase the possibility of conflicting interests between the company and its employees. Undoubtedly, the bigger the diagnostic effort, the higher the likelihood that executives inside the firm would see its objectives and priorities in disparate ways. This could make it more difficult for the coalition to gather data since objectives might call for a range of deliverables, from informational materials to fully developed change plans. Furthermore, internal consultants' diagnostic work is particularly dangerous since the leader can run into resistance or worse, be shunned by others for prying too much into their personal affairs.

The participation issue, which is Harrison's second conundrum, is as follows: Does the consultant choose to handle everything alone, or do they include others? The former may be required by discretion, particularly if the diagnosis's issue is delicate and likely to provoke organizational reaction. This approach often yields a more objective outcome as well, but there is a chance the consultant may overlook crucial information that is only accessible from organizational members. For less sensitive investigations, a larger organizational engagement is preferable since members may be more willing to share ideas and data. Better organizational commitment to the resultant suggestions might potentially be the outcome.

Harrison described politics as the third challenge, which is about who gains from the organizational assessment: the whole organization or just a particular unit. Even if the evaluation could be intended to help the whole company, it might only help the top leader. Participants' opinions on the research will influence more than just whether they agree with or disagree with the attempt to gather data. They may also significantly affect the consultant's capacity to carry out tasks both during and after the study's completion.

The aforementioned also draws attention to two significant ethical issues that the internal consultant should consider. The first is the significance of anonymity, especially when researching issues inside an organization that can reveal subpar performance on the part of specific people. Maintaining confidence is crucial for the internal consultant, not just with the sponsor but also with all other participants. They must make every effort to maintain this trust. The second is neutrality and eliminating prejudice, even in cases when the sponsor is conducting the research with predetermined conclusions in mind. This is especially crucial in defense industry scenarios when top defense officials are trying to defend a fait accompli even if there is strong evidence to suggest otherwise. Regretfully, the sponsor may not have had an option since the predetermined decision could have come from higher authorities. In these situations, the consultant has an obligation to objectively offer the information at hand along with his or her proposal that is in the best interests of the company. The change agent may need to have bravery since this is not always simple.

I was employed by a new commander who was determined to implement changes at headquarters based on work completed at another post. However, there was a lot of staff opposition since the transformation effort was being forced without a thorough organizational diagnostic. I had to face the commander after researching the methodology's origins and concluding that carrying out the attempt would be counterproductive. I only took this action after receiving backing from other directors who shared my belief that the transformation endeavor was failing. The effort was refocused by the commander, who also gave accountability to a staff officer of higher rank who was more suited to provide a diagnostic. A few while later, I would depart from the group. This presents two well-known diagnostic models that make it simple to integrate and classify raw data. These are the Burke-Litwin model and the Weisbord six-box model. Though the Burke-Litwin model is more thorough than the Weisbord model, both models are suitable for examining the issues of performance, alignment, and commitment as they are defined. Both are also really easy to use and explain. The Annex contains tools for other diagnostic models that could be more useful as well as comparison studies that might help change agents choose the most appropriate model for a certain issue or kind of organization.

Weisbord's six-box model

Weisbord's six-box approach was created after twenty years of advising. His two worries were resolved by the model: organizational theories were becoming too abstract for everyday application, and earlier models were too complex to be useful. Weisbord created the model as

a clear-cut method for leaders to tackle organizational issues without becoming bogged down in theoretical details. Weisbord described the difference between the system that exists on paper and what individuals do in his diagnostic model, which incorporates both formal and informal structures and activities. He issued a warning not to assume that attitudes or personality disputes are the main source of issues inside the company. The obvious solution would be to just get rid of the problematic people, but Weisbord's experiences shown that this would not be effective. Removing such people would not fix the issue since their influence on the organization typically got ingrained in the organizational culture as a whole. It is easy to use the model to gather data since each box reflects a different aspect of the organization's operations and focus. The change agent may choose which precise questions to ask members by consulting the leading questions that are linked to each box. The data's interdependence and relatedness are shown by the arrows, which makes further analysis easier.

Surroundings

Leading change inside the company is linked to transformational variables, many of which also play a role in organizational alignment. The model outlines five of these factors: the external environment, which is anything that affects the organization from the outside; the mission and strategy that the leaders declare and that the members accept or understand; leadership demonstrated by the leaders' personal example and strategic guidance; the organization's culture, which is how it functions; and organizational performance, which is the result.

Two important model implications. Organizational climate is first determined by transactions. The effects of mission clarity or lack thereof roles and responsibilities related to structure and managerial practice, the establishment of standards and adherence to them, reward fairness, and customer focus versus internal pressures are the five types of transactions that affect climate. Each of these relates to interactions among one or more of the transactional portion, providing a ready set of factors to pursue when dealing with climate-related issues. According to the paradigm, an organization experiences gradual transformation as a result of these interactions.

Making Sense of the Information

Think of a typical diagnostic scenario when a doctor consults with a patient who is complaining of a cough. An untrained observer may find hundreds of reasons for the cough from small ailments like the common cold or an allergic response to major conditions like lung cancer or emphysema from a simple interior investigation. However, a physician must weigh other significant information when deciding which of these reasons is most likely. What are the patient's current activities, age, gender, and medical history? Which kind of cough is this? With the use of intuition, a physician may make connections between data points, spot knowledge or comprehension gaps, and recommend follow-up questions for the patient. Change agents may reject certain explanations as implausible if new ones become apparent as they acquire more information. By the end, the physician has either ordered tests to obtain vital information, narrowed it down to a very select few and thus prescribed treatment, identified a lack of sufficient expertise to confirm a diagnosis and referred the patient to an expert or specialist, or some combination of the aforementioned.

This iterative process of identifying causative elements that contribute to the present state and then seeking the underlying causes of those factors is included into both the Weisbord and Burke-Litwin models.

As additional data that reflects the current condition, users enter each new discovery in the corresponding box in the model. A diagnostic process consists of three processes that use the existing data to determine what needs to be looked into or discovered next. Using the analytical processes in the Weisbord technique, the first step is to determine what is significant. This involves searching for areas where the organization's performance, conduct, or other aspects are not aligned with what they should be. Finding links or patterns among the pertinent data that may lead to further knowledge is the second step. The third step is to reach consensus on findings that provide more compelling justifications for the new data. These procedures are repeated by change agents until they stop producing any new data.

Despite the fact that this technique seems straightforward, the intricacy of the data may make it quite challenging to implement in real life. Uncertainty, ambiguity, and incompleteness are typical problems for the change agent. Because of this, management consultants have created a number of heuristics, or general guidelines, to assist in sifting through the data and distinguishing what is important and helpful from what might be deceptive or useless.

CONCLUSION

In order to effectively manage organizational difficulties, this abstract supports a comprehensive grasp of leadership, crisis typology, and the diagnostic process. Through acknowledging the interdependence of these components, leaders can cultivate resilience, flexibility, and tactical crisis management, guaranteeing that their companies are not only capable of surmounting obstacles but also positioned for long-term prosperity in a constantly changing milieu.

The abstract highlights the significance of a transformation narrative while turning the attention to the diagnostic procedure for organizational issues. By personifying the need for change and emphasizing choice points that either lead to an undesirable or desired future state, it emphasizes the narrative method. The story helps identify and diagnose issues, offering a strong basis for further change initiatives.

The difficulties in making diagnoses are then discussed, recognizing the difficulties encountered by change agents and the need for cooperation with senior leadership. Concerns of objectivity, partiality, and secrecy are also addressed ethically, emphasizing the careful balancing act needed to handle sensitive data and provide objective advice.

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CHAPTER 5

CHARACTERISTICS OF GOOD CHANGE VISIONS: AN ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT:

As organizations navigate the complexities of change, the formulation and communication of a compelling vision play a pivotal role in driving successful transformation. This abstract explores the key characteristics that define effective change visions and their profound impact on guiding organizations through the change process. The narrative begins by highlighting the importance of clarity in change visions, emphasizing the need for leaders to articulate a clear and concise picture of the desired future state. A well-defined vision provides a roadmap for the organization, aligning stakeholders and fostering a shared understanding of the change journey. Subsequently, the abstract delves into the significance of alignment between the change vision and the organization's values, mission, and strategic goals. A vision that resonates with the core identity of the organization establishes authenticity and credibility, garnering support and commitment from stakeholders at all levels. The abstract also underscores the motivational aspect of change visions, exploring the role of inspiration in mobilizing individuals toward a common purpose. An effective vision should evoke enthusiasm, instill a sense of purpose, and ignite a collective drive to overcome challenges inherent in the change process.

KEYWORDS:

Change Management, Good Visions, Organizational Change, Visionary Leadership, Vision Development.

INTRODUCTION

Notwithstanding gaps or inconsistent data, there are a number of documented methods for carrying out the analysis and communicating the findings while keeping the diagnosing difficulties in mind. After examining many models, the thirteen strategies proposed by Miles and Hubermann are especially noteworthy. Rather of advocating for a broad, all-encompassing approach that may not be ideal for every firm, their thirteen approaches provide a step-by-step menu of instruments that advisors can use as needed. Eight of the thirteen methods that are generally relevant to military formations [1], [2].

Observing Trends and Subjects

Important discoveries, such as "variables involving similarities and differences among categories" or "processes involving connections in time and space," may often be inferred from recurring patterns in the data. The authors caution that finding patterns in the data is just the first stage and that the consultant should not ignore contradicting evidence found in other parts of the data.

Recognizing plausibility

The data may seem random at times and lack discernible patterns. The consultant looks for answers for things that would not make sense otherwise, using intuition. However, once

someone presents such an argument, they have to look for supporting data. If not, it stays an untested theory and may not always need to be fixed by the company [3], [4].

Grouping

Using patterns and logical explanations, this strategy groups them into groups. Patterns of mistrustful conduct, for instance, may point to a larger problem with trust for the main command that is the subject of the investigation.

Creating Metaphors

Metaphors are a useful tool for simplifying difficult concepts. Although categorizing the patterns by clustering them may result in technically sound categories, it may not provide insightful explanations. Miles and Hubermann provide a question that could aid in articulating findings: "If I had to sum up an important feature at this site in two words, what would they be? "In a case involving significant backlogs of administrative staff work in a specific supervisor's office, there is a measurable difference between that offices being a "roadblock" versus simply being "vigilant" or "enforcing standards").

Counting

The frequency and consistency of an issue's emergence might provide crucial hints. Prioritizing the important results may be achieved by tallying the occurrences of important points brought up in interviews or supported by the documentation.

Drawing Comparisons and Contrasts

This is an additional method of sorting through the many patterns that could show up. What are the similarities and differences between two organizational unitsfor example, two autonomous commands, two distinct garrisons, leaders and regular members, etc.? Occasionally, the variations align with predictions. For instance, it is reasonable to anticipate certain inherent distinctions to emerge when comparing garrison services provided by continental United States with commands situated abroad. Disparities that are surprising or difficult to explain, however, might point to an important discovery [5], [6].

Dividing up

Occasionally, the pattern is not a single pattern but rather consists of three or five distinct nevertheless significant components, each one of which might represent a discovery. The aforementioned backlog issue may stem from a number of significant discoveries that have been combined into one major issue, including understaffing the administrative team, inadequate training, subordinate supervisors promoting subpar work, and unclear or contradictory directives from higher up.

Observing the connections between the variables

A variable in the data is a changeable quantity or condition. Occasionally, it may be measured or classified. If you see a correlation between longer processing times and poor morale, it may be a significant one. Relationships can be positively correlated, which means that when one rises, the other rises as well; inversely correlated, or negatively correlated, which means that when one rises, the other rises as well or falls; and causal, which means that one rising seems to lead to the other rising eventually. Effective use of such strategies requires moving beyond the obvious, which usually shows up at lower analytical levels. Pervasive issues at the individual level will manifest as clear trends across the company. The organization might simply take a multitude of localized measures to tackle broad issues that

do not warrant such strategic level attention, but acting at the strategic level involves narrowing those patterns to identify the systemic problems that need strategic-level intervention.

Identifying the Issue Methodically

Doing a diagnosis is essentially the same as asking hundreds of "why" queries. What is the cause of this symptom and why is it present? After that, one should inquire as to whether a newly discovered piece of information is likewise a symptom of the same issue or maybe one unrelated to it. The questions that are asked must be limited to the parameters of the issue being discussed. Members could find the questions bothersome and useless if they are not meaningful and serve a purpose. Ultimately, the diagnostic outcome should provide the most plausible explanation for the issue identified in Phase I. It may not be an ideal answer, but it should be the best available. Consultants have a dilemma when faced with data that is inaccurate, missing, or deceptive. Members of the organization may be biased by the consultant or by the participant. Not many firms enter data in the same manner or maintain records with the same diligence, so consultants must carefully analyze data gathered from records or knowledge management systems to guarantee its dependability and trustworthiness. The degree of confidence in the results will depend in part on the state of the data [7], [8].

Change agents should take into account three obstacles in their assessments, even if they have the greatest available data. Burke-Litwin first addresses levels of analysis by presenting the transformational-transactional divide. It is crucial that change agents distinguish between "macro" and "micro" strategic issues. For example, in human resource management, performance is transactional and reflects across the defense enterprise through support for individual service members, which is then aggregated into statistics. When it comes to the degrees of analysis they use, change agents need to be precise and consistent. Term definition presents the second difficulty. Using nebulous concepts like "efficiency" or "economy" to diagnose organizational behavior is one example. Take into account, for instance, how various stakeholders can assess the effectiveness of shared installation operations like family housing, medical clinics, or amenities and services for welfare, morale, and entertainment. The dispersed nature of several big military groups and its effects on the accuracy of any data gathered provide the third and most significant problem. Naturally, a broad range of international organizations and stakeholders will be included in a service or joint-wide research, with the possibility of considerable remote data gathering. To ensure the rigor and quality of data collection, analysis, and results presentation, critical thinking, objectivity, and bias detection become essential.

The consultant must take into account local concerns and parochial interests even in the best of circumstances, when all parties participating in the research accept the goals and are open and honest about their contributions. How effectively change agents at the Pentagon comprehend the situation in theater may be questioned by a responder in an overseas command. Additionally, change agents need to constantly examine how they gather data. Do they present bias or presume an issue or its resolution beforehand? Do they collect all the information the consultant wants? Important performance information may sometimes only be revealed in-person meetings or working groups, which isn't always feasible because of time and money constraints.

Creating the Vision for Change

When the transformation initiative is over, how does the company see a prosperous future? The goal of vision is to see a desirable future condition in one's mind. Following the

identification of the issue and its root causes, the senior leader creates a vision and shares it both within and outside. In order to create a cohesive effort in favor of the change, the objective is to have a common concept of the ideal future after the issue has been resolved [9], [10].

Defining the end state or aim of the change attempt is just one aspect of envisioning; another is providing guidance for subsequent stages, including idea and implementation plan. Members' concerns about the organization's planned transformation, its goals, its methods, and its timeline are all addressed by envisioning. The organization's members must find resonance in the responses. If not, no amount of preparation will be able to motivate the participants to lend their hearts or their labors to the cause. The when and how will pique the attention of some members more than others, including planners, operators, administrators, and resource managers. Their main worries could be if the plan can be carried out and whether enough money can be raised.

The change vision, also known as the vision of the ways, is a re-statement of the desired future state unique to the change effort. It is also known as the vision of the ends and the concept, which reflects the path and timeline of the change effort. I present these two perspectives as two interdependent outcomes of the envisioning process. This article distinguishes the change vision from the more general-purpose vision statement that organizations may use to describe the mental image of the entire organization at a future time in order to encourage long-term strategic change. The change vision usually answers the why and what questions. Though many of the elements discussed here are equally useful for creating more expansive corporate vision statements, I have found the more constrained definition of a transformation vision to be more useful.

Thinking of Difficult

Let's begin with the widely accepted definition of a change vision, which is a leader's or change agent's "mental image" or "picture of the future." Strong and full of significance, this picture lives solely in the viewer's imagination. That idea in your head is translated into words and images by the change vision and related vision statement, which you may share with others. It is inevitable that this translation is not perfect. Take into consideration the Army's operational doctrine, which was released in a brochure from the U.S. "Win in a Complex World," the 2014 title from Army Training and Doctrine Command, is a concise six-syllable vision statement. The concept, which required over 45 pages of text and visuals to clarify the intended meaning from the title, is not fully conveyed by the statement. Although the vision statement is simple to disseminate, the booklet was crucial in clarifying its meaning so force developers could implement the goal and provide the necessary capabilities. And yet, the final, thoroughly reviewed product is just 45 pages long. What aspects of their own mental picture did the senior leader neglect due to conflicts among different internal stakeholders, doubts about the viability of the plan, or other conflicts and disputes that inevitably surface throughout the envisioning process?

Sadly, the challenges associated with visualizing sometimes result in transformation visions and vision statements that lack inspiration, are utterly unclear, or are ineffectual. The following are some instances of issues I have run across while using vision statements and change visions in military settings: Some reform visions are meaningless to members but make sense to outside stakeholders. A leader may experience pressure to make sure the change effort is intelligible and prioritizes the needs of the stakeholders if the change is being driven by a mandate from them. However, the endeavor is unlikely to work if the members do not understand it. Conversely, vision statements intended for external stakeholders may

not make sense when directed at the membership. The change's vision is too broad or pabulum. The transformation vision need to be a fully developed concept that is appealing to other people. Members could not comprehend how the organization will accomplish it if it is shallow. Far too often, the vision statement is the only part of the transformation vision. If the vision is reduced to a bumper sticker or slogan with no real meaning, it will not inspire. Other change initiatives clash with the change vision. The military is engaged in several transformation initiatives at once, each requiring organizational resources and time. Does the transformation vision clash with, contradict, or overlap with another ongoing effort? Change initiatives may be derailed by these because they are superfluous, redundant, and duplicative. Potential mismatch between issue and solution is shown by the change vision. Leaders should anticipate some opposition based on misconceptions and misperceptions since, as previous examples demonstrate, not everyone will have the same understanding of the issue statement. However, when a leader withholds information intentionally or accidentally some views are created. People worry that having too much knowledge may lead to resistance. The leader wants the vision statement to be straightforward since the issue could be too complicated. This might lead to a misunderstanding of the intended fixes [11], [12].

The distinction between the intended future state from Phase I and the change vision presented here is one more obstacle to take into account. They may not be the same thing, despite what one would think. In actuality, they are seldom the same in my experience. The ideal future state describes the future organization once the issue has been resolved while taking an isolated look at the problem. There are two ways in which the transformation vision could stray from this. First, the change effort can be too little or dangerous for the objective to be successful in solving the whole issue. Maybe the top leader made a decision on which aspects of the issue needed to be resolved right now and which could wait until a later time. Because of this, the change vision restates the ideal future state in terms of the percentage of the issue that the change effort will resolve. The remainder would be taken care of in a later change attempt.

Very senior executives will choose the opposite form, in which the change vision is more expansive than the ideal future condition. Leaders should convey a more comprehensive perspective that views the current endeavor as a first step toward a larger goal, as opposed to seeing the transformation attempt as a stand-alone project. The author's personal anecdote: I had the chance to take part in a strategic planning process where the organization's going-in posture was to relocate to a less attractive host city and reduce its personnel by half to two thirds. Given that many employees in the business faced job loss, there was naturally a great deal of sensitivity around the endeavor. Although it was widely acknowledged that the organization's objective needed to be fulfilled, morale was seriously affected by the fact that a transformative endeavor was inevitable owing to exceptional circumstances. The planning team had to impose stringent restrictions on the information that was made accessible as a result. The group used a network of "trusted agents" who were required to sign non-disclosure contracts. The outcome was a workable, sensible, and effective strategy that avoided needless degrees of opposition, even if it was not executed as soon as planned. Change initiatives therefore serve as a means of communicating the organization's overall strategic direction. Both are legitimate methods for imagining, and both have the qualities of effective transformation visions. The development methods for them could be a little different.

DISCUSSION

Making excellent vision statements and transformation visions is more difficult than describing poor ones. It's also true that a strong vision statement does not ensure that a

change initiative will be successful. Thus, utility is the metric of merit that is used. What makes a change vision more helpful for members and stakeholders to comprehend the goals of the change agent or senior leader and to muster the necessary energy to start the change effort?

Kotter's characteristics of successful visions

The practice of conveying the intended end state is a crucial component of almost all change management methods. Creating the transformation vision and then articulating it are two of Kotter's eight stages.

Modify Communicable Vision

The development process is not explained by the aforementioned traits. While it is simple to suggest that the transformation vision should be desirable or possible, putting it into reality is a much more challenging task. Trial and error is absolutely an option, although it would probably be time-consuming and annoying. It is crucial to emphasize that the transformation effort is still in its nascent stages during Phase III. Establishing a common understanding and gathering facts required communication in order to define and diagnose the issue. The senior leader may have a clear mental picture of the change they want to see, but it may not yet be completely developed into words and deeds that they can share with others. There is still time to make changes, but it is obvious that it must be before the change effort is initiated.

As a result, leaders and change agents may start a discussion with members based on the evolving change vision. The goal is to build support for the change effort by promoting conversation about the issue in a manner that gives the leader valuable insight for improving and clarifying the change vision prior to the initiative's launch. However, the dialogue cannot be left open-ended; rather, the leader must start the discussion with a plan in place that will most effectively stimulate discussion about changes depending on the circumstances. It's crucial to communicate. According to communication expert John Baldoni, leadership communications should enlighten, engage, excite, and invite. Making sure audiences understand the motivation behind the change endeavor and the change vision is the goal of information. Asking for feedback from others and letting them know that lines of communication are available are key components of being involved. This should at the very least give the coalition's contact details. Encouraging people to be innovative and look for other ways to support the company, if not via the change initiative itself, is the goal of igniting. In the end, inviting is about motivating people to contribute as much as they can to the endeavor. Not every chance to share the vision can complete all four tasks simultaneously. As a result, the following guidelines may be used to help spread the change vision while using a particular communication opportunity.

Communications should concentrate on informing if the change attempt is complicated and hard to understand; this may call for the assistance of subject matter specialists. According to Baldoni, the goal is to guarantee that it is clear what must be done and who may need to be engaged. Communications should concentrate on involvement if the transformation attempt is beset by inherent controversy or ambiguity that impedes the clarity of the goal or ignites persistent conflicts inside the company. There is a danger to unity of effort, therefore leaders should think about highlighting early chances for members to participate. This may include providing chances for trial and error. Communications should concentrate on sparking change if the company has a history of change failure or a strong skepticism about change. It can be necessary to persuade members and stakeholders that the endeavor is valuable not so much for its own sake as it is as a show of the leadership's dedication to enhancing the organization, regardless of the expenses or personal dangers involved. This is another example where the

goal is to encourage greater change overall as well as the change endeavor itself. Communications should concentrate on inviting if there are problems with trust between leaders and members of the organization. Leaders who walk the walk and set the example are important, according to Kotter and Baldoni. The main thing leaders need to be on the lookout for is that although they shield themselves from the pain and turbulence of the change endeavor, members will still experience it. Therefore, leaders need to think about how to convey how the rewards and difficulties will be distributed fairly while also using the transformation vision as a uniting message.

Making the Mission Proclamation

According to Baldoni's paradigm, the vision statement fulfills a more comprehensive communication function in addition to being a declaration of the goal. The goal of publishing a change vision should be taken into account by the senior leader and change agent, since this may have an impact on the vision statement's content. For instance, is the goal to ask the organization to join together, engage individuals in tackling the challenges it confronts, start a bigger movement, or enlighten members about the change effort itself? Though a single vision statement may not be able to accomplish all four, leaders often pair it with other messages. When it comes time to starting the endeavor, this will be a major subject.

Though the vision statement should be the finished product at launch, it's crucial to embrace envisioning as an engagement process at this phase. There's a chance of harm. Leaders may be reluctant to share their raw ideas at times for fear that followers may act on them without thinking things through. It is imperative that the leader conveys not just the concepts but also the degree to which they are amenable to discussion. Imagining before launching has a hidden agenda. Leaders and change agents must create an environment that encourages greater change in all they do. The formulation of the vision statement by leaders reflects their overall approach to addressing change within the company. The leaders' aims are made clear throughout the creation of the vision statement. Ultimately, the leader is now conveying a commitment to action, which was absent from the earlier stages of issue definition and diagnosis.

As a result, cooperation on the vision statement need to include people who could be against the initiative in addition to the leading coalition. To find out what may connect more strongly and what can cause misunderstanding or friction, leaders should experiment with different wording and visuals when describing the intended future condition. How may the vision be misinterpreted or misused by others to undermine the change initiative? How much of the larger issue will the change effort address, and what may still need to be done in the future? In what way does the vision allay worries that the effort will either go too far or not far enough to solve the issue?

It is inevitable that this cooperative process takes time. For instance, when the U.S. Department of Defense established the U.S. Africa Command in October 2007, the command took over the original mission and vision from them. The command worked with several important stakeholders for eight months to design, test, and approve its own inaugural vision and vision statement. When it was released, the statement was widely recognized and understood. To ensure that the project moves forward, however, leaders should set a flexible timeline for the delivery of the transformation vision. Although it is certain that no strategic change initiative would satisfy all parties, this does not mean that the process should be hurried or that a solution should be reached too soon. By doing this, you run the danger of undermining the covert goal of encouraging future reform by perhaps depriving certain members of their rights.

Several general guidelines for crafting a vision statement

The first step is to confirm that the change vision differs enough and noticeably from the current situation. The transformation vision should, on the one hand, depict a future state in which the organization has fixed the issue. However, it should also be an indication of a leader's dedication to enhancing the company and motivating people to take action. Treating pertinent portions of the intended future state as intermediate objectives and stretching them for the change vision is one method to do this.

An illustration of this may be seen in the history of US Africa Command. During the early phases, the US military's propensity to advocate US methods for addressing security issues in Africa had to be reversed. The issue was that African partners did not always see these methods as appropriate or acceptable. However, leaders broadened the notion of prioritizing the needs of African partners as part of the reform vision. Members of the inexperienced staff were motivated by these words to start small-scale initiatives that carried out the transformation vision, such the 2008 launch of the Africa Deployment Assistance Phased Training program. ADAPT originated as a small-scale, wholly self-initiated project by a country desk officer, his connections in U.S. Air Forces Europe, and two U.S. embassies in countries getting ready for a peacekeeping deployment but lacking the necessary training to configure loads for U.S. aircraft.

Second, make sure that the organization's orientation changes in tandem with the transformation vision. There is no going back once the organization moves ahead, so to speak. This is not to suggest that failing does not exist, just that failing does not result in a return to the initial state of affairs. Rather of solving the initial issue, failure forces the organization to adopt a different approach. Good change visions include language that accepts that there may be setbacks and that adjustments may be necessary, but the overall goal of the change stays intact. Expressing things as opportunities and challenges is one approach to do this. Third, the ultimate concept's when and how should be shown by the change vision. The majority of vision statements have to provide an estimated timeline for when the change would be realized. A year, perhaps? From two to three? Between five and seven? More extended? Of course, "how are we going to do this?" is among the first queries that members and stakeholders will inevitably have. Senior executives and change agents should be ready with some basic responses since saying "I don't know" might make people less confident in the endeavor. Instead, one should foresee these queries in the transformation vision and extend calls to participation.

Lastly, the transformation vision has to be branded. Military organizations find this issue uncomfortable because it sounds like corporate fads: the transformation attempt is superficial, and flashy logos and slogans are hiding the superficiality. However, a lot of military reform initiatives revolve upon branding. Members of military groups may get a sense of identity and profound significance from naming traditions, heraldry, and other symbols. Choosing a name, even something as basic as <insert the unit's strategic plan>, aids with effort identification for huge, complicated organizations such as military. Effective branding generates curiosity and gives members the ability to tell others about it. Resistance and cynicism are two consequences of poor branding. Additionally, branding creates a connection between higher-level leadership and the troops in line units, as well as between internal and external stakeholders. Change visions have the potential of favoring certain audiences over others, as was mentioned before in this. One strategy to lessen this risk is to use branding that is connected to the transformation vision. Selecting names and symbols that uphold the current goal, vision, and values which the change endeavor would promote or support is

crucial. Branding can support and enhance the change vision, particularly if it represents a transformative shift or challenges an ingrained value.

The change in 1996 from the Implementation Force to the Stabilization Force in Bosnia is an example of this kind of branding. After the General Framework Agreement for Peace was ratified in 1995, IFOR was established with the goals of dividing the former belligerent groups, creating the Zone of Separation, and stockpiling weaponry in cantonment areas. The shift in mandate was mirrored in the name change from IFOR to SFOR, with the latter carrying out comparable tasks with a reduced force and an emphasis on helping the Bosnians create their own national institutions, such as a unified military. Thus, the name change represented a shift in the objective of peace enforcement and a narrowing of the scope of the international commitment.

CONCLUSION

The qualities of a strong change vision serve as crucial cornerstones that guide businesses toward effective transformation. The characteristics of motivation, flexibility, clarity, and alignment that have been studied together highlight how dynamic and complex good change leadership is. A succinct and unambiguous vision acts as the organization's North Star, offering a framework for navigation as it navigates change. When this vision is in line with the organization's strategic objectives and values, it becomes more genuine and credible, which appeals to stakeholders. It is impossible to overestimate the motivating power of a well-crafted vision, as it can excite people at all levels and propel group efforts toward the shared objective of change. Understanding the dynamic context in which change takes place is equally important. The sustainability and efficacy of a transformation vision are contingent upon its capacity to adjust to unanticipated obstacles or leverage unexpected prospects. Change visions must not only possess flexibility in the face of uncertainty, but also remain effective throughout the transformative process. In the end, leaders who exhibit and convey these qualities are more equipped to inspire their groups, foster resiliency, and successfully navigate the difficulties that come with change. The development of change visions with these characteristics becomes not only a strategic need but also a driver for sustained success and adaptation in the face of constant transformation as firms continue to navigate the always changing business environment.

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CHAPTER 6

CRAFTING A COMPREHENSIVE CHANGE CONCEPT: UNRAVELING THE INTERPLAY OF STRATEGIES, TACTICS, AND IMPLEMENTATION PHASES

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ABSTRACT:

The intricacies of crafting a comprehensive change concept, delving into the dynamic interplay between strategies, tactics, and the various phases of implementation. Drawing insights from organizational change models, the narrative unfolds with an emphasis on the challenging task of developing a change vision, outlining desired outcomes, and addressing potential resource constraints. The journey takes the reader through a vivid illustration of change strategies, exemplified by the "Story of the Four Commanders," showcasing the nuanced approaches leaders adopt in navigating change initiatives. The discussion encompasses well-established change strategies, such as power-coercive, rational-empirical, and normative-reeducative, offering a comprehensive understanding of their implications. The narrative further explores the significance of pacing in change efforts, distinguishing between time-driven and event-driven progress, as exemplified by Gersick's insights. The concept of the "commander's intent" from the military provides a structural framework for the change concept, emphasizing purpose, key tasks, transition, and end state. The abstract concludes by shedding light on critical considerations in planning and implementing change, including phased approaches and governance structures, as outlined by Burke's three phases of planned change. Overall, this abstract offers a comprehensive overview of the multifaceted process of crafting a change concept, unraveling the complexities inherent in strategic decision-making and implementation.

KEYWORDS:

Diagnosis, Monitoring, Planning, Stakeholders, Strategy, Support.

INTRODUCTION

The intended results of the change endeavor are defined by the change vision. "Okay, what's your strategy?" is the question that change agents will inevitably be asked. In the strict sense, because the methods and means are yet unknown, it is impossible to formulate a comprehensive plan. Proponents and opponents of the change may get more tense about how to proceed and how few or restricted resources may make any attempt at change difficult. The military faces a great deal of strain since so many large-scale transformation initiatives rely on legislative funds. Talks about resources might appear distracting and even derail the change agent. However, change agents must concentrate on the topic of how specifically, how will the change endeavor go forward? The change agent cannot dodge the issue of what resources—such as staff, equipment, money, and time—are required, even if the specifics may be addressed later in the plan. A concept for the change effort: what is the vision of the waysis required for this phase. Creating the idea is the most difficult step in this transformation approach. Change advocates won't want to provide too much information since it might impede necessary judgments and provide opponents with strategies to thwart the endeavor.

Members and stakeholders may get confused by a badly explained notion; thus, this also applies to poorly explained plans that, after resources are allocated, cause confusion [1], [2].

The Four Commanders' Story

Consider a unit where a new commander is taking over and there is an issue with vehicle readiness. After taking the necessary time to examine the organization, its procedures, and its systems, this commander concludes that using rewards and penalties, or carrots and sticks, is the most effective way to address the readiness issue. When subordinate units meet greater criteria, the commander awards them with a "gold medal." Members who implement best practices are rewarded with prizes or other advantages. Employees that exhibit efficient habits, including cutting down on the time it takes to order and get components, may also be recognized with rewards. Leaders would take some kind of action to penalize people whose position stays the same or worsens. Is it possible that depriving them of incentives will encourage appropriate behavior? If not, executives can publicly expose the unit's inability to stay up at staff briefings. The strategy could be effective at first, but with time, units might figure out how to manipulate the data to make themselves seem good or not look terrible. Each unit also approaches a ceiling beyond which they are unable to advance due to an external reliance. To put it simply, some things improved while others did not. The first commander leaves after two years.

The second commander enters the scene and determines that the issue is with training. In order to remedy procedural flaws and experience deficits, the commander implements a training and leader development program, either by using untapped internal knowledge or by bringing in outside specialists. After any initial training and education, there is sustainment training. There are indications that the training is working overtime. Expertise is costly, however, and turnover poses a problem for maintaining the training regimen's continuity in any military institution. To put it simply, some things improved while others did not. The second commander leaves after two years.

Arriving is the third commander, a "numbers" guy. This commander demands that everything be measured, even difficult-to-quantify subjective issues. The main decision support tools for identifying and prioritizing problem areas and allocating resources to address them are stoplight charts, metrics, and measurements. Positive trend lines might indicate progress; as the numbers rise, the unit is becoming better. This strategy does, however, have its limitations. Gathering data for metrics that aren't automatable requires a lot of resources. The reports could accidentally provide false information and forgo clarity for accuracy. Interactions between the measurements may lead to distorted conclusions, and certain metrics are not consistently measurable. To put it simply, some things improved while others did not. The third commander leaves after two years.

After receiving the guidon, the fourth commander determines that all previous methods were inadequate due to the members' lack of engagement. What are the troops' thoughts on the matter? As a result, the commander organized staff calls, focus groups, unofficial interviews, and other activities to get feedback and motivate participants to come up with their own ideas or provide suggestions to superiors. Participation also turns into the main way to monitor developments, reveal hidden issues, and come up with fixes. The commander thinks that interaction by itself will inspire members and gain deeper devotion to what solutions come up, hoping to achieve the Hawthorne effect. Nevertheless, this kind of involvement involves an initial time commitment, which some participants see as dragging out the issue or only talking about it rather than taking action. Working groups may come to an end when

irrational views are drowned out by stronger, more aggressive ones. While some things improved, others did not. The fourth commander leaves after two years [3], [4].

The typical response I get is a "hybrid" solution combining all four since it is difficult to see complete adherence to just one of these strategies being effective. They accurately point out that in order to be a well-rounded endeavor, all change initiatives will need some mix of rewards, instruction, reporting, and involvement. My argument against them is based on the observation that a commander's personal preferences—the methods they like to use and the advancement indicators they see as legitimate—have an impact on the solutions they choose to explore. If the commander is a stickler for statistics, then no amount of training, effective working groups, or rewards and punishments will please him or her until the critical metrics begin to improve. Although a commander who values cooperation and participation could be in favor of the change effort, he or she might not be comfortable with the pace of change until they are sure that all members of the organization have had a chance to voice their opinions. And so on. This narrative also teaches us about the difficulty of carrying out transformation initiatives that will last beyond the initial commander's term in office. In general, leaders should be cautious about what changes they impose to avoid unnecessarily frustrating members. One hopes that changes of leadership won't cause needless interruption to a change endeavor [5], [6].

DISCUSSION

Since the early days of change management in industrial organizations, similar philosophical and practical approaches to change have been reflected in the techniques stated in the aforementioned scenario. After conducting a historical review, Chin and Benne identified three broad categories of transformation strategies: normative-reductive, rational-empirical, and power-coercive. Notably, the authors did not make value judgments about whether is superior; instead, they noted that any change endeavor may use any method, whether it be advantageous or detrimental. The goes into great depth about these broad tactics.

Power-coercive tactics: using formal or dictatorial methods

The first commander used incentives and punishments as a power-coercive tool to effect change. Whether or whether members of the organization are eager to change, power-coercive tactics force change upon them. Such tactics are consistent with the conventional military command model, which holds that the commander's word is final. There are other forms of power outside command authority, however. Other coercive tools include doctrine, policy modifications, and legislation that encourages or forbids certain actions. Commanders believe that if everyone aspires to achieve the incentives, the company will get closer to the transformation goal, and compliance is the primary measure. Bottom-up power-coercive tactics are also possible. An organization's members may gather in large numbers to oppose an unfair rule or policy or to encourage leaders to make the changes they want to see. For instance, in the wake of widely reported cases of sexual harassment in the U.S. military in the 2010s, the voices of unfairly treated service members have had a substantial impact on the structure and culture of the armed forces.

These tactics are referred described as "power" and "coercive," but they don't have to be authoritarian. A lot of persuasion may be required to motivate members, like in the case of the steering coalition driving the reform initiative. If a commander doesn't provide clear instructions, other organization members could need incentives to participate in the endeavor. The fundamental driving force behind these tactics is conflict or rivalry, which might take the form of war, nonviolent protests, court rulings, or shifting the balance of power. This struggle may be advantageous, guiding the organization toward a more ideal state, or harmful, putting

the organization's continued existence in jeopardy. When businesses have to react to an external mandate or confront a crisis, these tactics may also be highly successful. In the second instance, top military and civilian officials continued to emphasize the advantages of functioning as a combined force in order to execute the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act. In addition to the requirements of combined professional military education, joint doctrine publishing, and joint assignment norming, the stakeholders called for a shift in the culture of jointers [7], [8].

The use of rational-empirical tactics in science

The third commander used an empirical-rational theory. The rational-empirical approach is more prevalent in America and Western Europe, claim Chin and Benne. This tactic has its roots in classical liberalism and enlightenment, which hold that humans are logical agents who typically pursue logical self-interests. It sees change as intentional, aimed at achieving "a situation that is desirable, effective, and in line with the person's self-interest."

Although rational-empirical designates a single category, the two names denote distinct manifestations: empirical refers to measurable, and rational refers to qualifiable logics. Each shows the adjustments that leaders make using data and their presumptions about what constitutes clear signs of advancement. Frederic Taylor's scientific management, which sought to identify the "one best way" to complete jobs on the assembly line, was among the first ideas in this area. Even though it was despised for its impersonal treatment of labor, traces of Taylorism may still be seen in contemporary attempts to boost productivity whether producing goods or rendering services. Following psychometrics and sociometrics—previous attempts to gauge people's attitudes and dispositions as a tool of personnel management—came another set of rational-empirical techniques. As instruments of organizational transformation, these tactics included reassigning employees to positions more productive for them based on their unique skills or swapping out organizational members with those thought to be more suitable for a certain role. Critics counter that these methods place more emphasis on personality than productivity. These tactics often involve mathematical modeling because it may aid in leaders' understanding of complexity. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system used by the US military, as well as force management analysis procedures unique to each service and combatant command capability requirement models are a few examples. Each creates measurements that enable executives to assess alternatives for supporting key projects or creating new organizations, as well as to evaluate the success of disparate endeavors. Metrics pushed by change initiatives, however, may come seem as impersonal and unbending, much as in the tale of the four commanders. They depend on legitimate and accurate data input and analysis, which means that the statistics appropriately and accurately reflect the organization's position, the state of change initiatives, and the general environment such that meeting targets corresponds to meeting the objectives or vision of the changes. In order to prevent undesirable second-order effects or unexpected unintended repercussions from the change attempt, this needs proper models that represent the topic of the model and correct data [9], [10].

Normative-reductive techniques: adapt during treatment or instruction

While the fourth commander used a normative strategy, the second commander employs a re-education strategy. Normative-re-educational was the class that Chin and Benne integrated these into, although they differ in how its members became involved. Re-educative models place an emphasis on behavior modification via instruction or training, using both internal and external experts to shape members' actions. Normative techniques, which depend on members' general skills and their participatory knowledge sharing, are more rehabilitative.

Normative-reeducative methods operate on the premise that altering sociocultural norms and value systems is necessary to bring about change. Changing one's personal norms entails modifying relationships, attitudes, abilities, and knowledge as well as habits and behaviors. Using internal or external consultants to support and nurture change initiatives on both an individual and organizational level is a common tactic. Based on how leaders employ consultants, there are two variations: normative and reeducative. Normative refers to establishing change via training, education, and coaching, while reeducative approaches focus on imposing new or modified norms through self-reflection and corrective action.

Normative techniques presuppose that every attempt at change must deal with issues related to interpersonal relationships or organizational morale. Thus, consultants place a high priority on identifying the underlying causes of issues and motivating clients to change their perspective. One such tactic was the use of T-Groups, when teams of employees from different organizations used facilitated conversation to discover and resolve issues. Action research is a more recent and contemporary form that systematizes research and solution creation as social activities by including communities of practice and reflection. It is possible to explain the military's acceptance of gays as the result of a normative approach, in which the force accepted a new normal after realizing that society and service personnel themselves were experiencing a change in values.

Re-educative, or training, techniques are different in that they deal with issues related to job completion or other technical components of the operation of the organization. Therapy may deal with cultural issues, but re-education is primarily concerned with process—how to do things better. Enhancement requires training inside the company to make sure the right people are aware of the solutions. This kind of approach is called for by several HRM reforms, such performance reviews, whereby companies use counseling and training in tandem to help staff members adopt new business practices. While these approaches rectify the impersonal shortfalls of the rational-empirical approaches, they may also cause chaos if used inappropriately. They need organizations that are willing and want the desired outcomes. Re-education tactics may encounter opposition if the new method seems more costly or more complex than the current procedure, whereas normative strategies will fail if the organization rejects the announced new normal.

The techniques presented by Chin and Benne are helpful in imagining the course of the change endeavor and determining its progress. The second concern is how to motivate efforts and promote advancement. Because organizational enthusiasm for change and available resources are always limited, change agents also need to think about the best ways to energize the change endeavor without getting in the way of other crucial organizational tasks. It will be helpful to comprehend how change is occurring [11], [12].

Gersick's pace of change

Time-driven and event-driven are the two ways change efforts typically proceed, as noted by Gersick in a seminal article on organizational change.¹⁹⁰ One could argue that the majority of change efforts in the U.S. military display time-driven behaviors, where the calendar dictates the creation or presence of key milestones. There are usually set deadlines for the yearly budget process, periodic reports, congressional hearings, and internal progress reporting. Within the Defense Acquisition System, choices on milestones are influenced by time. The accomplishment of one milestone establishes a "deadline" for the subsequent one, and the capacity to achieve this deadline determines whether the effort is proceeding according to plan. Put another way, an endeavor that was originally given a three-year deadline is "behind schedule" even if it may be moving along as it should be. This is because

the project would logically take four years to finish. Because time-driven change presumes a proactive perspective, it fits very well with military culture. By spreading out the work across time, the organization increases the likelihood of achieving long-term objectives. Senior leaders may also better organize their calendars by setting crucial deadlines or choices well in advance. The endeavor may then maintain its momentum more easily.

Since the change endeavor advances in response to certain circumstances and occurrences, event-driven change is often more reactive. Bursts of progress are possible after prolonged periods of stagnation. Rather than comparing time-driven change to an alarm clock, Gersick compared event-driven change to a thermostat. That is, the leader should step up the transformation effort when something happens that ignites the necessary feeling of urgency. This may be difficult. For the company to accept changing a widely used, well-liked, or established business practice positively, there may need to be a particular motivating factor. If such an occurrence doesn't happen for a long time, the reform initiative can be forgotten.

Time-driven change requires leaders to take this into consideration while formulating the change effort, since stakeholders will anticipate frequent assessments or progress at a consistent pace. As important markers of development, the notion can call for intermediate goals or targets. In-progress evaluations could become less regular or only occur when necessary if they are event-driven. In either scenario, creating a well-defined and understandable roadmap that identifies each LOE's contribution to reaching the target state is necessary for effective synchronization.

Putting Together a Change Concept

After putting the aforementioned building pieces in place, it's time to connect the dots and describe how the change effort will operate while maintaining flexibility in case circumstances change. Thankfully, military organizations already have a helpful framework for outlining a notion that satisfies stakeholder and member interest while simultaneously, to borrow Kotter's words, enabling widespread action. A well-constructed idea should not rely on a person's personality; rather, it should provide a rational basis for carrying out the change initiative, independent of the change agent or leader. It shouldn't be necessary to reverse progress in order to accommodate new commanders' preferences for doing things a different way or for different reasons.

Construct: The intention of the commander

Concepts are nothing new to military commanders; they may be found in both the Army Operating idea and the idea of operations for a large-scale organizational change. Since the Primer includes the essential components of an idea, it will modify the format of the commander's purpose from the United States military. The following is a definition of the commander's intent:

An operation's goal and the intended military end state should be stated succinctly and clearly so that mission command is supported, staff is given direction, and subordinate and supporting commanders can act to accomplish the commander's desired outcomes on their own initiative—even if things don't go according to plan. Thus, the concept consists of four parts: an explanation of the members' transition, a list of important activities, the goal and outcome of the change attempt, and the concept's final state.

The goal statement must be succinct and unambiguous. It should restate the main issue as it was outlined in Phase I and contextualize the change effort by addressing how it would assist the company in pursuing the intended future state and avoiding the undesirable future state. It

is imperative that the purpose statement elucidates the rationale behind the concept's rationality, feasibility, suitability, and acceptable levels of risk. But the mission statement shouldn't too dictate what the organization may or cannot do. Adaptability is still crucial. The primary duties need to enumerate significant acts and the crucial connections that participants need to foster. There shouldn't be an excessive or comprehensive collection. If there are too many, planning should incorporate them into more general categories without diluting their original intent. Although there is no magic number, the list of important chores shouldn't include more than 10 items.

It's critical to explain the shift as it may cause disruptions and members may stop supporting it if they don't see how the long-term benefits outweigh any short-term drawbacks. A "process that people go through as they internalize and come to terms with the details of the new situation change brings about" is how Bridges defines transition. The idea should, in general, discuss how the change endeavor could impact members and demonstrate why overcoming obstacles is worthwhile. The end state is a statement of the circumstances under which the change endeavor is successful and, therefore, may be concluded. These are simple since they usually make use of the labor completed in earlier activities and don't ask for a lot of specifics. Subsequently, the idea will guide the strategy, integrating the methods and determining the ultimate roles of leaders and participants.

Formulating the Scheme

Once the idea and goal have been determined, leaders focus on making plans to allocate roles, resources, and coordination mechanisms.

To manage the necessary aspects of implementing the idea, the business should ideally set up a planning team. Nonetheless, the crucial choices on how to organize the change endeavor should continue to be made by leaders. This addresses two planning-related issues: how to set up governance structures and phases or other milestones. In the event that these factors prove to be in opposition to the idea, the change agent need to suggest modifying the concept or the strategy. Ideally, the idea, strategy, and vision for the change should all be in sync with one another.

Phases of Change Planning and Implementation

It is preferable to see the change endeavor as having already started as opposed to believing that it will just begin when it is launched. The organization has already undergone some kind of change as a result of the work done to identify, characterize, and diagnose the issue as well as to design a solution.

The burgeoning endeavor has galvanized advocates as well as opponents. There is a distinction between the modification effort before to and after launch, however. The organization inevitably becomes more dedicated to the transformation endeavor. The top leader might possibly axe the project before it started, with little effect on the company. This option is no longer accessible after launch since the organization's leaders have committed to seeing the change through to completion and have now publicly recognized the endeavor.

Burke's three stages of transition

W. Warner Burke identified three stages of planned change—pre-launch, launch, and post-launch—in his paradigm, which effectively addressed this challenge. Launch is the point at which implementation is made public, and it is expected that both members and stakeholders will recognize and carry out the plan as necessary. They go into great depth about each step.

Pre-Launch: Transitioning from Concept to Reality

Burke claims that the pre-launch stage is when advocates for change organize the initiative and inform important parties about it. Put differently, leaders have recognized a problem and are shown a desire to address it. Pre-launch activities include diagnosis and visualizing since the leader always has the option to halt the endeavor with little long-term effects on the company. In order to prevent disinformation among members and facilitate plan development, military organizations may classify pre-launch activities and products as pre-decisional or otherwise non-binding.

Pre-launch is also the time when the transformation vision is shared and discussed with important stakeholders, including members of the organization and leaders. These important personnel in military groups are often the directors, special staff, and command group. Advisors and subject matter experts could also be among them.

Planning is another pre-launch activity; it helps to build the concept into a Sui, practical, and accep plan. Planning not only creates an architecture to guide and organize organizational actions, but it also gives leaders and change agents a useful way to get feedback. Was the idea and vision communicated to and understood by the staff? What is achievable and what is not achievable in the vision? Does it mean making more conscious changes? The aim is to prepare the endeavor for launch, the turning point at which the leader declares the change initiative to have started.

CONCLUSION

The process of developing a complete change concept sheds light on the complex interplay between organizational transformation strategies, tactics, and implementation stages. The process of undergoing change is shown as a complex one, highlighting the need of formulating a precise change vision and overcoming any roadblocks in the distribution of resources. The "Story of the Four Commanders" provides a clear example, highlighting various leadership philosophies and emphasizing the significance of taking into account multidimensional tactics like normative-reeducative, power-coercive, and rational-empirical. The significance of pace in change initiatives by distinguishing between progress that is driven by events and progress that is driven by time, as shown by Gersick's observations. A strategic roadmap is provided by the change concept's use of the military's "commander's intent" as its structural framework, which emphasizes goal, important tasks, transition, and end state. With the essential flexibility allowed, this organized method seeks to enable broad-based action and unite the business with a common goal. Burke's three stages of planned change pre-launch, launch, and post-launch are referenced throughout the abstract as it explores planning and execution issues. This framework ensures that change initiatives are not only conceptual but also strategically and operationally linked by highlighting the organization's increasing commitment as it moves through different phases.

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CHAPTER 7

ORCHESTRATING CHANGE: DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING COMPREHENSIVE CHANGE PLANS WITH A MULTI-MOTOR APPROACH

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ABSTRACT:

The intricate dynamics involved in crafting and executing successful organizational change initiatives. Drawing inspiration from various change models, the paper introduces the concept of a multi-motor approach, emphasizing the interplay of diverse strategies in navigating the complex landscape of change. The discussion spans the launch phase, where change efforts transition from planning to action, to the post-launch period, addressing implementation, sustainment, and termination. The paper delves into the challenges and nuances of post-launch, highlighting the importance of sustained leadership attention and proactive adjustments. Further, it introduces Van de Ven and Poole's four motors of change Life Cycle, Teleological, Evolutionary, and Dialecticas valuable frameworks for understanding change planning. By providing a comprehensive model that accommodates various change scenarios, the paper aims to guide organizations in orchestrating change effectively, ensuring adaptability, and achieving enduring success in the face of organizational transformation.

KEYWORDS:

Collaboration, Leadership, Monitoring, Planning, Stakeholders, Strategy.

INTRODUCTION

Burke's change initiative's implementation is the main goal of this phase. It should be mentioned that this could differ from the official proclamation that starts a change campaign. Launch may occur at a covert gathering with the leader and their most trusted advisors. The important thing to remember is that once the transformation project gets underway, there's no going back. The business is now and officially investing in the project; stopping it would need a second transformational effort. Burke states that the organization is fully dedicated to the upcoming transformation project throughout the launch phase, which also includes disseminating the message and planning the first events. Businesses must voluntarily decide to collaborate with the proponent and provide them authorization to develop the strategy, plans, and acquire the required resources in order to do this. Get going. As a result, it shifts the question from whether or whether a change attempt will happen to when it will [1], [2].

Rather from being a single event, Launch is a series of activities meant to raise awareness of the change project. Its objective is to transform the atmosphere inside the firm so that people who are not affiliated with the company acknowledge and concur that the change project is the right one. As a result, the launch may take many weeks or months as the business attempts to generate a "short-term win" by communicating and illustrating the change endeavor via early and subsequent activities, as described by Kotter. Following Launch: Implementation, Upkeep, and Termination

If the business follows the launch plan precisely, post-launch should be easy. Regarding the new structure, supporters have already completed the challenging process of preparing

everyone for the building's construction, so the true post-launch phase begins the moment the shovel touches the ground. There is just building left to perform [3], [4].

Of course, this is seldom that simple, since the proponent of the change must be actively engaged in monitoring progress and proposing required revisions. It is necessary to convey the transformation vision at all times. There's a potential that interest and energy levels may drop once post-launch activities begin or the organization hits the next big milestone, like initial operational capability. The project is no longer exciting or new. Senior executives must also use care to avoid "moving on" too soon and leaving the proponent to manage the challenging implementation process alone. Senior leaders have a lot of competing and urgent tasks on their plate, which keeps them very busy. Because of this, the proponent plays a critical role in making sure that top executives are allocating the appropriate amount of attention to projects for post-launch transformation.

In the aftermath of launch, the old military adage "no plan survives first contact with the enemy" comes into play. Even with the best of intentions, comprehensive strategies and plans can encounter unforeseen challenges when the change effort is really being carried out. As new challenges arise, supporters must act fast to identify them, evaluate how they will impact their goals and strategy, and make the required corrections. Once again, if the organization started its change attempt effectively, these first setbacks shouldn't jeopardize the change vision; instead, modifications to the plans or execution tactics should suffice.

Organize Your Tasks

When organizing a change effort, two factors need to be taken into account: how team members will be assigned responsibilities and how their actions will be coordinated. It is only when major revolutionary projects are undertaken that the answers to these challenges in armies become evident. It's easy to divide up the work since the bureaucracy is already in place to support these objectives. In a typical J-staff model, responsibilities are provided for human resource management, security, operations, maintenance, planning, public relations, and resource management. Another example is the typical U.S. Army procurement process for new weapons, which adheres to the DOTMLPF and designates distinct agencies for the creation of leaders, people, facilities, organization, training, doctrine, and equipment. Because conventional corporate practices provide protocols for collaboration, communication, and decision-making, coordination is also straightforward. Because of this perspective, change efforts have a similar design that divides them into "lines of effort," or distinct change initiatives. This is consistent with the way mainstream business literature presents change management, which maintains that organizations' focus has to be redirected toward the change endeavor and that leaders need to defeat or stifle dissent [5], [6].

Not all change initiatives, however, will profit from this. What happens if the techniques and tools are not sufficiently designed in advance? What if, under circumstances when normal metrics are impractical, the notion necessitates significant bottom-up activity? The nature and scope of the coordinating effort may vary based on the replies. Consequently, having a more comprehensive model will be useful for understanding the change planning process. For example, the four change-motors proposed by Van de Ven and Poole

Academics In a 1995 review of numerous theories of change, Van de Ven and Poole noted that Lewin's idea was simply one of many and that many kinds of purposeful change may occur simultaneously in an organization. These forms, which differed according to the degree and kind of change processes used, were referred to as motors rather than procedures. Each motor represents the entire architecture of a transformation endeavor. Change agents,

however, have a wide range of planning options since efforts for change have the ability to activate any combination of these engines.

This use of the term "strategic plan" is more of a marketing effort than an attempt at change since the objective is more aspirational and achieving it is less important than striving toward it. In the event that the company recognizes good conditions for change, the strategic plan provides a ready list of actions. On the other hand, the organization acknowledges that it is incapable of committing enough resources to a meaningful reform initiative.

Motor Life Cycle: Traditional Engineering Approach

The life-cycle motor, the most fundamental of the four motors, represents the previously indicated normal military situation. It has clearly defined origins and ends, and the organization pursues the transformation objective in its totality via a unified effort. Van de Ven and Poole described how an organization sets objectives and plans ahead of time, implements them, and then reaps the benefits by making long-term changes to its culture, structure, and/or processes using a farming metaphor. A "process of change progressing through an institutional, natural, or logical program prescribing the specific contents of these stages" and following a necessary sequence of stages make up the life cycle, in this sense.

Because programming is a feature common to all defense bureaucracies, the motor often describes the preferred approach to managing change in military organizations, even in cases where it does not precisely illustrate how the idea of the change attempt is put into practice. In essence, the life-cycle engine provides a structured approach to change decision-making, with the senior leader acting as the primary focal point. To promote change, the senior leader uses a pre-planned tiered strategy with established coordinating procedures and defined divisions of labor. They also drive change, communicate a unifying vision, and explain the need for change and the ideal future condition [7], [8].

The motor's tale conveys a single objective, making it easier to divide jobs neatly into discrete activities. The project office oversees a recently established "program of record" for weapons systems, with staff members assigned to oversee development, procurement, fielding, and maintenance. Like this, other reform projects have a designated proponent and are centrally controlled by DOD and its services. Decision-making points and benchmarks for synchronization and coordination. It will be essential to differentiate between the ways in which organizations characterize their change efforts and the true nature of the change. Only when an effort is done as a single, integrated effort and when protocols and results are outlined so that each activity's results are well-known and can be used to measure progress will the life-cycle motor operate as intended. One example is the training phase that comes with purchasing weapon systems; there is a set of procedures that must be followed in order for units to have soldiers who have been trained on the equipment and are ready for its deployment.

However, some change initiatives work differently because they can't be planned ahead of time and must instead be iterative, or because they don't exist as a single entity but are made up of multiple concurrent efforts that are competitive or independent of each other. Under these circumstances, Van de Ven and Poole's other three engines come into play and have an impact on the change plan creation process. However, since it presents a succinct and straightforward narrative that obscures the complexity and disarray that the other change agents may add, the planned technique may still be indicative of the organization's member communications strategy.

Teleological Motor: Method of Adherence

Compliance-focused change initiatives are the second most common kind of change initiatives in military organizations. In cases when everyone in the company follows a set of rules or principles, it might be advantageous. Consider adhering to information assurance, operational security, and counterterrorism policies, for instance. Having every person properly educated and following the rules is the best case scenario. Each and every time. Alternatively, they might take on a negative form in which the ideal state represents a situation in which something does not occur, as in the examples of sexual harassment and assault, fraud, abuse, and prejudice. Although the ideal state is desired, it could not be attainable or, at most, not endure. Reaching 100% training may only be a short-term fix due to frequent personnel turnover and the constant need to update rules, procedures, and other resources. Achieving 100% compliance is difficult since large businesses are likely to have some employees that disregard the training, misinterpret parts of the information, or break the rules overtly. The teleological motor functions as a cycle whereby the organization assesses itself with respect to the goal, takes action, and then reassesses. Van de Ven and Poole used the term "discontent" to describe the distance to the goal. The activity should theoretically get the organization closer to the goal, but as progress is difficult to measure, it requires ongoing cycles of action and feedback. Leaders set goals, do tasks, assess results, and calculate the new deltas.

DISCUSSION

The simplicity and straightforwardness of this benchmarking approach appeals to proponents and trainers alike. One potential solution to the turnover issue is the online distribution technique. However, the issue lies in the fact that while training numbers may be tallied, actual compliance is measured. Zero policy breaches as well as zero infractions of any type concerning information assurance are part of the ideal scenario. However, the intended state also shifts! Take social media's debut, which fundamentally altered how individuals communicate with one another. While some would have seen it as a danger to information security, others would have viewed it as a chance for more productive and successful teamwork. All the same, it altered the target state and the way the organization calculated the deviation from it. Of all, no organization enjoys the thought of chasing after shifting objectives and having all of their hard work come to nothing. But one cannot expect an engineering approach to change to succeed, particularly when the objective is the avoidance or elimination of something. The proponent enters the picture at this point. The proponent will take on the role of watchdog. They gather pertinent information, keep an eye on the environment and the organization, and track progress toward the objective to look for warning indications of impending reversals. It is hoped that one may swiftly restart forward motion and avoid or lessen reversals. Because the data collecting might be extensive and invasive, I advise the proponent to be less assertive and more passive than with other motors. Units should think about balancing open-ended channels with top-down data calls for bottom-up reporting of problems and concerns [9], [10].

Evolutionary Drive: An Empirical Method

Organizations that use the evolutionary motor pursue a specified set of objectives in a variety of ways, using best practices and discarding less effective ones.

The cycle that is shown is one in which different organizational divisions create variety by altering the accepted norm. Variations might be very little or very significant. Members exchange ideas and decide which of the many iterations best suits them. After that, the selected method is kept and integrated. When a cycle is used in a planned change attempt, the

goal is that repetitions of progress toward the intended state are produced and that the chosen variants show some kind of improvement.

However, hope is not a strategy; in fact, it may be the catalyst for undesirable behaviors inside a company. If an employee finds that navigating the enterprise-wide staffing procedure is too challenging, they may devise a workaround and have success with it. Even if the workaround may ultimately result in an unproductive or inefficient staffing procedure, word gets out and others adopt it. Complicating issues is the possibility that every modification attempt will function under its own separate goal state. Therefore, in order to guarantee that the company benefits from these bottom-up initiatives without taking unwarranted risks, the leaders as 18 must oversee the evolutionary process [11], [12].

Evolutionary motor as a deliberate alteration

The bottom arrow represents the proponent's main duty to keep an eye on the actions of subordinate components, document best practices, disseminate, integrate, and spot emerging practices that leaders may have to do away with. Given that the proponent has the authority to make judgments, they could be more invasive than the compliance model previously discussed. It can order trials or forbid certain actions.

Synthetic Methodology for Dialectic Motor

The transformation that most defies accepted military culture is represented by the dialectic motor. Uniformity of effort is valued by militaries, however this force functions under unsolvable paradoxes, where two points of view get locked in a never-ending state of conflict. Consider the ongoing struggle in military budgeting and programming to sufficiently finance the three needs (force structure, modernization, and readiness). All three are essential to the military's ability to achieve goals related to national security, but they also represent a contradiction as it is impossible to completely source all three, which means that trade-offs and risk management are required. The other two needs would be given less importance when a leader's strategic direction calls for giving any of them precedence. These three conflicting needs, however, may not always represent a zero-sum scenario since changing priority entails transaction costs. Transferring funds from modernization to readiness might cause acquisition programs—which rely on consistent and dependable financing sources—to be disrupted. Increasing end strength comes with a price tag that includes onboarding and stationing needs, which might put strain on modernization and readiness.

According to Lewis, there are inherent conflicts in organizational life that cannot be avoided; the demands of the individual vs the requirements of the group is one example of these conflicts. Think about any talent management or human resources program and how the requirements of the Army or any other service may clash with those of the individual service member or their family. Lewis added that there might be a contradiction in subgroup conflicts.

Decentralization for adaptability and efficacy against centralization for efficiency and control. Think about how joint and defense agencies absorb service responsibilities to maintain uniformity throughout the business at the cost of service-specific demands, or how local initiatives may clash with enterprise-wide efforts.

Think about how military organizations demand innovation and fresh ideas while yet placing a high priority on stability, predictability, and dependability. Other paradoxes unique to military institutions exist. One is the inherent conflict that a military faces between the bureaucratic nature of the public sector and its professional nature. Naturally, there are

conflicts between different perspectives on the use of military, such as heavy vs light or conventional versus unconventional.

Synthetic methodology

Synthesis comes in several forms. One is a negotiated resolution in which the disputing parties agree to a middle ground. When the solution becomes untenable and unacceptably high risk accrues to both parties, the synthesis breaks down. Another is when the war is won by one side. One cannot disregard the losing viewpoints for too long since the tension will ultimately weaken the winning perspective and a new argument will start. In the third scenario, the thesis and anti-thesis pursue their own worldviews independently of one another and interact very seldom to address pressing disagreements. When interoperability deteriorates intolerably, this synthesis cracks, and some kind of all-encompassing strategy might assist ease the stress as it cannot be avoided. The most effective approach, however, is to pinpoint the main causes of conflict and include guiding ideas or a strategic direction in the plan to assist the company deal with tension as it emerges. The important point is that only the senior leader has the ability to establish guidelines; advocates, particularly those who manifest a blatant bias in favor of one side of the dispute, may only suggest and provide advice but are not authorized to publish such guidelines on their own. The ability to keep an eye out for signs that the tension is becoming impeding the change attempt is a necessary for the proponent. After then, the proponent need to bring this up with the senior leader for a resolution. For instance, while designing a change initiative in talent management, it is important to include the essential concepts, KPIs, and strategic direction for the inability to balance the requirements of each individual member with those of the business.

Putting Motors Together

When organizing the endeavor, Van de Ven and Poole's motors might be combined. Consider how attempts to address a complicated issue needing localized solutions may be aided by the cooperation of the teleological and evolutionary engines, with best practices arising and efforts combining toward an emergent enterprise-level effort. Alternatively, the life-cycle and dialectic engines could operate concurrently as opposing visions that lead to interdependent reform initiatives. The opposing viewpoint nonetheless coalesces into a cohesive whole that advances the national security strategy or budget plan. Together, the Department of Defense and the services use all four engines in the hundreds of ongoing transformation initiatives.

Creating the Plan's Architecture

If the idea is widely embraced, creating the plan only requires gradually applying methods. Put differently, the plan adds who and what, while the idea answers the questions of how and when the change endeavor will take place. While careful planning is necessary to support effective change, elaborate preparations are not always the secret to success. Pursuing the meticulous plan may unnecessarily divert attention from other high-priority tasks, limit flexibility, and impede learning in big, complex companies. Another consideration is risk. It could be necessary to prepare more thoroughly for a desired goal if it entails high-risk, challenging, or risky tasks in order to reduce the associated risk.

If not, the plan should only include enough information for participants to understand the goals of the endeavor and their respective contributions to achieving them. The mission command concept of the U.S. Army is useful in explaining how a well-thought-out strategy becomes organizational action. It involves the commander exercising authority and direction by employing mission orders to allow disciplined initiative, all while maintaining the commander's aim to empower adaptable and flexible leaders. Therefore, the plan should

consist of three interdependent parts: a defined division of work among the subordinate organizations, a proponent with the necessary authority and responsibility to oversee the change effort, and clear channels of communication and coordination. I go into further detail on each:

Prepotency and administration

To do this, roles and authority for managing the project and guaranteeing its advancement must be established. Typically, this is accomplished by designating an office of principal responsibility, which may be a cross-functional working group or an official body with established status. Whatever the method, the OPR demands that the following be met:

Sufficient ability and capacity to keep an eye on the change efforts related operations. In order to gauge progress, the OPR has to gather and examine the relevant data. Enough power to oversee operations on the senior leader's behalf. Enough power and ability to create and deliver reports to the top leader as needed or instructed. This covers regular evaluations of work in progress. Additionally, the membership of the organization should have access to these reports. These should not be taken for granted since it is reasonable to believe that the OPR has the resources necessary to handle the extra duties involved in managing change. Alternatively, there can be an influence on other responsibilities if the OPR is to be built from inside the company. Furthermore, OPR duties are an integral part of the company and shouldn't be contracted out. Even in cases where contractors are given specific tasks, the OPR has to be in a position to evaluate the task's completion and alignment with other aspects of the change endeavor. Nonetheless, the division of work affects the extent of OPR responsibilities.

Partition of labor

This clarifies who is responsible for what, and it will vary depending on the nature of the tasks involved. This is where organizational structures that the military organizations may already be employing, as well as frameworks like Van de Ven & Poole, might be useful. Think about a change initiative that involves developing new capabilities or deploying a new weapon system. Typically, military organizations use life-cycle motors as a foundation for job division; the US military is one example of such an organization. In order to accomplish the total intended state of the weapon system given to a force that is prepared to use it in combat, DOTMLPF provides seven different lines of endeavor, each with a specific goal.

The nature of the lines of endeavor, however, varies. The life-cycle model, which is used in material development, usually involves designing, developing, producing, and fielding the system first, followed by scheduled updates. This cycle still operates in a life-cycle manner with a consistent start and conclusion, even whether it is carried out quickly for things like software application security patches and bug fixes or more slowly for things like hardware platform upgrades and alterations. Others, such as Leadership & Education and Training, may function more as compliance initiatives, with activities intended to transfer system knowledge and skills and success determined by proof that troops can put the training to use. As a result, the kind of work to be done and the results will determine which motor mix is used in the plan.

Depending on the situation, other common organizing constructions may follow structural or functional lines. By splitting tasks functionally in accordance with the staff structure, a unit-level change effort may adhere to the G-staff architecture. If there is a substantial local context, a change effort may also be split geographically by area or location. For instance, one may split military partnership projects by regional commands or separate base-level

modifications to family support programs. The task essentially splits itself when one relies on such constructions, and one may take use of the coordinating mechanisms already in place, including staff meetings. The change endeavor may, however, find itself in competition with other regular operations for resources and attention, which has drawbacks.

Another option would be to create distinct entities that report to the OPR and do the task. Certain organizations, like military research laboratories and innovation centers, may be permanent, while others may only exist temporarily and dissolve after the reform initiative is over. This is helpful when there is a high chance of disruption to the organization, although it could be countered by the need to reallocate resources to the new entity.

Mechanisms for coordination

A sufficient number of coordinating mechanisms must be included in the plan so that the OPR may assign tasks, gather reports, update senior leadership, and take required action. We propose three methods for your consideration. Gersick's theories of event-driven and time-driven transformation serve as the foundation for the first. Time-driven change, like yearly budgeting or summer staff rotations, sets calendar-based goals and choices. Decisions are made in response to events, often in the form of attaining quantifiable progress. As a result, the change endeavor may be divided into stages, with intermediate goals serving as short-term objectives that demonstrate progress toward the overarching vision. A choice to proceed to the next phase may be made as soon as the requirements within each line of effort satisfy the phase's objective. Regular communications might also be a part of coordination procedures to guarantee that the effort receives attention. Progress reports may be distributed by timely in-progress assessments, newsletters or other regular mailings, town hall meetings, or other such events.

Ultimately, performance and effectiveness metrics are required. The former gives details on how successfully each change effort activity performed on its own. Was the training satisfactorily finished, and was the information retained? Is development of the new capability proceeding as planned? Because they are indirect, the latter are more difficult to quantify. How much is the organization altering its actions to conform to the intended future state? These metrics don't have to be quantitative; in fact, certain kinds of change initiatives can call for the gathering of qualitative data in its place. Nevertheless, the measurements need to be used regularly so that appropriate measure comparisons may take place during the course of the change endeavor.

The organization has spent time and resources organizing the change effort up to this point, but it hasn't guaranteed that it would be carried out. The endeavor is at the pre-decisional stage, therefore there is potential for modifications or cancellation with little effect on the organization. Naturally, those who were in favor of the change would be sad, but they would also go back to how things were. Understanding the issue, its diagnosis, and the goal and strategy to address it might indicate that another attempt will be made in the future, but not right now. Burke's launch phase signifies the change effort's point of no return. When the initiative first starts, the organization's top executive or supporter commits to it and, often in public, legitimizes it. A significant occasion like a ribbon-cutting or all-hands gathering might be the unveiling of the new logo or guidon. A more subdued approach to launch might include the senior leader declaring at a staff meeting or signing a memorandum approving the start of the change endeavor. When the senior leader decides to go forward or signs the starting memorandum, the launch might take place at a meeting. Alternatively, the change effort is carried out covertly without any explicit formal message sent outside of the leader's tight group.

Launch is not a single event, but a process. The cutting of the ribbon need not be the first of several events intended to inform the organization and stakeholders that the transformation process is underway. Launch might take place as a gradual roll-out over an extended period of time. No matter how quickly or widely the launch takes place, it consists of a number of coordinated actions that collectively highlight the change initiative. The launch has to be well planned, much like the whole transformation endeavor. However, instead of handing the launch plan off to staff members who would handle it like any other routine operational planning task, top executives, change agents, and steering coalitions must be the ones spearheading it. The message is crucial; it must highlight the gravity of the issue, lay out the fundamentals of the proposed change, and inspire hope that the endeavor will be successful. The coalition should be ready to modify the message to accommodate any plausible scenario and be aware of the kinds of responses to anticipate.

CONCLUSION

The complex terrain of change projects with an emphasis on flexibility, tactical preparation, and efficient implementation. Recognizing the dynamic character of organizational development, the multi-motor approach described in this study emphasizes the necessity for a sophisticated orchestration of multiple change tactics. Examining the launch phase highlights how important it is to have this first step when the company makes the shift from planning to actual execution and commitment is cemented. Post-launch concerns highlight the continuous difficulties associated with implementation, maintenance, and termination, hence highlighting the need of proactive adaptation and persistent leadership participation. The four engines of change identified by Van de Ven and Poole provide a useful framework for assessing and organizing change initiatives. Upon using a Life Cycle, Teleological, Evolutionary, or Dialectic motor, organizations may better customize their approaches to the unique features and goals of the change project. Recognizing that transformation is not a one-size-fits-all activity requires this flexibility. The study argues in favor of a complete model that takes into account the complexity present in diverse change situations as businesses deal with the inevitable nature of change. In doing so, it gives companies a road map for navigating the difficulties and unknowns brought forth by change, eventually promoting resilience and long-term success.

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CHAPTER 8

CRITICAL STEPS FOR EFFECTIVE CHANGE IMPLEMENTATION

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ABSTRACT:

The importance of meticulous pre-launch preparations to establish the groundwork for successful implementation. The first step involves strategically determining optimal launch conditions, considering both time-driven and event-driven approaches. Subsequently, the paper delves into the development of a clear launch vision and concept, addressing the multifaceted challenges of effective communication during the launch phase. The third step focuses on the detailed planning of the launch events, emphasizing the sequencing and scripting of activities to convey desired messages. The inclusion of red-teaming, or testing and evaluating, ensures a thorough assessment of potential challenges and pitfalls. The fourth step introduces measures of performance, offering insights into evaluating the general effectiveness of launch events and triggering adjustments for ongoing success. The final step revolves around the senior leader's personal communication strategy, highlighting the leader's role in harmonizing activities with the overall organizational effort. The paper acknowledges the challenges faced by senior leaders in choosing their level of participation and emphasizes the importance of external evaluation to maintain objectivity.

KEYWORDS:

Planning, Resistance, Stakeholders, Strategy, Training, Vision.

INTRODUCTION

Pre-launch work accounts for the majority of the work involved in the five processes that comprise launch preparation and execution. As soon as launch gets underway, the steering coalition can see that audiences are not understanding the message as they should, and they should modify the strategy accordingly. This, however, is not feasible if the ability to gather information and provide feedback was not established prior to launch. There won't be the necessary sensors in place, and the coalition won't know where to look or how to get trustworthy input. Planning a launch is similar to a mini-change project. A comprehensive strategy outlining every step of the launch process, performance metrics to gauge the launch's effectiveness, and a clear understanding of how it will go forward are all necessary. A well-planned launch makes sure that the best possible circumstances are met for the launch. The following five actions are part of the launch preparations. Choosing when to begin is the first step, and that may also include choosing how to choose when to launch! The senior leader is not always bound to an event at a given time, even when stakeholders or other parties may specify the exact day and hour. In actuality, there may not be a set date for the launch. The change initiative's leader may choose to put it on hold until the proper circumstances arise in order to maximize exposure during the launch period, when audience receptivity is at its highest. In times of crisis, a leader may also determine that now is the right moment to start the change effort since it has the potential to both solve the initial issue and mitigate the crisis. Another option is to carry out what I have dubbed a "soft launch," which involves publicizing the change initiative and enlisting the organization's support for it before the idea and strategy are finalized and used to promise stakeholders action [1], [2].

Step 1. Establish the ideal launch parameters

Launch conditions may be declared in two ways: event-driven or time-driven. 240 Time-driven launches are calendar-driven, meaning they can be either a single day or a period with a start and end point that is predefined. The set date may be chosen in a variety of ways, but it usually corresponds with an outside event that the group either cannot control or has to use as a means of drawing attention to the campaign. Launches may be dependent on the fiscal year at the corporate level in order to take advantage of the financial circumstances. Campaigns may be time-driven at times, depending on the term of a key stakeholder or leader whose departure might have a detrimental impact on the campaign. At other instances, such when a leader sets a deadline for action, they could be established arbitrarily [3], [4].

Launches that are event-driven are contingent. Launch takes place as soon as is reasonably possible once the directing coalition confirms that the environment meets the predetermined ideal parameters. Alternatively, the campaign may need to commence right away if it is the outcome of a crisis. Event-driven launches provide leaders more freedom to postpone if circumstances warrant them. Some examples of such circumstances are inadequate socialization, unchanged communication obstacles, or unclear consequences from other strategic events. Leaders have to be worried about the amount of time that goes by, however, since the organization's dedication to the campaign may wane and it may be supplanted by other initiatives and forgotten.

Step 2. Create the launch's idea and vision

This serves as yet another reminder that visualizing is an ongoing process that will be used for a variety of goals throughout the endeavor. Launch is only one of the phases that presents unique hurdles to the original plan. A launch may happen in a variety of ways, from the widely publicized to the low-key, covert. Both may function, and launches often take place in the middle. However, visualizing the launch aids in comprehending the necessary steps to convey the change endeavor successfully and prevent inadvertently inciting adversaries.

The circumstances in the environment after launch should be outlined in the launch vision. Though it's ideal to have a "yes" response to every inquiry, one must also be practical. On the basis of the launch alone, neutral parties are unlikely to alter their thoughts. It is doubtful that opponents would reconsider, and they could even intensify their resistance. Above all, supporters could stop being active. While some were eager to assist in getting the initiative off the ground, they could have later given priority to other unfinished business. Baldoni's four "I"s provide a framework for considering this. Following the identification of the main target audiences for the launch effort which may be large or narrowly focused the vision would specify the appropriate course of action for each of those groups. Because of launch activities, who needs to know, be inspired, get engaged, and get an invitation?

The launch concept establishes the kind of launch events that are essential in order to organize the resources and the information needed to carry out those activities efficiently. As with the whole change endeavor, it's crucial to figure out not only who needs to change, but also how and when. When all of the focus is on the main opening activity the ribbon-cutting ceremony without taking into account how important audiences who are unable to attend the event will be engaged, it is an indication of a poorly thought out launch idea [5], [6].

The idea's most important component is deciding which themes and messages to spread. The organization's message should be made clear in the launch idea. The other components of the launch concept are similar to those of the change effort itself: a purpose statement outlining the rationale behind the effort's launch; a list of key tasks, which could be interpreted as the

sequence of launch events to be carried out; an explanation of the shift from pre-launch to post-launch and its implications for the organization's members and others; and an indication of when the launch phase will conclude, at which point the effort will enter full implementation.

Step 3. Create the launch strategy

Thorough planning starts. The organization has to decide which events take place when and what each one is meant to achieve. Events may be arranged differently depending on the audiences and accepted conventions. Such standards can, for instance, mandate higher level interactions before reaching the target audience. Engaging with a multinational stakeholder first may be necessary before engaging with member nations, particularly if the audience spans an entire geographic area of responsibility. For instance, in the case of a NATO change initiative, engagement at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe may be necessary before engaging with member nations. Alteration initiatives involving interagency partners could need departmental or ministry involvement prior to bureaucratic or subordinate agency involvement.

The coalition must also choose how often to interact directly with the same large audiences. Due to schedule conflicts and other issues, the intended order of launch events may not be possible, but any changes should be considered against the possibility that some audience segments would feel mistreated or will not hear the organization's messages.

Setting the script for each event comes next once the events have been ordered. Every launch event offers a chance to communicate the intended messages, even to audiences that aren't there in person to hear or see it. Scripts serve as a reflection of both the messages to be shared and the methods for doing so. They may be quite prescriptive, like a speech that is read aloud, but recipients may find such communications off-putting and unauthentic. Less restrictive formats might include "talking points" or other such structures that guarantee message coherence while giving the speaker leeway [7], [8].

It is recommended that planners put together a committee of individuals who are not directly involved in the campaign's creation, or who are external to the business, to assess the themes, messaging, leader-specific messages, and corporate identity. The red team should ideally be well-versed on the target audiences of the campaign, including stakeholders and outside parties. This is particularly important for people that the military often has little interaction with, including foreign communities. Anticipated issues encompass a range of issues, such as unsuccessful message delivery, unambiguous rejection by target audiences, early exposure of the change initiative due to insider or opponent leaks, ineffective countering of misinformation or debunking of the effort, and unforeseen obstacles with the necessary methods and means, including unanticipated resource requirements. In the event that any of these occur, the coalition should consider the potential damage to the reform effort. Occasionally, these difficulties provide opportunities, or leaders might lessen them by taking proactive measures. For instance, a trial balloon—a small-scale test communication in which a message is made limitedly public—can reveal worries with premature exposure. If results are positive, the coalition may accept the test message and go on with the strategy with more vigor. If the message is negative, the coalition has the option to reject it and therefore refrain from using it going forward in the change initiative.

The last thing to think about when creating the launch strategy is which audiences the company needs to leave out. This is not a topic for comfort, since learning that an audience is being excluded might damage the organization's image and undermine the transformation initiative. Other than disarming adversaries, there are a few further justifications for

excluding an audience. It could be necessary to restrict access to change initiatives including sensitive information to individuals who have a legitimate need to know. Certain audiences may not be allowed to access material by laws, rules, or regulations. For example, contractors may not be exposed to future government contract decisions. Even though coalition members should be aware of these limitations, errors may still happen, especially if there are many simultaneous communications and a dispersed launch attempt. As a result, the strategy should take possibilities and chances to react into account in case anything goes wrong.

Step 4. Determine performance metrics

Performance metrics provide a way to assess the overall efficacy of the way the launch activities are conducted. It is not the same as efficacy metrics, which look at how launches affect viewers and, for example, how much they abandon their opponent. It is challenging to create relevant and trustworthy metrics that would be correlated with the change effort's future success, despite the fact that one should attempt to quantify such consequences. During launch, the organization's control the efficient delivery of the message should be the main emphasis. Performance metrics must to be created with more in mind than just updating the coalition on the organization's operations. They ought to serve as a catalyst for judgments on how best to modify both the launch and the ongoing change initiative. It is a question that one set of actions should try to address. Finding the gaps and inconsistencies brought about by errors, script deviations, or planning oversights is the goal. Using these steps, the coalition should swiftly modify the launch to fix any mistakes and provide clarification as required [9], [10].

Another set of measurements provides a response to the same question, but from the viewpoints of the audiences. The alliance should arrange itself to take advantage of say-hear gaps, which occur when listeners misunderstand the message and behave in unexpected ways as a result. Finding the potential cause whether it be misunderstandings, word conflation, hidden prejudices, or something else entirely would be helpful before making any necessary corrections for further interactions. Coalition members should modify the launch in order to prevent or reduce say-hear gaps, since it is crucial to make sure that the direct receivers received and are acting upon the correct message. Are audiences reacting as expected to the surprises? is the subject of a third set of metrics. Launch events may bring to light unspoken opinions about the change initiative. For instance, launch may compel external stakeholders to choose a side even if they may have been reluctant to express support or opposition. If members believe that the change effort as launched differs from what they had previously endorsed, their first reactions may also come as a surprise. This can occur if environmental circumstances have altered since the coalition first recognized the issue.

Step 5. Decide on the senior leader's own communication plan

Senior leaders assess their own responsibilities in the launch throughout the process in order to coordinate their actions with those of the company. They need to explain how they plan to determine if the launch's requirements are met. In a similar vein, top executives have to be very clear about what level of information the coalition will provide them with throughout launch. The leader have to step in and decide whether to proceed with the launch based on information that has been leaked too soon or other mitigating circumstances that would make the launch difficult.

Selecting which launch events to attend, which to watch, and which to assign responsibilities to others is a difficult task for the senior leader. There's little doubt that audiences will notice distinctions and pay more attention to those that the senior leader personally attends. During the campaign, leaders may utilize multimedia to raise their visibility. For example, they can

offer taped remarks and social media releases during launch events. The senior leader's other needs also determine the involvement levels. Senior executives have to consider the risks involved in their decisions. Post-launch expectations may be influenced by participation levels. A leader who is all over the place early on in the launch may not be able to maintain that pace later on, which might cause detractors to claim the change effort won't last long. A mistake made by a leader could affect the campaign more than a mistake made by a member. Additionally, adversaries can decide to focus their critiques on the senior leader without regard to the reform initiative, halting the intended momentum. It is not advisable for senior executives to assess their own performance metrics. The leader's viewpoint might be very positive or excessively critical of themselves. Since it is hard for leaders to be impartial about how they perform at launch events, it is preferable to rely on unbiased or independent sources.

DISCUSSION

Resistance and Ambivalence

Change may be very uncomfortable, even when it is essential, as noted by American philosopher Eric Hoffer. According to him, "any drastic change is a crisis in self-esteem; a population going through a drastic change is a population of misfits, and misfits breathe and live in a passionate atmosphere." There will be reluctance to undertake change initiatives even in the best of situations, when leaders and members are in agreement on the objectives. Will everything turn out okay? What will occur to me? Naturally, this can only occur as a result of the regular turbulence in the surroundings. Organizational existence involves friction, stress, and conflict. Of course, the status quo presents a challenge to anybody hoping to spearhead change. According to Kotter, there are two reasons why the status quo endures: either because people actively work to maintain it or because institutional obstacles keep people from supporting change. The first is the conventional understanding of resistance, which holds that individuals act as roadblocks to advancement. Change initiatives, in Kotter's opinion, must overcome opposition; if a "troublesome" supervisor stands in the way of the change, it is best to fire them [11], [12].

The oversimplification of Kotter's usage of the term "troublesome" is problematic. It is based on a well-known story of a worker who has acquired information and abilities that the change attempt may render outdated and who does not want to comply. The problematic supervisor is an issue if the change endeavor adheres to Van de Ven and Poole's classic life-cycle engine of change. Since the organization is attempting to transform as a whole, any member who is not on board might be a barrier that needs to be removed or remedied. It's mend yourself or go home, is the message.

This perspective on resistance is too limited to be helpful in big, complex institutions like the military. Given the inherent conflicts resulting from shared organizational paradoxes, it follows that every presentation of a change vision runs the danger of offending people whose opinions differ from your own. Think of interservice rivalry or joint-service conflicts, for instance, when conflicting viewpoints originate from distinct fields of competence, history, and culture. Concerns about the equity of the services are likely to arise from a change initiative that promotes a collaborative viewpoint. Similarly, attempts by the services to pursue service-oriented goals may cause suspicion among those who have a vested interest in promoting jointness. Therefore, in real life, resistance to one's reform initiative is inevitable. However, change agents will encounter more difficult challenges than opposition. The bigger difficulty lies in members' contradictory emotions on change, or ambivalence. While some members of the resistance may be straightforward and tell the change agent, "No!", many

individuals are likely to be uncomfortable and say nothing, neither fully supporting the effort nor attempting to thwart it. It might be that they are uncomfortable making a commitment or that they do not think they fully comprehend the goal of the change endeavor. Maybe they don't know how the endeavor will impact them or others, or they worry that the change agent is too enthusiastic about the likelihood of success. Members reject change for a variety of reasons and in a variety of methods, some more complex than others. Open communication from the steering coalition or senior leader is essential to resolving these issues. Building trust between the coalition and the organization's members is essential to getting individuals to support the change initiative in spite of their reservations.

Theory of transitions Bridges

The organization experiences an uncomfortable and uncertain transition toward the new normal even when members broadly approve and welcome a change effort; this often entails a reluctance to let go of the old methods, regardless of how inadequate or unproductive they were. By characterizing transition as a psychological phenomenon with a multi-phase "process that people go through as they internalize and come to terms with the details of the new situation change brings about," Bridges distinguishes between change and transition. In other words, a transition is brought about by change. While Bridges' three stages of transitions are very diverse both within and across people, Lewin's depiction of changes was a succession of three distinct phases. Ending, Losing, Letting Go is the first phase that predominates in the early stages of the transition. It stands for the state of giving up on a familiar activity. This illustrates the confusion brought on by giving up the old way of doing things, as opposed to Lewin's unfreezing, which focuses on the possibility of the new. In the US military, it may be very difficult to let go of old habits, particularly after combat success has cemented them. It reminds me of the adage "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." According to Bridges, in order to effectively cope with the pain of letting go of the past, members of an organization must be able to mourn. The second stage, which Bridges refers to as The Neutral Zone, is characterized by intense anxiety and an emotional "no-man's land" while a person "journeys from one identity to the other." Members may find the old methods more appealing than the unproven and immature new ways that the change effort is pushing when they are in this zone since they are, in a sense, looking over their shoulder. There's a strong want to give up and turn around. Therefore, the task for advocates is to stick with it, steer the organization through the transitional phase, and encourage innovative solutions to issues that crop up as a result of the change effort. This is another reason why discussing the impending shift while developing the idea for the change attempt is beneficial. Bridges's New Beginning is the third stage. Although it happens simultaneously with the first two stages, this phase becomes more significant with time. Bridges highlights that embracing the new is not the same as letting go of the old. People could feel uneasy as the organization implements the novel and untested approach. The issues and the change's undesirable second-order impacts might show up. Even while members who have reached this point may not want to return to their previous behaviors, it does not imply they are content or happy. The concept explains how companies adapt to change, often in a negative manner. Coping operations may not be obvious to the proponent because the many large-scale reform initiatives in the U.S. military are intricate and include units and organizations spread over the world. A change endeavor may be derailed by paying insufficient attention to coping, particularly if the firm persists in using its outdated methods of operation in spite of warnings from upper management.

Clawson's seven stages of buy-in

How could these coping mechanisms affect people's willingness to accept or reject change when the leader confronts them? Military organization leaders often demand that reform

initiatives be somewhat socialized. This is a logical consequence of these kinds of companies' hierarchical structure and ingrained need for teamwork. Change agents must so notify all impacted departments or groups and solicit their opinions and assistance. People who don't know ahead of time could oppose change only because they feel left out. Senior managers who want to keep the environment focused on the team are more likely to take the side of the ignorant party and tell the change agent to double down on communication. However, leaders may assume that socialization equates to acceptance, which is different from readiness to support. John Clawson challenges this idea by defining seven different buy-in levels that are explained along a spectrum of reactions to change. These are: enthusiasm, engagement, agreement, compliance, indifference, passive resistance, and active resistance, in order of most positive to most negative. Keep in mind that Clawson uses buy-in differently than most people do, and he explicitly discusses this. "A lot of people seem to think that buy-in is something you either have or you don't. The difference instead lies in whether or not the members are aware of this. Hence, when members buy in with active opposition, they actively try to thwart the initiative and defy the leader's intentions. Therefore, the objective of change agents is not just to socialize but also to do so in a manner that pushes others in the direction of positivity. While indifference and acquiescence are acceptable, passion is unquestionably preferred. In the meanwhile, socialization ought to reveal possible sources of both passive and active opposition, giving people a chance to voice their worries and provide input that the leader may take into account.

CONCLUSION

An important strategic framework for organizational executives starting transformation projects. The article presents a five-step approach that highlights the need of thorough preparation, effective communication, and flexibility in managing the challenges associated with implementing change. The significance of building a solid basis for successful change attempts is shown in the focus on ideal launch circumstances, a clear launch vision, and a well-thought-out launch strategy. By using performance measurements, leaders may get vital insights into the efficacy of their efforts, which enables them to make timely changes and improvements.

The article also emphasizes the importance of top leaders in coordinating change and the need of a well-planned personal communication strategy. A more complex view of leadership dynamics during change implementation is made possible by the difficulties in determining involvement levels and the significance of external assessment. The study offers helpful insights on handling resistance and ambivalence as it expands its topic to include the larger field of organizational difficulties. The integration of transition theory with the seven degrees of buy-in enhances comprehension of various responses in the organizational setting and provides leaders with useful strategies to manage these intricacies.

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CHAPTER 9

RESISTANCE AND AMBIVALENCE IN ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE: INSIGHTS AND STRATEGIES

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ABSTRACT:

The intricate dynamics of resistance and ambivalence encountered during organizational change efforts, providing valuable insights and practical strategies for leaders and change agents. Drawing from studies on individual and organizational responses to change, the paper highlights the multifaceted nature of resistance, encompassing behavioral, emotional, and cognitive dimensions. Ambivalence, characterized by conflicting attitudes or desires, is scrutinized as a nuanced state that warrants a distinct approach. The narrative unfolds through an examination of Sandi Piderit's research on the various manifestations of resistance and the recognition of ambivalence as a potential source of energy for change agents. The analysis extends to the organizational level, introducing the metaphor of an "immune system" that organizations develop to safeguard against change. The study showcases the challenges faced by change agents when opposition consolidates into structured resistance, emphasizing the need for strategic communication and engagement. Furthermore, it cautions against hastily dismissing resistance, acknowledging its inevitability and proposing a more nuanced perspective that considers ambivalence as a tool for fostering dialogue.

KEYWORDS:

Ambivalence, Change, Leadership, Resistance, Strategies, Support.

INTRODUCTION

Piderit's conflicted and reluctant responses to change let's stick to the more negative end of Clawson's range, which includes aggressive opposition and indifference. What attitudes and actions could follow? Three main areas of focus were identified by Sandi Piderit in her evaluation of research on resistance to change. Behavioral is the most apparent. Members or interested parties deliberately act to resist the change or exert less effort. Change agents or senior executives need to address these behaviors since they are simpler to see. Observable emotional reactions might also often take the shape of grievances or increased worry brought on by a shift. Sometimes people want to help the change effort, but they find it too much to bear. Academics like Argyris explained that these reactions were the outcome of a person's innate protective patterns and suggested strategies like coaching to assist get over them. It might be difficult to identify cognitive reactions, which can manifest as resistance or an unwillingness to change [1], [2].

An internal struggle of conflicting wants or attitudes regarding something is called ambivalence. Ambivalence effectively conveys the unease with change that Hoffer discussed before, but it only shows up in relation to change initiatives. Even when someone wants to assist and cognitively supports the change effort's goals, they may have unfavorable feelings about the possible disturbance. When the soldiers learn that they might have to work in makeshift office trailers for two years and maintain their vehicles in a muddy field at the far end of post, they may not respond positively to the promise of a new brigade combat team

facility, furnished with cutting-edge upgrades and modern maintenance bays. Another instance would be if members object to the change but are also careful not to insult a leader they find endearing. They could adhere to the plan, however grudgingly, or they might use covert tactics to show their disapproval.

Ambivalence may also exist within a response category. Cognitive reactions, for instance, may contradict one another and be phrased as "Good idea, but." The "but" might refer to a number of practical concerns with following the concept, including time, location, and strategy. These points of view may be very beneficial and spark discussions that address valid worries about the change initiative, hence raising the likelihood of success. However, emotional ambivalence may be much more intricate. An overseas unit's return to the continental United States might elicit both relief and sorrow at the same time. It may be challenging for people to articulate these conflicting feelings. It might be detrimental to see resistance and ambivalence as challenges that must be conquered. Piderit issued a warning, saying, "Moving too quickly toward congruent positive attitudes toward a proposed change might cut off the necessary discussion and improvisation." Instead, she saw ambivalence as a possible source of energy, a means by which change agents might interact with and hear out members while they planned and carried out changes. This is crucial to keep in mind when thinking about change initiatives in big organizations because of the wide range of opposing viewpoints and possible ways to understand the motivation and tactics behind a change initiative [3], [4].

Organizations Are Resistance to Change

If only people practiced ambivalence and resistance, things would be lot easier. Then, in an effort to enlighten, persuade, or at the at least motivate members to get out of the way of advancement, leaders and change agents might speak with each member on an individual basis. However, since they have comparable fears about the shift, individual resistors tend to join together. As the resistance network expands, the opposition becomes more structured and coordinates its discontent. Gilley, Godek, and Gilley illustrated how reactions to change may develop from a clamor of disparate concerns to a cohesive, powerful resistance by drawing a comparison between the human immune system and other systems. This happens even in cases when the possible change intervention has clear advantages.

People sense when a change attempt is underway and start to ask inquiries, just as the body's receptor cells do when they identify viruses. Fear and false impressions spread, causing rumors or gossip to surface and opposition to organize. Sabotaging the change endeavor or rejecting or avoiding the change might come next. Large organizations, by nature complex, tend to have strong and effective immune systems. Despite the coalition's best efforts, it is possible that a large portion of the organization will hear about the change initiative indirectly via third- and second-hand sources as opposed to directly from the change agent or senior leader. When the change agent is leading the transformation without clearly awarded senior leadership credibility, resistance may organize swiftly. Resistors could be the change agent's rivals, and the change effort might suffer only as a result of who came up with the original concept. Alternately, resistors might be reacting to a scarcity of resources or apprehension over their loss or reallocation [5], [6].

It is important to discuss why crushing opposition is seldom a wise course of action before wrapping up. This will be enticing since, as previously said, resistance is inevitable. So how much does it really pay off to invest the time and effort to please everyone? Why not simply issue the instruction and compel compliance from the top leader instead? The reason for this is that some reform initiatives are certain to fail, even with careful planning and enthusiastic

member support. The ideal course of action in these situations is for the company to conclude the endeavor in a manner that encourages other change initiatives. This isn't how the authoritarian method works. Rather, participants would develop an innate resistance to further change.

For instance, the predictors of member reactions to organizational change events developed by Oreg et al. began with a straightforward example of an IT project at a for-profit company. Although everyone in the group accepted the new feature and supported the project, the program didn't function as intended. The initiative collapsed as support declined and apathy about the endeavor increased. This case study teaches us that although there are several reasons why a change endeavor could not work, it is always preferable to create an atmosphere where change is welcomed rather than imposing change on its constituents. The pre-launch stage is not the only time to deal with resistance and ambivalence. The material that has been covered so far in this article illustrates the attitudes and actions that leaders and change agents will have to deal with from the beginning of the change endeavor until its conclusion. Luckily, there are indicators that can be used to forecast shifts in how people will react to an endeavor both before and after launch. Three types of "predictor criteria" were found by Oreg et al.; one of these will probably impact members' opinions about a change attempt, whether positive or negative, and the other two will affect members' propensity to act on their replies or to disengage [7], [8].

The first set of predictors consists of variables that affect how much members perceive the change initiative to be "aligned with their own interests." Change agents are more likely to evaluate these interests in the moment during pre-launch preparation in order to gain support for the launch choice. Members may reevaluate how effectively their interests are being served when the change effort is implemented and they have more knowledge about how it is going and how it impacts them in real life. As a result, once-unwavering support may start to fade. The second category includes elements that affect members' loyalty to the organization and the degree to which the change effort is tangible in their eyes. Members who have a strong sense of commitment to the organization are more likely to see change initiatives positively, as the authors point out. A physical feeling of the shift is just as vital. Members who are involved or seeing the change effort are more likely to see it as important if an event is soon, which encourages them to become involved. Members are more likely to withdraw from a change attempt if they perceive it to be too remote or intangible—for example, if important events are scheduled for the far future or involve units on different postings. The last category focuses on members' feelings of control and support as well as the tools that are available to help them adjust to the change. Do members feel abandoned or do they have access to social support that enables them to come together and struggle through the challenges of change? Do members feel pressured into positions and behaviors they are less comfortable with, or do they have some degree of liberty to reshape their responsibilities within the organization?

For this reason, communication is essential throughout the whole transition process. The goal and objectives of the transformation should be explicitly stated and embodied by senior leaders, who should also provide an acceptable example. This promotes candid communication and creates an environment that is conducive to change. While it's not always a good idea to crush opposition at every point, leaders should take it as a sign that they need more information. It is important to differentiate the strategies used by the top-level executive to bring about change from those that are part of the endeavor to lessen opposition. It would be inaccurate to assume that engaging in a participatory manner is more necessary for minimizing resistance than a directive one. Senior executives should use a firm top-down

approach to change, for instance, if the company is experiencing poor performance or a crisis brought on by misbehavior. By outlining the how and why of the shift, one may stop rumors and gossip from casting doubt on the leaders' intentions. Leaders in extremely big companies should never presume that the goal and methods for implementing change are obvious. For instance, a review of fifty years of failed attempts at acquisition reform by military scholars Chuck Allen and Peter Eide found that there was always a "nexus of agreement" to "execute weapons procurement more efficiently," but there was no indication of what the reforms would entail from the official vision statement of "Acquisition excellence through leadership with integrity." One useful strategy to leverage such circumstances to support the transformation endeavor is to intentionally participate in a two-way relationship while using ambivalence as a tool. Listening and maintaining conversation are crucial in both large-scale settings like global teleconferences and small-scale settings like one-on-one follow-up meetings. Recognizing and understanding opposing viewpoints lessens the detrimental impacts of ambivalence and increases the likelihood that a diverse range of people, including the whole population of service members, would support a change initiative. Leaders may also create implementation plans that cater to a larger portion of the combined force with the help of these useful tools. Excessive hierarchical communication, especially during a teleconference, may be unsettling and inhibit discourse, leading to disinterest or open opposition to the endeavor.

DISCUSSION

Most transformation initiatives senior executives come across in the U.S. military are already in motion. Programs pertaining to weapons systems, for instance, may need years or even decades from inception to ultimate fielding, and program leadership may rotate every other year. Furthermore, hundreds of these initiatives are always in progress, and many of them rely on one another. Not all of the improvements that are ongoing are new programs. Aside from base realignments and closures, military construction, research and publication of new doctrine, new requirements for training and education, host nation support agreements, contingency operations, diplomatic relations, and military-to-military contacts, there are many other factors that influence change within the U.S. military. It is not always feasible to coordinate all of these operations, despite the best efforts of top military officers [9], [10].

When taking over change initiatives, senior executives or change agents should begin with the premise that activities should go on until there is proof that they shouldn't. Removing an endeavor from its predecessor too quickly can only serve to incite opposition to the one's own. Senior executives should, of course, take the time to carefully consider the initiatives, determine why they need to continue, and assess them objectively. There are five ways to proceed with a change effort: carry it out exactly as it is, carry it out with changes, re-design the endeavor, halt the effort, or entirely undo it to return to the previous state of affairs. The latter two are not synonymous with the former as halting refers to putting an end to organizational energy expenditure and accepting the new state of the organization, while undoing refers to starting a second change endeavor with the goal of regaining as much of the initial condition as feasible.

More has to be communicated by senior leaders than simply the decision. They have to presume that those who are opposed to the change endeavor will take advantage of the transition to weaken it. Senior leaders must so promptly inform their organizations that the efforts are being reviewed and that members are expected to stay committed until instructed differently. While the evaluation is being conducted, the leader must communicate their concerns to the organization and provide direction on any necessary quick improvements to the endeavor if they feel it is flagging and that there is a high probability of it being

cancelled. Reducing mystery and keeping the organization's immune system from exploiting information gaps are more important goals than limiting disturbance. A thorough evaluation gives the senior leader the negotiation power to assist steer a faltering effort back on course, even if the assessment may not be achievable. This article poses a number of important topics for leaders to think about and provides broad analytical principles related to each subject. It's difficult to respond to these queries. They're all context-specific.

One should attempt to rebuild the original change narrative and develop the change effort's historical trail to its current shape in order to provide a response to this issue. It is then feasible to determine if the effort is still adequate for solving the issue that was first planned. The original urgency that sparked the change initiative may no longer exist, and those who came before may have put so much effort into the project that they were blind to the fact that things had changed. It does not inherently mean that a program is ineffective if its main goal is to neutralize a danger, which it did. It's possible that the force will still need to be able to neutralize or dissuade more threats. Alignment is a question that leaders evaluating the endeavor must answer.

Before doing the analysis, leaders need to avoid the trap of holding onto an idea that the endeavor is not on the right road. It's possible that a leader disagreed with the initial feeling of urgency or was aware of environmental developments that cast doubt on the effort's goal or rate of advancement. It is crucial to evaluate the endeavor from the standpoint of the preceding change agent [11], [12].

Connection between this endeavor and others

Members of the armed forces navigate a constantly shifting ocean. There are dozens or perhaps hundreds of change initiatives underway at any one moment! There are local and enterprise-level ones. While some are at the concept stage, where change agents are creating urgency and building the governing coalitions, others are developed, planned, and moving forward. Certain attempts to change will rely on others. For instance, the deployment of a new weapon system may be contingent on the building of a facility, the state of technical preparedness, or the capacity to attract and keep the personnel necessary to implement the change. Of fact, rivalry for the same resources might sometimes cause interdependent attempts to clash. It is essential for senior executives and change agents to look beyond the churn and assist the company in comprehending the ongoing change initiatives, their motivations, and how each fits into the larger strategy framework. Senior leaders also need to be aware that changing a change effort runs the danger of postponing it and having a domino impact on other ongoing change initiatives. This does not absolve the leader from making the difficult choice to end initiatives that are not yielding results. It is preferable for leaders to make well-informed judgments, notify relevant parties of those decisions, and establish guidelines that permit the continuation of other change initiatives. In summary, leaders should always decide on changes in a manner that will encourage further changes in the future.

There are many possible roadblocks to advancement; the key issue is which ones are the most significant. Anything that blatantly stands in the way of realizing the transformation vision is what I refer to as a major barrier. Leaders need to remove these obstacles or risk the endeavor failing or being severely delayed. While not all of them, there are a number of prevalent causes of crucial obstacles.

Large-scale change initiatives never go as intended, especially when they include important external players, need technology advancements, or confront challenging settings; modifications in the

The US military encounters all three routinely. The majority of transformation initiatives inside the U.S. military are funded by Congress, raising concerns about the initiative's effectiveness and potential roadblocks. Programs may be abruptly terminated due to a lack of technical preparedness, which is a subjective criterion in and of itself as the U.S. military works to maintain its technological advantage. Similar to how situational changes may call into question the importance, urgency, or priority of a change endeavor, so too can the organic flow of the strategic environment. Although ambivalence and resistance may be important sources of hurdles, senior leaders should be cautious in judging how important they are. It's simple to overreact and see any resistance as flaws rather than as a chance. They could try to intimidate or overwhelm their opponents. However, underreacting is another typical error made by change agents and senior executives. In an attempt to keep their focus on the change initiative and their many other obligations, they choose to ignore or minimize the resistance, believing that the benefits of the work will be sufficiently obvious. Another frequent cause of difficulties is the governance framework, which includes the change effort's pace. While inadequate governance conveys to members that the work is not that essential, appropriate governance supports the transformation endeavor. Belief in the coalition, the advocate, and maybe the senior leader is undermined by perceptions of ineptitude. Artificial or unreasonable timelines may cause a company to respond negatively, particularly if they are predicated on the leaders' anticipated tenures. Put another way, members will feel more confident to slack off and wait for the replacement if the whole transformation initiative is centered upon the senior leader rather than the company. Senior leaders may counter this by keeping members' attention on the long-term benefits to the company and the transformation vision. Intermediate deadlines need to be significant and serve as a decision-making tool, according to senior management. If not, members can consider collecting and reporting data to be a pointless effort. The effort's credibility might decline.

It is also important for senior executives to consider how the communication campaign aids in the endeavor. According to Kotter, leaders often fail to adequately explain change initiatives, which may cause members and leaders to either ignore or devalue the change effort. However, leaders risk over communicating when they discuss change in ineffective ways or at inappropriate times. The message may get stale or uninspired if the top leader does not alter it. Efforts may also be derailed by leaders if they mostly discuss them in their closing statements during staff calls, when the change effort is just one of many important initiatives that are quickly mentioned. It may seem as if the message and the change initiative are unrelated to the command's top priorities. Instead, leaders need to include change-related communication into other endeavors. A logical extension of the governance problem concerns the caliber and timeliness of important implementation guidelines. In a first-hand account, the chief of staff signed the strategic plan for the command as the last official act before handing over power to the next chief of staff. The strategic plan was promptly canceled and a new one was initiated by the newly appointed chief of staff. The new chief of staff struggled to get the next strategic plan underway, and this series of events indicated to members that the leadership did not take change seriously. For instance, leaders may use certain power-coercive techniques to communicate and push for the necessary adjustments if an internal crisis was the driving force behind the transformation attempt. This may not fit well with a company culture that promotes teamwork and participatory approaches as standard operating procedures. Data analysis is often used to support changes to organizational structures or weaponry, which may favor rational-empirical methods. It shouldn't be necessary to halt the modification endeavor in order to retool it. The idea or strategy has to be reevaluated if it is the cause of a significant obstacle. Decisions taken in the past on the direction the endeavor takes may be changed by leaders.

Continue or Give Up the Effort

The aforementioned suggests that the change endeavor should go on, and in fact, the change agent's default strategy should be that. Rapidly ending a change endeavor after taking accountability is a risky course of action. Because it may be arbitrary and terminated at any moment, it may convey to members that it is not worthwhile to invest time and energy in a change endeavor.

However, change agents should always be forthright and truthful while determining whether to continue with a certain endeavor. The endeavor need to go on if it remains relevant and feasible. If the original issue persists but the effort is reaching a point where its benefits seem to be waning or leaders are growing frustrated with the apparent lack of progress, the change agent should make suggestions to reframe the effort into something different that might avoid or at least lessen the obstacles it is currently facing. When making these kinds of decisions, care should be taken to prevent inadvertently alerting opponents or resisters, who could then start plotting to derail the change initiative before a final choice regarding its course is reached.

The senior leader should first establish legitimacy over the transformation endeavor and its future, regardless of the result. The top leader has to show that they own and embrace the transformation endeavor if they want it to go on. By doing this, members and stakeholders restore the change effort's validity and break its links to its predecessor. The new leader redoubled efforts to bring about change. If legitimacy isn't established, the organization's immune system can activate and thwart the endeavor. Overstating failure or attributing all shortcomings and unfulfilled objectives on a subpar plan or strategy are two examples of resistance. It might also take the shape of rejecting the earlier one. Whatever the final choice, there is still a lot of communication to be done. Leader communications should show empathy for both opponents and supporters while describing how the change effort moves forward, whether or not changes are made. It is important for leaders to be transparent about what will change and what won't. Confusion is decreased as a result. The leader should direct a suitable portion of the message to the front lines, or specific service members and civilians who may be impacted, in order to set expectations for how the chain of command and other formal and informal channels will carry out the leader's intentions. This is especially crucial in very large organizations.

Even if the option is to halt or reverse the change initiative, senior leaders still need to demonstrate that the choice was legitimately made by them and that they did it in an impartial and logical manner. This is because those who have supported the endeavor could feel let down or even deceived. If the choice is made to halt, leaders need to make it clear which objectives to give up on or pursue in a different method and convey a plan for making the most of the endeavor. Additionally, senior executives need to outline a plan for ending the organization's efforts without leaving a disorganized collection of partially completed tasks, partially developed procedures and structures, and partially executed concepts. For these reasons, it is crucial that leaders refrain from giving opponents the authority to give up on their efforts unless doing so is specifically part of their termination plan.

A second change attempt is initiated if the choice is made to reverse the change effort! The primary conclusion of a research on the reversal of a strategic transformation initiative was this. The unsuccessful attempt altered the organization, leaving enduring memories and artifacts behind, such that the intended status quo ante was not reached. As far as feasible, the change reversal effort should aim to return things to how they were before, but leaders should

anticipate which components could be the hardest to revert and create expectations that the issue that needed to be fixed initially will be handled later.

A helpful military example comes from civilian human resource management: in the late 2000s, the National Security Personnel System, which was based on pay for performance, briefly replaced the long-standing General Schedule management and pay system. After many NSPS issues, the DoD quickly repaired the GS system. The goal of pay for performance was to incentivize employees to perform better and put in more effort while also fostering innovation. This was in contrast to the GS system, which rewarded length of service instead and was seen by supporters of the NSPS as rewarding mediocrity. However, as a result of ensuing pay disparities, employee unease and discontent, and onerous administrative requirements, the NSPS's implementation proved difficult. However, issues with pay variance and its conflict with the GS rank system persisted after the NSPS was abolished. In order to undo NSPS, a plan had to be in place to stop members from unjustly losing status or income they had earned. The workforce's cultural demonization of pay-for-performance as intrinsically unjust complicated attempts to look into other solutions for resolving the GS system's shortcomings, which the DoD wanted NSPS to remedy.

Determining causality in dynamic and diverse situations is quite challenging. Proponents of a change initiative could consider it successful too soon based on data from quick victories. They could also claim success since they haven't had any glaring setbacks. In the event that anything went wrong, supporters would assign responsibility to others. Anything less than the complete realization of the transformation vision might be used by opponents as proof of failure. They may alternatively assert that any achievements were the product of chance or extraordinary circumstances. Eliminating the hyperbole and separating the facts may be challenging.

Senior executives need to be cautious not to come out as just supporters of the changes they own or started. The leader's statement that change is not successful does not imply that it is. Instead, the greatest reason for their success is the organization's demonstrated good outcomes, for which the change effort is responsible. are three questions that make up a plausibility test that may be used to determine if a change attempt was successful or unsuccessful and to assist in communicating such a conclusion to others. Although they may not always eliminate subjectivity, the responses to these questions might help leaders rationalize their assessments of the worth of change initiatives. Leaders may also shift the focus from the value judgments themselves to the outcomes and lessons learned from the endeavor. The pursuit of improvement is a good topic in and of itself. It is more probable that members and stakeholders would embrace the leaders' viewpoints if they can communicate these ideas in a tangible way, citing verifiable facts and praising the efforts of organizational members. Primers like this one have two major functions. The first is instructional; it aids in guiding learners and pupils in comprehending difficult ideas or procedures in a methodical manner. The other is more useful. In a difficult scenario when judgment is needed, how can one start to comprehend the circumstances in order to provide a helpful course of action? With the vast amount of literature and real-world experience from thousands of researchers studying change, as well as hundreds of consultants and consulting companies trying to help businesses navigate change, it is difficult to address both goals in thirty thousand words or less. The Primer focused more on the series of questions that leaders and change agents should think about, even if it included many groundbreaking ideas and concepts. Neither theories nor change models are flawless. To be helpful in any particular circumstance, even well-known process models, such as those found in commercial business literature, must be

updated, changed, or contextualized. The triangle Pettigrew created and his analysis of it make this argument quite clear.

The main lesson is that it is ineffective to write off change as "too hard" in very huge institutions like the U.S. military. There are strategies for dealing with it, but they call for cooperation and patience. The dynamic and complicated nature of transformational change makes it impossible for leaders to create a flawless strategy that will hold up over time. If the strategy turns out to be unsuccessful, it should be acknowledged as a sign that the company is picking up valuable lessons from its execution. Failure occurs when an organization gives up on making changes and gives in to laziness or complacency. When opponents of the change gleefully pronounce an endeavor to have failed, it is not always a real failure. In the face of a constantly changing global security landscape, military institutions must strike a balance between addressing immediate requirements and preparing for future difficulties. There is a constant demand for change. Senior leadership positions need a readiness to accept and even encourage change. However, it may be challenging to identify which significant change initiatives are making progress, which need to be flagged, and which need to be modified or replaced totally in businesses when hundreds of such initiatives are underway at once. Leaders should find this primer useful in navigating this difficult climate and in making more informed choices on organizational change.

CONCLUSION

The story focuses on taking over, maintaining, and ending change initiatives while providing advice on how to assess the applicability and efficacy of current projects. Reconstructing the change narrative, evaluating alignment with organizational interests, and comprehending the interdependencies across diverse change initiatives are just a few of the important factors that are outlined in the paper for leaders. It also looks at important roadblocks to the advancement of change and offers tactics for refocusing efforts in the face of difficulties. The study, which focuses on change initiatives in big businesses, highlights how important good communication is at every stage of the change process. By defining parameters linked to alignment with interests, organizational commitment, and perceptions of support and control, it offers insightful information on anticipating member responses. It is emphasized how crucial it is to steer clear of an authoritarian strategy and instead use ambivalence as a weapon to boost change initiatives.

This article provides a comprehensive perspective on organizational change, making it an invaluable resource for leaders traversing the intricate terrain of resistance and ambivalence. It also offers practical techniques to increase the chances of effective change implementation.

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CHAPTER 10

PROCESS MODELS OF CHANGE OF AGILE AND SCRUM

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ABSTRACT:

The multifaceted realm of process models of change, providing a comprehensive overview of the theoretical frameworks and practical applications that guide organizational transformations. Process models serve as structured roadmaps, offering a systematic approach to understanding, planning, and implementing change initiatives. The paper categorizes and analyzes prominent process models, shedding light on their key components, stages, and underlying philosophies. Beginning with an examination of foundational change theories, the narrative progresses to outline renowned process models such as Lewin's Three-Step Model, Kotter's Eight-Step Process, and the ADKAR model. Each model is dissected to illuminate its unique contributions and limitations, allowing for a nuanced understanding of their applicability in diverse organizational contexts. The analysis extends to contemporary models that embrace agility and responsiveness, catering to the dynamic nature of today's business environment. Acknowledging the evolving landscape of change management, the paper explores the integration of technology, digitalization, and data-driven insights into modern process models. This includes an exploration of Agile and Scrum methodologies, emphasizing iterative and adaptive approaches to change implementation.

KEYWORDS:

Agile, Collaboration, Empiricism, Inspection, Iterative, Product Owner.

INTRODUCTION

All levels of change managers need to be skilled at determining when change is necessary. They must also possess the ability to take actions that will guarantee change. Although change agents put a lot of effort into making changes, it's generally acknowledged that up to 60% of change initiatives fall short of their goals. Making a mistake may be expensive. Therefore, it is crucial that people in charge of change do it "right," yet doing it "right" is not simple. Whether they are managers or consultants, change agents are often less successful than they might be because they engage in ways that limit their ability to influence enough of the results, failing to identify some of the critical dynamics that determine outcomes. This looks at change from the standpoint of the process, or the "how" of change and the manner in which a transition takes place. Following a discussion of the parallels and divergences amongst process theories, the emphasis shifts to reactive and self-reinforcing patterns of events, choices, and behaviors and how these impact change agents' capacity to accomplish desired outcomes. It is suggested that in order to minimize any negative effects from these sequences, those in charge of making changes must be able to take a step back and observe what is happening, including their own and others' behavior, recognize crucial turning points and subsequent patterns some of which may be hard to spot and consider other options that might produce better results [1], [2].

Conditions and procedures

A framework for understanding organizations as a system of interconnected parts that are incorporated into and heavily impacted by a larger system is provided by open systems

theory. The quality of fit between an organization's internal components—such as the workforce's skill set and its manufacturing technology and between that system and the larger system of which it is a part such as the organization's strategy and the opportunities and threats posed by the external environment is the key to any system's prosperity and long-term survival. According to Schneider et al., both internal and external alignment increase organizational performance because aligned systems minimize the loss of energy and resources since their varied components support rather than interfere with one another. Setting the example for change and motivating people to accomplish objectives that enhance both internal and external alignment are characteristics of effective leaders. Miles and Snow contend that it is more beneficial to see alignment as a process that entails looking for the greatest possible match between the organization's internal components and its environment rather than viewing it as a static state. Barnett and Carroll provide more details on the differences between processes and states. The state viewpoint concentrates on "what" needs to be altered, is being altered, or has already been altered. In contrast, the process view pays attention to the "how" of change and concentrates on the manner in which a shift takes place. It calls attention to matters like the rate of change and the order in which things happen, the process by which choices are made and conveyed, and the reactions individuals have to the deeds of others. An important part of this transformation process is played by change managers [3], [4].

The procedure for change

After conducting a thorough multidisciplinary literature survey, Van de Ven and Poole identified more than 20 distinct process theories. After further investigation, they were able to pinpoint four ideal categories of theories that provide different perspectives on the process of change: dialectical, teleological, life cycle, and evolutionary theories. Teleological theories describe change as an ongoing cycle of goal creation, execution, assessment, and learning and presuppose that organizations are adaptable and purposeful. Learning is significant because it may influence how objectives are set and how they are achieved. Dialectical theories describe stability and change in terms of confrontation and the balance of power between the opposing entities. They center on the competing agendas of various interest groups. According to life cycle theories, change occurs as a result of a process that moves through a required series of phases that are connected to one another and cumulative, meaning that each step is a necessary prelude to the subsequent stage.

According to evolutionary theories, change happens via an ongoing cycle of variation, selection, and retention. Variations are chosen based on how well they meet the needs of the environment and the resources at hand; they are not intentional; they simply happen. The preservation and upkeep of the organizational structures resulting from these changes via persistence and inertia is known as retention. All four theories see change as a culmination of numerous decisions, actions, and events that are connected in some way, although they differ in how much they emphasize that certain essential stages must be followed and how much the direction of change is predetermined or constructed [5], [6].

The phases' sequence

The sequence in which the steps of the change process occur is emphasized more in certain theories than in others. Compared to teleological theories, life cycle theories are more prescriptive in this regard. According to Flamholtz, organizations go through seven phases of growth, starting as a fresh enterprise and ending with decline and maybe rehabilitation. He contends that the standards for organizational performance shift with each developmental stage. During the initial phase of an organization's life cycle, survival is the main priority, and

markets and products are important areas for growth. Resource management and operating system development become critical responsibilities in the second stage, when resources are often strained and operating systems get overloaded. In order to guarantee the long-term operation of the firm, more formal management processes, such planning and management development, are needed during the third stage of the life cycle, and so on through the remaining seven phases.

The sequencing of steps is less prescribed by teleological theories. They depict change and development as an iterative process of goal formulation, execution, and assessment, which results in the alteration of an anticipated end state according to what the parties involved have discovered or planned. Although there is a logical progression linking each of these phases, the sequence need not, and often does not, unfold in a manner consistent with the previously described orderly linear process. To get a desired goal, for instance, the procedure would need to proceed tentatively, requiring ongoing testing or perhaps going back to previous phases, even if an initial diagnosis could make a problem clearer. Even in situations where a goal may be established early in the process, it is typical for unforeseen issues or fresh demands for change to surface and need attention even when the present change sequence is still ongoing. It aimed to expand its clientele to include those who often purchased cars that were more costly, like Ford or Opel. Although the company had previously said that it will introduce a new model that was technically better than other vehicles in its lineup, the announcement in early 2008 made it apparent that the range would also be repositioned and rebranded [7], [8].

The importer saw right once that this would need significant adjustments to its own operations. A large number of the merchants within its dealer network had originally been used automobile dealers.

Their showrooms were often located in buildings next to their original service shops or retail locations for gasoline. Many of their clients had been with them for a long time; they had started off buying used automobiles from them before switching to one of their selection of affordable imported models. An early diagnostic suggested that in order to draw in the kind of client base interested in higher-end, more costly automobiles, the importer would need to incentivize many of these dealers to renovate and upgrade their locations and, in some situations, move. Additionally, some dealers' sales techniques were very crude, which suggests that they need more education and training. The importer promptly started devising a change strategy, but early attempts to test out ideas for change with a sample of dealers encountered stiff pushback. This made me reconsider. In order to investigate the possibility of replacing some of the current dealers with dealers who were already selling more upscale vehicles and who might be interested in either switching brands or rebranding and selling the imported cars alongside their current range, the problem was reframed. Another diagnostic exercise was then conducted. When this tactic was put to the test, not many distributors of competing brands expressed any interest in switching or weakening their loyalty, which led to yet another reconsideration.

This third course of action included investigating the prospect of forming a new partnership with an Indian producer of low-cost automobiles in addition to assisting some of the current dealers in making the necessary adjustments to market the rebranded vehicles. In order to import and distribute its cars via dealers who weren't ready to go upscale, a linked company had to be established. The financial crunch's aftereffects affected auto sales before plans to execute this approach were far established, halting plans to relocate most dealers upmarket and causing the Indian manufacturer to declare a delay in launching its low-cost automobiles in European markets. These modifications necessitated further review of the circumstances.

DISCUSSION

According to Van de Ven and Poole, theories based on the life cycle and evolution portray change as a predestined process that proceeds in a predefined direction across time. This kind of transformation entails gradually modifying organizational structures in predictable ways. The limitations imposed by a larger system or some ingrained code may dictate the approach. For instance, Greenwood and Hinings contend that an organization's institutional framework may restrict its ability to adapt, particularly if it is a part of a larger system with closely interconnected links. Conversely, teleological and dialectical theories see change trajectories as created, meaning that those participating in the process have the ability to alter objectives and the means by which they are achieved. From this angle, the procedure is not unnecessarily restricted by an underlying code or by variables beyond the immediate system. The change agents have the ability to engage and take actions that have the potential to really impact the situation. According to the strategic choice framework, for instance, the caliber of the strategic decisions made by the leading coalition members in charge of the organization is one of the primary determinants of its efficacy. The importance of human agency is highlighted by teleological and dialectical theories, which also contend that change agents have the power to influence change in ways that either strengthen or weaken organizational effectiveness [9], [10].

The effect of order on result

It may not always be simple to accomplish this in practice, even though teleological and dialectical theories contend that members of a system have significant freedom to create change trajectories, break away from ingrained habits, and purposefully move the system towards redefined goals. To what degree the change leaders will be able to achieve this option will depend on the kind of change sequence reactive or self-reinforcing.

A series of interconnected choices, acts, and events make up a change process. They are related in that every event shapes later occurrences and is influenced by those that came before it. Event B is both a reaction to event A and a component that forms event C, which in turn affects D and so on, in the sequence A>B>C>D>E. The competing objectives of those engaged in a situation are the main focus of dialectical theories. Reactive sequences result from these disputes when one party opposes another's efforts to bring about a certain change. Subsequent events in reactive sequences contest preceding events rather than validating them. A decision is put into action by a leader as the first step towards reaching a certain goal. The leader's original objective is supported by the reactions that follow this action, but these responses are fleeting. Others respond to the previous incidents, maybe because they don't think the present course of development will help them much. This turning point results in a new direction being pushed for the transformation. However, it's possible that this new course won't last long. It is tested in this instance after occurrence Y. It may not always be feasible to please everyone, and some people may oppose the change, even while those spearheading the change may try to minimize conflict by developing a vision that takes into account the interests of several constituencies, including bosses, peers, subordinates, consumers, suppliers, and financiers. This emphasizes how crucial it is to behave in a manner that will mobilize everyone concerned to support change in addition to striving to establish a workable course for it.

Self-confirming patterns

When a choice or action results in positive feedback that supports the direction of development and reinforces previous occurrences, it creates a self-reinforcing sequence. Additional movement in the same direction is induced by this reinforcement. Self-reinforcing

patterns may be advantageous in the short run, but change managers must be aware that they may lead participants down a road that produces unfavorable results in the long run. Three factors will be used to explain this: cognitive biases, psychological commitment to previous judgments, and self-reinforcing sequences increasing returns [11], [12].

Growing profits

Economists first became interested in the idea of growing returns as a major force behind self-reinforcing sequences. Pierson links Arthur and David to the early interest. They contended that a given technology, even though it might not be the most efficient alternative, may generate increasing returns and achieve a decisive advantage over competing technologies, like the Dvorak keyboard and Betamax video format, if it is the first to market or widely adopted by early users. Examples of these technologies include the QWERTY keyboard and the VHS video format. Arthur identifies four factors that may encourage rising returns. These prerequisites apply to almost every facet of organizational transformation, not only the acceptance and spread of new technology.

Setup expenses

When they are large, there is a strong incentive to continue with a selected course of action in order to disperse expenditures over an extended period of time. For instance, if new arrangements are maintained over time after the adoption of a new business process, then rising returns from the original investment are probably going to be realized.

Acquiring knowledge Repetitive application of knowledge may result in enhanced proficiency and ongoing development. Members of an organization, for instance, learn by doing, and the more they do, the more skilled they become. Because using these newly gained competencies yields ever-increasing profits, this learning offers a strong motivation to keep going in the same direction. Changing to a new method of working might result in decreasing benefits until new competencies are built, at least initially. Sync when more people choose the same course of action, the advantages of that specific activity grow. Video retailers discovered that it was more profitable to carry VHS tapes than Betamax tapes as more people purchased VHS recorders, which in turn drove more people to purchase VHS recorders, according to Arthur. Choosing the appropriate horse to bet on Individuals are driven to choose the course of action they believe will be most widely embraced because they are aware that alternatives that do not gain widespread favor would eventually have negative effects. They believe that if they stick with this decision, the returns will become better over time.

Psychological adherence to previous choices

A further process that reinforces itself is the psychological adherence to previous decisions. Staw contends that, in reality, decision makers are often driven by retroactive rationality and the desire to defend previous choices, despite the majority of decision theories which hold that people are prospectively rational and make judgments in order to maximize future gain. According to Staw, when leaders are confronted with unfavorable consequences after making a choice, they could allocate more resources to support their prior judgment and prove that their initial course of action was ultimately sensible. However, the situation may not be saved by the extra spending. Rather, it may result in more unfavorable effects, which would then spur further investment decisions in an effort to achieve favorable results. This destructive loop is referred to by Staw as the "escalation of commitment" to a decided path of action. This increasing level of dedication seems to be encouraged by two causes. First and foremost, change managers must prove their own abilities and provide evidence for a previous choice.

This might be in the form of justifying oneself to maintain their own sense of self-worth or justifying others to convince them that a past choice was correct. The second is a reaction to what is seen to be consistent pressure. According to Staw, there is a misconception in many organizational contexts that change managers who act consistently are stronger leaders than those who veer between several courses of action. Change managers who are consistent in sticking to their plan of action even in the face of early setbacks are perceived as brave, devoted, and unwavering, while those who keep an eye on performance and are willing to adjust course if results fall short of expectations are perceived as less decisive and less effective.

These factors may push change managers to intensify their adherence to previous choices in the hopes that this adherence will show that, in retrospect, a seemingly bad choice turned out to be a wise one. It is often difficult to veer away from this self-reinforcing pattern, even for change agents who are aware that a number of their previous choices were incorrect. As part of the FiReControl project, nine specially constructed regional control centers were to be connected via a new national computer system in place of the control rooms in 46 local Fire and Rescue Services located across England. In addition to enhancing national resilience, this new interconnected network was intended to make it easier for fire departments to be sent to the locations of major catastrophes, such as terrorist attacks, industrial accidents, train collisions, or floods. With a budget of £70 million, the project was started in 2004 but was abandoned in December 2010 due to a number of setbacks and issues. At least £469 million was squandered and none of the initial goals were met. Due to the non-delivery of the new computer system, eight of the purpose-built centers had sat unused for as long as three years, resulting in maintenance costs of £4 million each month.

Despite their criticism of the project's management in April 2010, members of Parliament on the Communities and Local Government Select Committee said that the project should go on since so much money had already been spent on it and that it will ultimately pay off. In contrast, the Fire Brigades Union said that carrying on would entail "throwing good money after bad." The committee recommended that the project proceed, and Shahid Malik, the fire minister at the time, agreed, saying, "The government agrees with the select committee that the FiReControl project should continue with renewed vigour." Not everyone agreed with this suggestion.

CONCLUSION

Dynamic change processes are and how choosing or modifying process models to fit certain organizational settings requires flexibility. When it comes to managing effective and long-lasting change projects, having a thorough grasp of process models becomes more important as businesses struggle with the need of constant adaptability. The story also discusses how leadership affects change, highlighting the need of a corporate culture that is prepared for change. It makes its way through the complexities of communication tactics, stakeholder participation, and the need of creating a cooperative atmosphere that supports change. A comprehensive view of the development of process models of change is offered by the synthesis of theoretical underpinnings, conventional models, and modern methodologies. Using real-world experiences as a basis, practical insights are provided to help leaders, organizations, and change agents navigate the challenges of transformative journeys. It emphasizes how dynamic change processes are and promotes using process models in an integrative and contextually aware manner. In the end, this investigation advances the current conversation about successful change management techniques and offers insightful advice for those tasked with leading and navigating organizational.

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CHAPTER 11

CHANGE: COGNITIVE BIASES, PATH DEPENDENCE, AND STRATEGIC INSIGHTS IN ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS

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ABSTRACT:

The complexities of organizational change, exploring the impact of cognitive biases, path dependence, and strategic insights on the transformation process. Change managers often grapple with implicit theories and selective perceptions that lead to idiosyncratic interpretations, potentially resulting in visions unfit for the dynamic nature of organizational environments. Drawing on insights from scholars such as Conger and Edwards, the study illuminates how leaders, driven by past successes and cohesive team dynamics, may fall victim to cognitive biases, hindering their adaptability to new circumstances. The narrative unfolds with a real-world scenario involving a successful European telephone and internet bank facing challenges after a period of rapid growth. The newly appointed CEO's vision of implementing voice automation and routing as a cost-cutting measure becomes a focal point. The study introduces the concept of path dependence, illustrating how early decisions can set organizations on self-reinforcing trajectories, limiting the flexibility of change leaders. Strategies for minimizing the impact of reactive and self-reinforcing sequences are explored, emphasizing the importance of recognizing dynamics affecting outcomes. The study further introduces Lewin's three-step process - unfreezing, movement, and refreezing - as a theoretical framework for intentional change management. Lewin's insights into the delicate balance of driving and restraining forces during change provide a foundation for understanding the dynamics of change implementation.

KEYWORDS:

Anchoring, Cognitive Biases, Confirmation Bias, Decision-making, Hindsight Bias, Loss Aversion.

INTRODUCTION

Implicit theories about how things operate and selective perceptions of what matters may lead to cognitive biases and peculiar ways of understanding events in change managers, which may encourage them to create and stick with change objectives and visions that may not be appropriate. Conger contends that while change agents must realistically weigh the opportunities and limitations of a given circumstance and show consideration for the interests and concerns of people affected by the change, this may not always be the case. Individuals spearheading the shift may get so engrossed in the endeavor that they ignore any information that contradicts their own viewpoint. According to Edwards, decision-makers often categorize their choices by contrasting them with analogous choices made in the past. This prompts individuals to assess results by concentrating on the aspects of the current circumstance that align with the chosen scenario type. As individuals adopt a mentality that limits their attention to those components of a situation they think to be significant, they neglect important but contradictory information. They give the impression that they are performing efficiently since they don't pay attention to inconsistent or unfavorable input. If change managers have a history of accomplishments, this cognitive bias may be strengthened

since a successful track record may bolster self-confidence and the assumption that they can exert enough control to get desired results. When a cohesive leadership team leads a change, this self-reinforcing dynamic may be reinforced if members engage in "groupthink," which Janis refers to as suppressing criticism and impeding reality testing. A popular phone and online bank with headquarters in the Netherlands provides services to clients all around Europe. It has created an organizational culture that appreciates the client and concentrates everyone's attention on providing great customer service during the last 14 years. When speaking with consumers, employees at the service centers are not limited to predetermined "scripts" and are instead urged to build rapport in order to recognize and meet their requirements. More than 85% of Direct Banking's clients have told their friends and family about the bank, and a big part of its success has been the high caliber of customer service the company provides [1], [2].

After ten years of explosive expansion, expenses started to rise and margins started to contract. The issue was given to a new CEO who was appointed. He replaced two of the bank's executive team members with two new managers shortly after assuming his position. One of the fired managers retired early, while the other was given a new position in the bank. The CEO told the executive team he intended to implement voice automation and routing after just four weeks on the job.

His goal was to save expenses by analyzing incoming calls using voice recognition technology to determine who is calling, why they are calling, and what sort of transaction they need. He maintained that partial automation, which gathers routine data and routes the call to a specialist agent who can finish the transaction, may provide an intermediate option in situations where full automation of the process was not feasible.

The newly appointed CEO was well-liked with his exceptional track record of reducing expenses and raising margins via technological innovation, and since joining the bank, he has effectively used the channels of internal communication that had already been created to persuade others that Path dependency [3], [4].

Early moves in one direction may lead to further movement in that same direction, which is a key component of many self-reinforcing sequences. Over time, this process can limit the flexibility of change leaders to create and oversee a successful change trajectory. This process of constraint is known as "organizational path dependence" by Sydow et al. Path dependency starts with a pivotal incident that sets off a series of self-reinforcing behaviors that gradually stifle alternatives and restrict the options available to a change manager. Path dependency is described by Sydow et al. as a three-phase process that includes lock-in, path construction, and preformation.

During the route construction phase, managers of change are distracted from other options by a pattern of choices, acts, and occurrences that self-reinforces and eventually becomes dominant. Although there are still a number of alternatives accessible, they are becoming fewer in number, and it is becoming harder to veer off course.

During the lock-in phase, the process gets locked onto a certain course and the available choices further shrink. The most dangerous aspect of this stage, according to Schreyögg and Sydow, is the possibility of leaders degenerating into dysfunction as a result of their inability to adjust to changing conditions or better options. They become confined to a certain mode of operation. Established procedures and practices continue when confronted with more effective alternatives or significant environmental changes, and the system is unable to adapt [5], [6].

Reactive and self-reinforcing sequences' little influence

When those in charge of a change don't always operate in a manner that will allow them to have the greatest amount of control over the result, they may sometimes be less successful than they might be because they are unaware of some of the dynamics that influence outcomes.

Sequences that react

Reactive sequences are likely to occur when change includes several parties, each of whom is trying to further their own interests, depending on the power dynamics. Negative responses are often easy to see, but this isn't always the case, particularly when those who are dissatisfied with the direction of change lack the courage to speak out or don't have the authority to stop things as they happen. Those impacted by the change may first follow the leaders' instructions, but eventually they could have the courage or the authority to question the way the change is being handled.

By keeping an eye out for hazards in their surroundings, anticipating opposition, and acting swiftly when people don't agree with them, change agents may become more successful. Mangham explores how leaders, like actors, may gauge their "audience" before a performance, relying on past research by Goffman. He makes reference to Goffman's finding that some performers practice being objects to themselves in front of the mirror before going "onstage" and doing the same in front of other people. Change managers can also predict the potential reactions of those impacted by a change to events. Mangham goes so far as to say that leaders may simulate several steps into multiple different futures, akin to a mental game of chess where different moves and their outcomes can be evaluated. This testing may be made easier with the use of a stakeholder analysis, which identifies the people who will be impacted by a change or have the ability to influence its result, evaluates their degree of influence over events, and predicts how they will feel about them.

Self-confirming patterns

Self-reinforcing sequences carry a risk because they might make change managers less flexible and less able to adjust to changing conditions. This risk can arise from growing rewards, psychological attachment to prior actions, or cognitive biases. Self-reinforcing sequences are described as entrapment processes by Schreyögg and Sydow, who state that they "often unfold behind the backs of actors and bring about an escalating situation with unexpected results." According to Sydow et al., the restoration of choice is a necessary prerequisite for escaping the route dependence that is often connected to self-reinforcing sequences. Change managers must make every effort to keep themselves informed about and free to choose several paths of action [7], [8].

Intricate designs

Alternating between self-reinforcing sequences, wherein increasing returns and other forces encourage the development of routines that narrow the scope for action, and reactive sequences, wherein negative reactions and a hostile context can trigger discontinuities that push the change in a new direction, are sometimes how change takes the form of punctuated equilibrium. These self-reinforcing reactive cycles can be seen in relation to various processes, such as the creation of new goods and services, the development of interpersonal relationships within a project team, and the creation and execution of a new business strategy, over a variety of time periods, including a few days, months, or even years. Taking a process-oriented approach to leading change

This expands on the concepts covered in 1 and offers a process model grounded on dialectical and teleological theories, which see change as a deliberate, structured, and often contentious process. The model offers a conceptual framework that change agents may use to pinpoint the problems they must solve in order to achieve their goals. The methodology may also be used to determine what sorts of inquiries will encourage leaders to evaluate their performance and consider areas for improvement.

DISCUSSION

Even if executives who foresee or detect changes in the external environment of their business may be in a better position to start change, just realizing that change is needed may not guarantee that it will occur. Those who want to consciously alter the status quo might benefit from Lewin's insightful explanations of the nature of change. He maintained that a scenario in which everything is still is not referred to as the condition of no change. A state of "quasi-stationary equilibrium" is involved, similar to the flow of a river in a certain direction and at a specific pace. One may compare a shift in an individual's, group's, or organization's behavior to a change in the river's direction or speed. For instance, when they get together for departmental meetings, members of two groups in the marketing department may exhibit both competitive and cooperative behaviors. The way they interact with one another depicts the quasi-stationary equilibrium as it is at the moment. The marketing director may opt to step in to encourage more positive collaboration if they believe that there is an overall imbalance between disruptive intergroup rivalry and amicable cooperation. In this instance, they want to change the quasi-stationary equilibrium state of the departmental meeting's dynamics [9], [10].

According to Lewin, every level of behavior is kept in a state of quasi-stationary equilibrium by a force field made up of an equilibrium of forces that promote and oppose change. This degree of behavior may be altered by reducing the opposing or resistant pressures or by applying more forces for change in the desired direction. Change may come from any strategy, but Lewin claims that each strategy will have distinct side consequences. There will be more tension when the forces pushing for change are increased in order to effect change. If this gets out of control, it may lead to high levels of emotionality, aggression, and destructive behavior in addition to challenging the change agent's intentions via a series of reactive actions. Conversely, in situations when the forces resisting the change are reduced, a condition of relative low tension will result as a side impact. Lewin's field theory led him to support a high-pressure strategy that exclusively concentrated on strengthening the forces pushing for change, as opposed to a low-pressure strategy that highlighted the significance of lowering the restraining forces. He maintained that strategies requiring the application of external pressure for change are less likely to build commitment and produce a more lasting change than strategies involving the elimination of restraints inside the person, group, or organization.

Lewin's three-phase method

Lewin proposed that unfreezing, moving, and refreezing are the three phases in a three-step process that are necessary for effective transformation. Thus, managing change entails assisting a person, group, or organization to unlock or unfreeze their current level of behavior; and transition to a new level. Put behavior back in check at this new stage. In order to unfreeze, the driving and restraint forces must be unbalanced. Kotter contends that by making organizational members aware of the need for change, the present equilibrium may be upset. Strengthening driving forces and reducing restraints may be achieved by presenting a picture of a better future state and supplying information that instills a feeling of urgency.

Such action has the power to inspire people and organizations to abandon their old habits and look for new productive ones. Schein also makes the case for how challenging people's perceptions of the advantages of the status quo may spur change and learning. The balance of pushing and restraining forces is adjusted during Lewin's second phase, movement, to transfer the equilibrium to a new location. While these factors might take on many forms, they often materialize as performance-affecting behaviors. As a result, changing attitudes and ideas as well as the procedures, frameworks, and institutions that influence behavior are often necessary to bring about movement. Refreezing is the process of maintaining increased performance levels and preventing reversion by reinforcing new behaviors. New practices may be embedded with the support of incentives that reward higher performance levels and feedback that indicates the efficacy and consistency of the new behaviors [11], [12].

Burnes has seen a trend in recent years to minimize the importance of Lewin's contributions for modern companies. For instance, Dawson and Kantor et al. contend that firms that operate in tumultuous contexts are not relevant to the concept of refreezing. They contend that organizations should be adaptable and flexible, and that it would be illogical to force them to operate in a rigid manner. But Lewin's argument is that change is, far too frequently, fleeting. A "shot in the arm" causes a transformation that is not maintained, and life goes back to as it was. According to him, thinking about change in terms of only getting to a new place, such as temporarily increasing the degree of cooperation in the marketing department's meetings, is insufficient. For as long as it is relevant, he said, permanence must be a key component of the objective. This phase might last for a short while and consist mostly of taking stock before implementing even more changes. Nonetheless, in order to reduce the risk of things returning to as they were before, it is essential to consider consolidation.

Conceptualization

This research looked at activity patterns at various phases of a transition to see whether Lewin's three-phase model held up. According to Lewin's paradigm, unfreezing-related activities need to be visible before movement- and refreezing-related activities. In order to disrupt the current state of affairs, the organization must first unfreeze; otherwise, it will be ill-prepared for change. Movement requires at least some old behaviors to be abandoned in favor of new ones. Refreezing won't aid in the organization's stability at a new equilibrium until these new behaviors have been developed. According to Ford and Greer, if such a progression or sequence is present, then when Lewin's model is implemented, the intensity levels of the components connected to each of the model's three phases should also alter.

Change process profiles will show increasing degrees of "movement" and "refreezing" components as implementation moves forward. Compared to change process profiles associated with lesser degrees of success, those associated with greater degrees of implementation success will exhibit larger amounts of unfreezing, movement, and refreezing variables. The degrees of unfreezing-moving-refreezing activity correlated with the degree of implementation success are the subject of this second hypothesis. Lewin's theory does not imply that just one of the three phases would predominate. For instance, refreezing is just as crucial as unfreezing even if it happens later in the change process. As a result, implementation success will be linked to a greater use of all change process elements.

The three stages of Lewin

Setting goals was found to be a measure of unfreezing since it is an activity that defies preconceived notions and spurs examination and appraisal of the organization's interactions with its surroundings. This component was measured using a three-item scale. Since adjusting behavior is necessary to move an organization toward a better state, skill

development was recognized as a measure of mobility. Developing new behaviors calls for the delivery of new competencies and skills. Due to the fact that refreezing requires incentives and confirmatory feedback in order to promote desirable behaviors, feedback and managerial control were recognized as measures of refreezing. The creation of management control systems that keep an eye on behavior and steer change in the right direction is consistent with this demand for feedback.

Additionally, a measure of implementation success was created, and information was obtained from over 100 managers who were engaged in the implementation of changes using a cross-sectional sample. The data were divided into four groups, each of which represented a distinct degree of change implementation, in order to test hypothesis

1. The results showed that the use of management control and feedback, or the refreezing variables, was far more common early in the implementation phase than it was for the other change process variables. Refreezing variables were used more often than the other change process variables as implementation went on. To a lesser extent, movement activities also rose as implementation went on. The data were divided into three groups, each of which represented a different degree of implementation success, in order to test hypothesis

2. The findings showed a very significant overall difference between the result groups, and successful implementation was correlated with greater levels of utilization of all process variables, including goal-setting, skill-development, feedback, and management control. The use of refreezing activities, such as feedback and management control, was considerably lower when the success of change implementation was low than in the change profiles associated with implementation success. This is an especially intriguing finding that highlights the significance of sustaining change. The overall Lewinian trend from unfreezing to refreezing is supported by Ford and Greer's results. They also discovered as suggested by Lewin's framework that companies achieving greater implementation levels use more intense unfreezing, movement, and refreezing techniques.

Phases of the change management process

A short examination is given of three more process models of change that might be thought of as extensions of Lewin's fundamental model. The explanation or diagnosis of the issue facing the customer. The investigation of other paths and objectives, as well as the formulation of objectives and plans of action. The conversion of goals into practical change initiatives. Additionally, they contended that the development and maintenance of a suitable rapport with those participating in or impacted by the change is a prerequisite for change managers to be successful. As a result, they decided to add two more phases to the aiding process: one dealt with relationship building, and the other with relationship breakup. In order to sustain the momentum for change, termination must be handled wisely.

The procedure for change

Though there is a logical order and distinct dominating points, the boundaries are not always obvious in reality, and the sequence may be iterative in the sense that certain tasks may be handled more than once. Furthermore, some problems may be solved in tandem with other problems. For instance, learning may happen at any stage of the process, and problems with people must be dealt with continuously.

The process begins with the realization that a change must be made due to internal or external factors, such as the development of a new product or the retirement of important personnel. Examples of these internal factors include the financial crisis. Complex processes of

observation, interpretation, and decision-making are involved in recognition, and if these processes are not properly handled, they may result in improper consequences. For instance, an organization may fail to change when it should or alter when it is not necessary. Sometimes leaders are too focused on what is going on in their immediate area and fail to see the need for change. Members of the organization may not realize the consequences of what is happening outside of the organization, even if they are aware of it. Including fresh perspectives in the development of the change agenda is one method of upending conventional wisdom. Senior managers at the top of a department or the company are frequently the only ones involved in this activity, but individuals at different levels of the hierarchy, such as those in the sales team, customer service representatives, or those who work closely with suppliers, may be more knowledgeable about new opportunities and threats.

CONCLUSION

This investigation of organizational transformation reveals the complex dynamics that mold and impact transformative processes, with a particular emphasis on cognitive biases, route dependency, and strategic insights. The trip through cognitive biases highlights how important change managers' implicit beliefs and biased perceptions are, and how this may unintentionally result in the maintenance of visions that are inappropriate for the dynamic corporate context. In order to promote adaptation and efficient decision-making, the research emphasizes the need of accurate assessments, sensitivity to stakeholders' requirements, and avoiding information silos. Path dependency is a key idea that shows how taking early moves in one direction may set off self-reinforcing sequences, limiting the flexibility that change leaders have to choose the best course.

The possibility of organizational lock-in at this stage emphasizes how crucial it is to be vigilant and adaptable enough to consider other options. The research suggests a more sophisticated approach, acknowledging that change may occur as a complicated pattern of punctuated equilibrium, with reactive cycles and alternate self-reinforcing sequences. Lewin's three-step method offers a useful and ageless foundation for deliberate change management. The phases of movement, refreezing, and unfreezing provide information on the fine balance between propelling and resisting forces. The results of Ford and Greer provide empirical evidence for the intensity escalation of these activities throughout the effective implementation of change.

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CHAPTER 12

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE: FROM RECOGNIZING THE NEED TO SUSTAINING TRANSFORMATION

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ABSTRACT:

The multifaceted journey of organizational change, traversing the critical stages from recognizing the imperative for transformation to sustaining the achieved metamorphosis. The narrative unfolds with an emphasis on the often underestimated challenge of translating the necessity for change into a genuine desire within the organizational fabric. Leaders are confronted with the formidable task of navigating individuals out of their comfort zones, contending with factors such as a history of past success and the absence of immediate crises. The narrative scrutinizes the crucial role of early relationship building between change agents and those affected by the impending transformation, underscoring the significance of trust and understanding. Moving beyond mere recognition of the need for change, the discussion progresses to the pivotal stages of reviewing the present state and identifying the future state. These stages, entwined with the diagnosis process, underscore the intricate interplay of historical context, external environment, and self-reinforcing sequences shaping the organization's current state. The planning and preparation phase is illuminated, shedding light on the nuanced decision-making processes, the selection of change strategies, and the meticulous attention required for effective interventions. The discourse emphasizes that planning is not solely a technical endeavor; it necessitates astute consideration of the human dimension, gauging readiness, and addressing potential threats to individuals.

KEYWORDS:

Adaptation, Culture, Leadership, Management, Organizational Change, Strategy.

INTRODUCTION

After a need for change has been identified, the following stage is to turn that need into a desire for change. It's common for leaders to underestimate the difficulty of pushing others beyond their comfort zones. Notifying organizational members of the need for change and inspiring them to abandon the status quo are two ways to create a readiness for change. This may be challenging for a variety of reasons, such as a track record of prior success and the absence of a pressing crisis. Change managers may react to this scenario in a variety of ways, but the effectiveness of a given solution will depend on a number of things. There may not be enough time, for instance, to include others or try out several alternatives if the need for change is urgent. It's possible for change managers to believe that taking a mostly directive stance is their only choice. This could succeed in certain situations, but in others, it might encounter resistance and organizational members might respond in ways that obstruct the change. In some situations, however, such as when the change agents have realized that a change is necessary well in advance, they could feel free to think of other options, such as getting others involved in an early diagnosis to establish a consensus on the need of the change. Selecting the people who will be in charge of overseeing the transition is also crucial. According to Kotter, the change initiative is unlikely to succeed unless individuals who understand the need for change are able to form a powerful enough "guiding coalition" to steer the process. While not all top managers must be part of this steering coalition, he

contends that it will have a much higher chance of success if it is seen as representing a sincere commitment to change in terms of titles, knowledge, experience, reputations, and relationships. Clegg notes that when it comes to experience and background, it's common to believe that the lead should be a technical specialist rather than the manager in charge of making the change work once it's implemented. He disputes this notion, contending that implementation may not be as successful as change managers hope if users are not actively involved in overseeing the procedure [1], [2]. In order to guarantee that there is a sufficient degree of trust and understanding amongst all parties involved, attention must also be paid to developing successful relationships between change agents and individuals impacted by the change. People rapidly create opinions about the competence, helpfulness, and motivations of the change agent, hence the early phases of relationship building are crucial. This conversation demonstrates how crucial early process events may be when it comes to spearheading change. A series of actions and counteractions, as well as self-reinforcing sequences, may be started by an ill-considered choice or action, a failure to see the need for change, and eventually they can influence the course of change and have unintended repercussions [3], [4]. Even though assessing the current situation and projecting the future can first seem to be two different tasks, in reality they are often combined. These two processes often go through several iterations, moving from general ideas to a vision of a more ideal condition that is sufficiently specific and in-depth to be put into practice. Whether the approach should begin with a look at the present or the future is a topic of significant discussion. In order to prevent the shift from being seen as a "utopian leap" to an impractical future that is unachievable given the existing circumstances, it is said that the change should begin in the present. However, an excessive emphasis on the here and now might close doors and result in change objectives that are too cautious and limited by past experiences.

Examining the current situation

The historical background of the organization, its external environment, and the reactive and self-reinforcing sequences that have led to the current state of affairs are often the only ways to comprehend the organization's current status. Depending on the kind of change being managed, there will be differences in the specific goals for examining the current condition. Typical justifications include assisting in determining the necessary adjustment by determining the root of an issue, pointing out existing shortcomings, or highlighting possibilities. Provide a baseline to assist determine the future direction and make it evident what is changing. The information obtained from this kind of assessment may also be utilized to assist prepare individuals for change and predict the reactions of organizational members and other stakeholders.

Determining the future condition

The necessary steps for determining the future state vary depending on the kind of change being implemented for example, transformative or incremental and the role that change managers play in the process as a whole. If change managers are in charge of starting the transformation, one of their main responsibilities will probably be creating a "vision" or perspective of how they believe the company should appear in the future. However, if their job is to carry out an externally imposed vision, then their responsibilities may be restricted to considering and imagining how the change would affect their area of the company.

The vision's quality

Those who make the diagnosis may have an impact on the quality of eyesight. To identify every problem and develop a solution that will satisfy all important stakeholders, they need expertise and understanding, including familiarity with the local environment. This is

significant because it may serve as a focal point for attention and action when one can see a better future situation. It is able to focus effort and energy. According to Locke and Latham, when objectives are realistic and well-defined, individuals are more inclined to stick with them, strive harder, and give up less easily.

Even if the plan is clearly important, the people spearheading the change may have a stake in a certain result or latch onto the first idea they come up with, which keeps them from thinking about other options. The initial vision—the faulty one supported by the new CEO of Direct Banking in Example 1.5—might not be the greatest in terms of the desirable end state or its capacity to inspire those who must be involved in the transformation [5], [6].

Whether or whether the need for change is turned into a desire for change might depend on how the diagnostic stage is handled. If the diagnostic procedure refutes the organizational members' belief that everything is OK as it is, Schein contends, then those members are more likely to be driven to abandon the current situation and pursue a more ideal one. Members of the organization get enough anxious about this difficulty to be inspired to look for other opportunities. The prospect of what may be has enough promise to justify the work of making changes. In summary, Schein contends that any disconfirmation provided by the diagnostic phase will be contested or denied, and those involved will not be motivated to change, unless the unfreezing process offers a promise of psychological safety, with either some benefit or, at worst, a minimal threat to their wellbeing.

This explanation of how a diagnosis might assist unfreeze a situation and foster a willingness for change serves to highlight the prior observation that the lines dividing the phases listed in 2.2 are not always obvious. A diagnosis may help identify opportunities and difficulties. Later in the process, implementation and evaluation of change can also help an evolving diagnostic when new opportunities and problems are found.

Making plans and being ready for change

The planning phase is all about figuring out and stating how the change objectives are going to be met. Sometimes, those spearheading the change pay inadequate attention to this. Burnes notes that, in examining Lewin's contribution to change management, change managers must examine opportunities for movement by analyzing all of the motivating and impeding factors at play after unfreezing. This underlines even more how diagnosis is ingrained in each stage of the transformation process to some degree.

Selecting the overall change strategy push, pull, or a combination of the two is crucial as it may significantly affect how the change turns out. The kinds of treatments that will work best also need to be taken into consideration. 16 offers a typology of interventions, while s. 17–23 provide a thorough analysis of a few chosen instances. The many details that must be taken care of in order to bring about the intended transformation also need attention. The various jobs will have varying lead times, dependencies on one another, and be subject to resource and other limitations. Making poor choices now might have consequences later. In scenarios when essential resources are limited, for instance, deciding early to allocate resources to a certain course of action may reduce the likelihood of changing course later on since committed resources may not be reallocated to another project. When the sort of change in question is what is frequently referred to as a "blueprint" change, it is feasible to engage in more thorough preparation. Changes to a blueprint are ones in which the destination may be known ahead of time. Blueprint changes may take many different forms, such as moving, computerizing a company process, or introducing a new grading or rating system. These conditions make it simpler to foresee what must be done, and change management may be seen as a "planned change" that follows the model's subsequent phases step-by-step using a

preset linear procedure. However, it is often not feasible to determine the final point before implementation. Even if there may be a clear need for change—for instance, because the company is losing market share or isn't innovating as quickly as its rivals—it may not always be clear what has to be done to make things better. There may not be able to provide a precise description of the end state or the steps required to get there, even while there may be a widely stated aim and a direction for change, such as increasing competitiveness. The pace of change in the operating environment may be so rapid in certain cases that it may not even be useful to conceptualize in terms of particular end states since the exact definition of a desired end state may be constantly changing. A "blueprint" approach to change is not acceptable in these situations. It is necessary to see planning as a more flexible, iterative process that develops with time. Prior to creating new plans, existing ones are examined as they are carried out. It's critical that change managers see planning from more than just a technical standpoint. People concerns must also be given careful consideration. Plans must take into account how prepared and receptive individuals are to change, as well as if the process poses any threats to them.

DISCUSSION

The emphasis now moves from preparation to action, with whatever has been prepared now needing to be carried out. Change managers often overlook managing people concerns, which results in change plans not being carried out as planned. Individual organizational members may not perceive any advantage for themselves from the change, even if a change manager may see clear benefits for the organization as a whole. This will influence their desire to support or oppose the change. It is important to pay close attention to managing stakeholder interests, inspiring people and organizations to support the change, and communicating the change. It is also necessary to pay attention to evaluating the change and tracking advancement. Change might require a lot of backtracking, according to Buchanan and Storey. Burke shares this viewpoint and contends that the process of change is often more like to a series of loops than a straight line, reflecting the fact that plans are seldom carried out as intended and that unexpected effects frequently arise even when they are. It is a common complaint of change managers that they must continually "fix things" in order to maintain the change's momentum.

As previously said, many situations require making little, cautious moves in what is thought to be the correct direction. Following each step, it is necessary to evaluate the previous one to see if the direction is still valid and whether the step was successful. It is important for leaders to actively seek and respond to input in order to assess the efficacy of the transformation strategy. Change managers must be aware that even while planned interventions are being carried out as intended, the desired outcome may not be being achieved. This could be the result of things like insufficient resources, rigid organizational structures, reward systems that penalize new behavior, a lack of commitment and motivation on the part of those who will be directly impacted by the change, or a lack of political support from those in a position to sabotage the project. It's also possible that some of the early advantages of the implementation's early stages may disappear when path-dependent behaviors result in rigidities that reduce the range of options. Input on the change's trajectory may indicate that reevaluating the change strategy and its execution is necessary. Too often, the people spearheading the change neglect to actively seek out input from the public and only become aware that the change is having unexpected effects when someone else or an unforeseen event calls their attention [7], [8].

The supplier discovered and subsequently informed Concrete Flags managers that personnel had tried to restart the machine by pounding the weigh boxes with a big hammer while they were making modifications to the apparatus.

With the outdated machinery, it seemed that this rudimentary technique for transporting wet concrete had functioned rather well, but it had damaged the modern apparatus. Managers were made aware of a significant discrepancy between the operators' knowledge and abilities and the new equipment by means of this feedback. In response, they scheduled many training sessions, which had the immediate effect of improving their ability to use and maintain the new machinery. After a little time, another issue surfaced. Giving end customers a pamphlet with laying directions was part of fulfilling the goal of giving them custom patios on pallets directly. Sadly, the workers, who still saw their job as producing concrete paving stones, had not been informed of the booklet's significance. Managers conducted an inquiry and discovered that the employees thought it unnecessary to insert the brochure before the pallet was shrink-wrapped. It was just a little piece of paper. They had kept shipping patios-on-pallets without the laying instructions until supplies ran out. It was not until consumers started complaining that they had not gotten the promised pamphlet that managers became aware of this issue.

Managers realized after receiving this input that while they had focused a lot of energy on creating a new marketing plan and planning and setting up the new machinery, they had paid comparatively little consideration to how the change would affect the operators. The employees had not been informed of the change or given any assurances. It was incorrect for managers to expect that they would embrace it. The operators saw it as a "money-making management ploy," endangering their ability to keep their jobs. No one had told them that the strategy was to buy more machinery and boost output to meet the expected rise in demand while still protecting employment [9], [10].

Unprompted input from customers and suppliers of new equipment has triggered many of the remedial steps needed to keep the transformation on schedule. Managers at Concrete Flags discovered, among other things, that they could have done a lot more to spread the word about the change and actively seek out input that would have made it simpler to keep an eye on how it was being implemented. Change managers may still run into problems if the required data is hard to get or unavailable, even if they understand how important it is to assess and monitor progress. The fragmentation of the transition process is one of the causes of this. In the case of software design, Clegg and Walsh provide the following examples: strategy, feasibility, conceptual design, detailed design, programming, implementation, usage, and maintenance are typical steps in the process. Different persons, often with different objectives and aims, are typically involved in each of these phases. The feedback mechanism is compromised by this fragmentation. One group could push the project in a certain way without realizing the need to let others know about it, or it might face an issue head-on and solve it without realizing how its actions would affect end users. They could not always know who needs to know, even when they are aware that others might also need to know. Those who are informed can also not understand the importance of what they have been told. Clegg and Walsh note that it may be challenging for individuals engaged in the change process to influence and learn from one another due to this lack of consistency and feedback.

Maintaining the shift

Change, according to Lewin, is much too often fleeting. Following a "shot in the arm," life resumes its previous state. He believes that thinking about change in terms of only arriving at

a new state is insufficient. As long as it is advantageous to do so, attention must be paid to maintaining this new condition; this warning is crucial since there are situations in which it may not be advantageous to preserve a change due to recent changes. According to the NHS Modernization Agency, a sustained change occurs when "new ways of working and improved outcomes become the norm" and when "the systems surrounding them are transformed in support, and the thinking and attitudes behind them are fundamentally altered." Numerous things may have an impact on sustainability. One is the initial management of the whole transition process. More involved techniques may earn a greater degree of commitment that is more likely to be maintained, while strict top-down strategies are more likely to generate conformity, which can evaporate when the pressure to maintain the change is relaxed [11], [12].

How leaders behave after the original transformation objectives are met is another important consideration. A change aim is not automatically the new norm just because it has been accomplished and is producing better results. Prematurely announcing triumph may destroy momentum before the attitudes and ways of thinking needed to sustain the new style of working have been ingrained, according to Kotter. Additionally, he makes the case that leaders have to seize every chance they get to demonstrate to people and organizations how their work is producing results after implementation. He asks for input that is pertinent, intelligible, and targeted so that members of the organization may concentrate their efforts on the things that are really having an impact. A number of authors contend that customized feedback systems may support change sustainability in addition to facilitating oversight and control during the change's implementation phase. By working with operational managers, who will continue to be in charge of day-to-day operations after the change has been implemented, change managers can contribute to the development of this type of feedback by helping them create self-administered mechanisms for monitoring and managing the situation in the long run.

Another element that might thwart change, according to Kotter, is "churn." This is corroborated by Buchanan et al., who found that once leaders left, their successors often sought to further their own agendas and prioritized alternative topics. This was discovered after doing significant study in the National Health Service of the United Kingdom. Care must be taken to make sure that the next generation of leaders continues to embrace the new strategy in order to reduce the effect of turnover. Even with leaders in place, turnover may still be an issue if any of the other participants in the transformation go and their familiarity with the new methods of operation is lost. According to Buchanan et al., when replacements bring in attitudes and work practices that are inconsistent with the adjustment, the issue may become worse. In these situations, careful consideration of selection and induction might be beneficial. Taking charge of and handling people-related problems

Sometimes, change agents approach problems when creating and implementing change plans from a purely technical standpoint, paying insufficient attention to what some refer to as the "softer" people issues, like conflicting priorities and goals, internal politics, and the influence of stakeholders on outcomes.

Communication, trust, motivation, and commitment support for those impacted by the change are some examples of the "softer" people issues that change agents overlook. The Triumph scenario, which is discussed in the Introduction to Part IV, is a useful illustration of how problems with stakeholder management, communication, and motivation may impact the outcome of a change project. In this instance, the procurement of components from nations with competitive prices.

Acquiring knowledge

Leaders that are effective are those who can draw lessons from their experiences and use those lessons to change their behavior and perform better. The differences between single-loop and double-loop learning are made by Argyris and Schön.

Learning in a single loop

When leaders concentrate on identifying mistakes and using this feedback to change their own and other people's behavior, single-loop learning takes place. It encourages ongoing development by extrapolating from historical patterns. In the short and long run, this may be beneficial, but it may not be revolutionary since it might not significantly alter the fundamental presumptions and beliefs that drive behavior. Novel approaches to behaving are probably constrained by existing beliefs and established practices. When the actions of leaders provide good feedback via ongoing progress, the status quo often becomes maintained. When faced with pressure to increase profits, a leader may look for methods to streamline operations by enhancing the alignment of the organization's internal components. Reorganizing departmental structures could be viewed as a means of removing jurisdictional conflicts that impede the manufacturing process, and training could be recognized as a means of enhancing the fit between employees' skills and the skills required to operate the current manufacturing system effectively. While taking similar steps can result in efficiency gains, it's also possible that short-term gains could be undermined if leaders lock the system into producing the same goods for customers in traditional markets using current technologies, thereby preventing the possibility of taking actions that could help take advantage of new opportunities as they present themselves.

Dual-loop education

Double-loop learning happens when leaders are able to think creatively by analyzing results, recognizing and questioning the presumptions and beliefs that guided the choices and actions that resulted in these results, and, when necessary, modifying presumptions to allow for the possibility of trying out novel behavioral strategies. Strategically speaking, Midland Bank executives in the UK, for instance, were the first to question the conventional wisdom that suggested the only way to connect with individual consumers was through an expensive branch network. As a result of their bold ideas, First Direct, the nation's first telephone bank, was established.

On a less strategic note, leaders should try to understand why individuals opposed the change by trying to sympathize with those who were impacted by the introduction of a new performance management system. When seen from this angle, leaders may come to the realization that their approach to leadership may be contributing to the issue, which may cause them to reevaluate some of their presumptions about the dedication and drive of their staff. According to Covey, leaders see things as they are and believe they are objective, but in reality, they see what they have been taught to see. In the performance management scenario, a recently hired HR director could have relied too much on prior knowledge from a previous employer and failed to see that the presumptions from that experience were not appropriate for the present circumstances. Covey contends that we can take more responsibility for our basic paradigms, maps, or assumptions and the degree to which our experience has shaped them when we are more aware of these things.

We can also examine, test, and challenge our paradigms by listening to others and being receptive to their perspectives, which will help us gain a broader perspective and a more objective viewpoint. The assumptions made by leaders about time is one area that often goes

unnoticed. According to Huy, the way leaders see time influences how they assign resources, prioritize challenges, and determine the urgency of certain tasks. While leaders with a longer time view are more likely to strive toward obtaining long-term, enduring achievements, those with a shorter time perspective are more inclined to choose activities that provide quick, visible benefits and pay less attention to longer term consequences. It is plausible that leaders who are not cognizant of their short-term viewpoint may be more susceptible to route dependencies, which may ultimately result in inefficiencies. Double-loop learning offers a fresh perspective on circumstances and occurrences while challenging conventional ways of thinking and doing. With this knowledge, leaders may be able to steer clear of ineffective route dependencies and minimize the time and money needed to deal with unwarranted backlash and opposition from other stakeholders.

Increasing the effectiveness of leaders

It has been suggested that leaders may become more successful by taking a step back, observing what is happening, and using these observations to guide their behavior. They should pay close attention to how people respond to their actions and how their choices affect both short- and long-term results. Unfortunately, this does not occur very often because leaders are too busy with a busy schedule to take the time to observe and reflect. They are also too committed to a course of action to see evidence that contradicts their beliefs. Moreover, they are shielded from information about the consequences of their decisions by organizational structures, policies, and management practices that discourage upward communication and create an environment of organizational silence. Finally, they are so caught up in and entrapped by a path that gradually reduces their scope for decision-making that they become path dependent to the exclusion of path-breaking behavior. Leaders must be conscious that these obstacles may make it difficult for them to switch from an instantaneous "doing" mentality. Instead, they must make a concerted effort to adopt a "observing" mode and apply a critical viewpoint to their daily practices. Leaders are better able to act and intervene in ways that can disrupt inefficient patterns and steer the change process in a direction that has a higher chance of producing superior outcomes when they perceive leadership as a process and when events, decisions, actions, and reactions are seen to be connected.

CONCLUSION

This investigation provides leaders and change agents with a thorough manual that sheds light on the complex process of organizational transformation, from its beginning to its long-lasting effects on organizational culture. Change plans include two dynamic parts: implementation and progress assessment.

Their success or failure depends on how well people problems are managed throughout these periods. The essay emphasizes how the process of change is iterative, recognizing the ongoing need for flexibility and adaptability. The story incorporates real-world examples to highlight the unanticipated effects of change efforts and the critical function that feedback systems play in course correction. Importantly, the topic of discussion goes beyond achieving change objectives to include the often disregarded difficulty of maintaining transformation. A focus is placed on elements that affect sustainability, such as organizational "churn," post-implementation activities, and leadership tactics. The need of continual learning is discussed, with a focus on the differences between single- and double-loop learning and how each reinforces current behaviors differently from allowing for significant changes in perspective.

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CHAPTER 13

NEED FOR CHANGE AND STARTING THE CHANGE PROCESS

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ABSTRACT:

The foundational aspects of organizational change, unraveling the critical junctures encapsulated in the recognition of the need for change and the initiation of the change process. Acknowledging the often underestimated challenge of translating the recognition of change necessity into a genuine organizational desire for transformation, the narrative scrutinizes the complexities faced by leaders in navigating individuals beyond their comfort zones. Leadership dynamics are dissected as the narrative unfolds, addressing the intricacies of instilling a readiness for change within organizational members. Factors contributing to the difficulty of this process, including a history of past successes and the absence of immediate crises, are examined. The discourse navigates through the diverse responses of change managers, contemplating the effectiveness of directive approaches versus collaborative strategies based on the urgency of change needs. The pivotal role of a cohesive and influential guiding coalition is highlighted, emphasizing the significance of assembling a team with diverse titles, information, experience, reputations, and contacts. While not mandating the inclusion of all senior managers, the narrative contends that a potent guiding coalition significantly enhances the likelihood of successful change initiation.

KEYWORDS:

Diagnosis, Leadership, Planning, Stakeholders, Strategy.

INTRODUCTION

All systems, whether they work groups or whole organizations, must be able to identify and react to changes that may impact the availability of inputs or the demand for outputs in order to thrive. Some systems do this much better than others. They look for possibilities and possible hazards because they are proactive. They actively look for ways to start changes that might provide them a competitive edge and they get ready for potentially unstable situations. Some people react considerably more quickly and only take action when it is absolutely necessary. Nearly all theories of change that were accepted up until recently were cumulative and gradual. These models presuppose that businesses engage in a process of ongoing, gradual change in response to opportunities and dangers. This reaction is described by the gradualist paradigm. Although many believe that continuous adaptation is the best strategy for change since it keeps the company in line with the outside world, this pattern of change is really the exception rather than the rule. The punctuated equilibrium model best captures how most companies react to changing conditions [1], [2].

The basic idea behind punctuated equilibrium is that systems develop via alternating periods of equilibrium and revolution. During equilibrium times, persisting "deep structures" allow for only modest incremental change, whereas during revolution periods, same deep structures undergo fundamental alteration. Managers have more alternatives for responding when the need for change is identified early on. They are limited in what they can accomplish when they are compelled to respond to an immediate and compelling demand for change. Acknowledging the need for change and initiating the change process are two of the four forms of change that are defined, and their implications for change management practice are

examined. These types of change rely on whether they are proactive, incremental, or continuous [3], [4]. When people become aware of and react to what they see to be noteworthy external or organizational events, they might begin to sense the need for change and develop a change agenda. The need for change is indicated by differences between actual and intended performance levels, but issues might occur when these differences go unnoticed because just a small number of indicators are given enough attention. A few of the signs that need observation are examined. The last section of the draws attention to problems that may have an impact on how the agenda for change is formulated. Although top managers are often the only ones who can formulate the change agenda, individuals at different levels of the organization could be in a position to provide insightful feedback. Their contribution may not, however, be enough to ensure that the organization will deal with the problems they deem significant.

Initiating the modification

A few of the problems that arise when the transformation process is started. The most crucial step is to transform the need of change into a desire for it. Members of an organization are not helpless puppets with no ability to effect change, but rather autonomous players with the ability to step in and make meaningful changes. They will need a variety of change management skills, ideas and theories to assist them understand and manage the change process, drive to seek change, and confidence in their own abilities to influence results. Determining who will spearhead the change, at least initially, is the second problem that has to be resolved. An outsider, an insider, or a member of the system or subsystem that is the subject of the change might be the change agent. There is evidence to show that change initiatives driven by users, as opposed to technical specialists, have the greatest chance of success. The effect of trust and confidence on the caliber of the change Relationships are also taken into account [5], [6].

Change patterns

An effective conceptual framework for understanding organizations as a system of interconnected parts that interact with a wider environment is provided by open systems theory. Regardless matter whether the focal system is a department, organization, or work group, it is a component of a larger system and depends on it for the feedback, resources, and information it needs to thrive. An organization may be seen as an open system that actively interacts with its surroundings. It takes in different inputs, changes them, and then exports the results. When a company produces products or services for clients outside of the company, the money made from selling these outputs may be used to pay for the purchase of additional resources, such labor, facilities, raw materials, and equipment, so that more outputs can be produced. Customer and other external stakeholder feedback may indicate that the company needs to adjust how it produces the goods and services it exports or that it needs to create new products in response to market shifts. These adjustments may also have an impact on the organization's need for environmental inputs. The strategy of an organization may also be impacted by changes in the cost and accessibility of inputs. The majority of businesses work in dynamic environments, and in order to thrive in this ever-evolving world, they must be able to recognize new opportunities and dangers and take appropriate action.

This looks at an organization's ability to react to threats and opportunities. Although it is suggested that the best course of action is to continuously make little adjustments to guarantee that the organization is constantly in harmony with its surroundings, this is seldom the case. The general norm is that many companies take a long time to adjust to new circumstances due to internal pressures that encourage stagnation. As a consequence, they

experience strategic drift and a growing mismatch with their external environment, which ultimately compels them to implement a drastic adjustment.

Changing the gradualist paradigm with adaptation

According to the gradualist paradigm, businesses engage in a process of ongoing, incremental change in response to opportunities and dangers. Their reaction is changing, and as a result of these ongoing adjustments, the organization is gradually being transformed. In support of this theory, Brown and Eisenhardt mention businesses like Intel, Walmart, 3M, HP, and Gillette, implying that their cultures are built around the capacity to adapt quickly and consistently. They cite Burgelman and Chakravathy, who contend that since businesses evolve and sometimes undergo transformation as a result of continuously modifying their goods, continuous change is often shown via product innovation. One recognizes HP as a classic example. Instead of making a quick, abrupt transition, the business evolved from an instruments company to a computer company via quick, ongoing product innovation.

When it happens, continuous change means that social norms and work procedures are always being updated. Weick and Quinn contend that in the absence of predetermined goals on the side of a change agent, this results in novel patterns in the way an organization organizes itself. It is emergent in the sense that change is not purposefully orchestrated. It is ongoing and the result of regular management procedures. They quote Orlikowski, who contends that in order to bring about noticeable and dramatic changes, people and groups must adapt to and experiment with life's inevitable setbacks, malfunctions, exceptions, opportunities, and unexpected consequences. These experiences must then be repeated, shared, and amplified.

During a period of significant product development linked to the Pentium processor, multimedia, the internet, and the convergence of telephony and consumer electronics, Brown and Eisenhardt examined product innovation in six computer industry businesses. Of their case studies, three included companies with a track record of good product innovation and commercial performance, while the other three concerned companies with a track record of rather poor multi-product portfolio development. Three traits—a continuous process of adjustment semi-structures that supported improvisation, temporal linkages that supported learning, and sequential procedures for handling transitions—were found in the companies that could handle change.

Weick and Quinn confirm similar results, noting that the characteristic feature of continuous change is the notion that little, ongoing changes made concurrently across units may add up to produce significant change. The three interconnected processes they see as being connected to ongoing change are learning, translation, and improvisation. By use of reciprocal adjustments, improvisation enables the alteration of work practices, resulting in a reduction of the time interval between planning and implementation, until the point at which planning and implementation converge. The constant modification and revision of concepts as they move across the organization is referred to as translation. Learning entails the ongoing modification of common mental models, which makes it possible for an organization's capacity for responsiveness to shift.

DISCUSSION

Equilibrium periods

In order to explain an organization's fundamental structure, Gersick presents the analogy of a playing field and the game's rules. He then uses the game in play to illustrate activities during

an equilibrium time. The characteristics of the playing surface and the game's regulations dictate a consistency in football gameplay, even if it may vary over a match. The nature of the playing field and the game's regulations cannot be altered by the coach or players, but they may interfere and make adjustments that will impact the team's performance. When it comes to organizational change, during times of equilibrium, change agents may step in and respond to external or internal disturbances by making little modifications, but they won't have a significant impact on the organization's underlying structure [7], [8].

According to the punctuated equilibrium paradigm, in equilibrium periods, organizations are difficult to change because of forces of inertia that seek to preserve the status quo. According to Gersick, the deep structure generates a powerful inertia that keeps the system from producing alternatives outside of its own bounds as long as it is intact. Furthermore, any deviations that do happen may be brought back into alignment by these forces of inertia. Three causes of inertia are identified by Gersick: obligations, incentive, and cognitive frameworks. Members of an organization often form common mental models and cognitive frameworks that affect how they see the world and learn. Concentration may be limited to thinking "within the frame" by shared mental models. When it comes to transformation, focus could be limited to finding better methods of doing things. During times of equilibrium, people of the organization often neglect to question presumptions about its philosophy of business and fail to pay enough attention to the prospect of doing things differently or even differently.

Fear of losing money is a common motivator for resistance to change, particularly when it comes to buried costs from times of equilibrium. Gersick makes reference to the worry that one may lose control over one's circumstances if the equilibrium breaks, and he contends that this is a major factor in why people are motivated to prevent significant system change. Thaler and Sunstein contend that individuals would rather remain in their existing circumstances for a variety of reasons, drawing on the research of Samuelson and Zeckhauser. Change might also be impeded by obligations. According to Tushman and Romanelli, a system's structure often creates networks of interdependent resource relationships, such as relationships with suppliers, and value commitments, which prevent it from achieving the necessary change, even if it is able to overcome its own cognitive and motivational barriers to realizing the need for change. This point of view, at least partially, supports the claim made by Greenwood and Hining that an organization's normative embeddedness might restrict change. Periods of discontinuous change happen when a revolutionary upheaval is brought about by inertia, or an organization's incapacity to adapt as quickly as its surroundings.

Revolutionary eras

According to Gersick, the fundamental aspect of the punctuated equilibrium paradigm is that organizations don't transition gradually from one "kind of game" to another. Romanelli and Tushman explain that this is because organizational unit resistance to change prevents minor modifications from being established and having a significant impact on related subunit activities. As a result, little adjustments don't add up to modify the structure gradually. According to Weick and Quinn, proponents of punctuated equilibrium theory believe that moments of divergence, or an increasing discrepancy between an organization's internal structure and external expectations, are when revolutionary change events take place. According to their research, an organization made up of a series of interdependencies that converge and tighten when short-term adjustments are sought in an effort to attain greater levels of efficiency is the metaphor of the company suggested by episodic change. The organization's inability to quickly adjust to changes in the external environment results from

this emphasis on internal alignment, which diverts attention from the need of maintaining alignment with the external environment. Lewin referred to this condition as quasi-stationary equilibrium, which is maintained by inertia until misalignment reaches a critical point that triggers significant changes. The company must transform itself in order to go ahead. According to Gersick, deep structures can only be transformed by a process of complete disruption. In this reasoning, any meaningful change can only be achieved by first dismantling the deep structures, which will leave the system momentarily disordered. After that, a portion of the system's original components and a few new ones may be reassembled into a new configuration that runs under a fresh set of guidelines. A new equilibrium is based on this process of revolutionary upheaval and organizational transformation. This new equilibrium, however, gives birth to another time of relative stability, which is followed by another era of revolutionary change, due to factors of resistance that prevent ongoing adaptation. As a process of punctuated equilibrium, this one keeps going [9], [10].

The punctuated equilibrium paradigm proponents contend that revolutionary experiences may impact a single company or a whole industry. The UK's power supply industry is one instance of a complete sector that had to alter its fundamental structure. The Conservative government's decision to privatize the sector brought in new regulations and a level playing field for all of the utility firms operating in it. Even after a protracted period of gradual transition, Marks & Spencer found itself out of step with its surroundings and underperforming other major stores, forcing the company to completely restructure itself.

A multitude of case studies provide evidence in favor of the punctuated equilibrium paradigm. Pettigrew presents a research on how ICI changed between 1969 and 1986. He discovered that periods of drastic change were alternated with times of gradual adjustment and that changes in fundamental ideas came before adjustments to organizational structure and business strategy. Tushman et al. studied the evolution of AT&T, General Radio, Citibank, and Prime Computers, noting times when organizational structures, processes, and strategies came together to better reflect the core goals of these companies. They also noticed that short bursts of severe and widespread change interspersed these equilibrium periods, which resulted in the creation of new missions and the start of new equilibrium periods.

The potential for foreseeing change

There are situations where foreseeing the need for change is not too difficult. Businesses that operate inside the European Union, for instance, are able to predict the effects of new rules that are now being considered in Brussels if they give it the necessary attention. Businesses that compete in marketplaces where profit margins are being compressed may anticipate the need to attain higher levels of efficiency or create new revenue sources. Nonetheless, there are times when businesses face unanticipated upheavals, such as the 2008 financial crisis, the fallout from the 9/11 terrorist attacks, or the SARS pandemic of 2002–2003.

When it comes to foreseeing the need for change, some businesses are much more adept than others. They take the initiative. They look for chances and possible dangers. To get a competitive edge, they either plan for potentially disruptive events or for changes they could start. Some companies are much more reactive, taking action only when it is absolutely necessary to do so.

The sooner a need for change is identified, regardless of whether it is gradual or transformative, the more alternatives managers have for handling it. Managers' options are often limited once they are compelled to act in response to an immediate and compelling demand for change. As an illustration

Less time for preparation

Those who are proactive and foresee the need for change are more likely to have the time necessary for careful planning. It is doubtful that there will be enough time to include a large number of individuals. However, it does require time to diagnose problems, lessen resistance, and boost commitment when people are included and encouraged to participate in the change process. There won't be much time for experimentation. However, early adopters may have the opportunity to try again in the event that their initial attempt fails. It is harder to look for original answers when change is urgently required. Early movers may have the chance to get a competitive edge by not only producing but also protecting, for example via patents, their innovative goods or technologies. Late movers may have limited ability to influence changes in markets and technology [11], [12].

An organizational change typology

A helpful typology of organizational change can be obtained by combining two of the dimensions of change that have been discussed thus far: the degree to which change involves transformational change or incremental adjustment, and the degree to which the organization responds either proactively or reactively to an opportunity or threat tuning adjustment that takes place when a modification is not immediately needed. In order to achieve and/or defend the strategic vision, it entails looking for better ways to do so. Some of these include enhancing policies, techniques, and procedures; introducing new technologies; rethinking processes to save costs and time to market; or developing personnel with the necessary skills. The majority of companies spend a significant amount of time fine-tuning. This method of implementing change is often started from inside the company in order to make little tweaks that keep the organization's internal components and its strategy in line with the outside world. Adaptation is a gradual and flexible reaction to an urgent outside change request. It might include reacting to a competitor's effective new marketing approach or a shift in the availability of a crucial resource. To put it simply, in order to be competitive, you have to do more of the same things, but better. When a business, like Nestlé, is compelled to react to a competitive move by another, like Mars, which may have included increasing the size or lowering the price of some of its confectionery items, that is an example of adaptive transformation. It is not the goal of this form of change to do things fundamentally differently or in fundamentally different ways.

Both tuning and adaptation are forms of change that take place inside the same framework and are constrained by the current paradigm, even if they may include little or significant alterations. Reorientation and re-creation, on the other hand, are forms of change that focus more on the rules and the playing field than on how a specific game is played, to borrow Gersick's illustration. They include changing the organization and bending or breaking the structure to carry out certain tasks in a unique way.

Reorientation entails redefining the business. It is started in anticipation of upcoming chances or issues. Ensuring the organization's future alignment and effectiveness is the goal. The frame could need to be altered, but because the modification has been expected, it might only need to be done gradually over time by continual frame bending. In the mid-1980s, Nestlé provided an excellent illustration of reorientation. It started a significant transformation program while business was doing well in order to make sure that in the long run, it would still be in line with its surroundings. In order to determine which companies it should be in, it started a top-down study. For instance, should it stay in the pet food industry, keep producing baked beans even if their margins were shrinking, or, as a significant user of cans and glassware, produce its own or purchase them just in time? It also started a bottom-up study of

the additional value that each primary operation produced, as well as a large initiative to re-engineer the supply chain across the whole company. Another example is given by British Gas. The corporation was brought to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission after its privatization as a monopoly gas provider. The leadership management knew that the corporation would have to make changes or maybe face dissolution when the panel delivered its findings. A team of ten senior managers was assembled to investigate and test potential outcomes in order to equip the organization to deal with the unidentified changes that it would inevitably encounter in the future. Senior management may need to put in a lot of effort to instill a sense of urgency and win support for the need to prepare for change in situations where the need for change is not immediately apparent to everyone and is not seen as urgent by many. Re-creating a reactive change entails quickly and simultaneously changing every fundamental aspect of the organization in order to modify it. According to Nadler and Tushman, it always entails the dismantling of certain system components and the shattering of organizational frames. It might be confusing. One often mentioned instance of this kind of transformation was implemented by Lee Iacocca upon taking over as CEO of Chrysler. He started a revolutionary transformation process that included selling off numerous overseas businesses, pulling the corporation out of the big automotive market, and changing the majority of the senior staff.

In the UK, the state-owned coal sector was privatized between 1994 and 1995. Around 20 deep mines and the same number of opencast mines were operated by UK Coal at the time. By 2004, the number of mines had decreased by almost 50% and turnover had decreased by half. The primary cause of the closure of several deep mines owned by UK Coal was the depletion of commercially viable reserves. The commercial rationale for fresh investment was damaged by the ongoing decline in global coal prices, therefore no new mines were constructed to replace those that had closed. It wasn't only that the commercially feasible reserves had run out. Environmental objection to burning coal with a high sulfur content was one of the other issues. Major clients found imported coal to be more appealing both in terms of cost and this measure. Another contributing reason was the huge financial outlay needed to establish a new deep mine.

The plan for change

The closure of opencast and deep mines prompted UK Coal to start exploring for methods to increase the business's operational effectiveness. One approach to do this was to give each mine greater autonomy and assign to each unit a larger variety of tasks than was previously the case, which would lower the overhead costs of its central corporate headquarters. In order to safeguard the long-term viability of all the surviving deep mines, UK Coal implemented a continual improvement program in conjunction with this restructure.

Faced with dwindling prospects for expanding its mining enterprise, UK Coal also started to reevaluate its resources and contemplate modifying its business strategy. It made the decision to investigate the idea of reframing the business as a mining and land management firm. Numerous adjustments were made as part of this reorientation, one of which was the addition of new senior managers with expertise in land and property management to the company. Consequences of these various change kinds for change management techniques As previously said, different forms of change may have an impact on the locus of change, the phases in the change process, and the emphasis of change efforts.

The emphasis of change initiatives

The goal of incremental change is to increase the internal alignment between the various organizational components in order to increase the organization's efficiency and perform

tasks more effectively. Seeking a new arrangement for organizational components is the goal of transformational change, which aims to realign the company with its evolving environment. As previously said, this often results in doing things in a different way. The series of actions necessary to accomplish a desired result.

One significant obstacle to change might be inertia. Interdependencies between work roles, departments, processes, technologies, customers, and suppliers tighten as an organization transitions through an equilibrium period. Ideologies that dictate the optimal way to operate also gain traction, and resistance to change is bolstered by concerns about losing the advantages of the status quo. Therefore, equilibrium breaking—a phenomenon Lewin called "unfreezing"—represents the initial stage of the transformation process. By releasing the freeze, the organization may move into a new state and assist shifting.

Lewin's three-phase method

Unfreezing is a crucial initial stage in the change process since most forms of change will encounter opposition from certain stakeholders. But in a small percentage of situations, when dynamic organizations must continually adjust to fast-paced settings, the problem may not be breaking through inertia and unfreezing the organization, but rather assessing and refocusing the ongoing process of change.

The proper sequence for change, according to Weick and Quinn, is as follows: "freezing" to assess the situation and draw attention to what is happening; "rebalancing," which entails reinterpreting the past and resequencing patterns so that they unfold more smoothly; and "unfreezing," which allows for the continuation of improvisation, translation, and learning "in ways that are more mindful of sequences, more resilient to anomalies, and more flexible in their execution."

The center of change

Nadler and Tushman contend that the severity of the change—that is, its degree of trauma and dislocation—will play a significant role in deciding how it is handled. Referring to the above-described typology of change. Compared to incremental change, transformational change is more intensive. According to Gersick, during transformative transition, organizational participants typically feel intense emotions along with uncertainty since the organizations are no longer guided by their previous deep structures and do not yet have future directions. In addition, reactive change is more drastic than proactive change. According to Nadler and Tushman, during reactive transformation, everyone understands that failure might jeopardize life. Members of the company may also discover that time constraints and a lack of resources often limit their ability to work effectively. They continue by saying that tuning is the least intense, and that adaptation comes next. Reorientation is linked to a spike in intensity, while re-creation is linked to the greatest degree of intensity.

Change's intensity

Their basic claim is that local leaders can often manage low-intensity changes by using project management and other implementation strategies linked to standard management procedures. The difficulty of managing change grows with its intensity until it can no longer be effectively handled by standard management procedures. Senior management often establishes unique responsibilities and structures to support the change process when it reaches this degree of intensity. They may even designate an internal or external change agent to help with the transition. This method of change management is known as "transition management" by Nadler and Tushman.

It incorporates procedures designed specifically to handle a particular transition, with the senior team acting as a support system and the organization carrying on as usual. If the change is significant enough, it can be included as one of many crucial things that need to be examined and handled gradually on the senior team's agenda. The CEO now takes responsibility for leading the change rather than handing it off to others, and when the intensity of changes rises even more, change management becomes a top priority for the leadership team.

Novel patterns of transformation

The investigation of punctuated equilibrium by Gersick, which spans several levels and domains, indicates that this pattern of change is not new. The way that people are perceiving it is novel. Many individuals may work their whole working lives in organizations that were never really out of step with their surroundings when change happened more slowly. As a result, their exposure to organizational change may have been limited to gradual adjustment and modification. But as change happens more quickly, a growing number of firms have gone through phases of strategy drift and environmental mismatch, to the point where a drastic shift in direction is the only option to go ahead. It seems that managing and altering companies is becoming more crucial and challenging rather than easier. There is no question that companies need to have effective change management as a key competency given the constantly changing environment in which they operate. A large number of change initiatives would even say the bulk fail to provide the desired results. The inability to see the need for change at an early enough stage is one explanation for this. The BBC had become comfortable during a protracted era of stability, during which time it had established a reputation for truthful reporting and programs of the highest caliber. Employees thought the BBC was the world's greatest broadcaster and programme producer, and it was financially stable. However, the BBC took a while to react when the globe started to alter.

Conditions at the BBC when John Birt arrived

In 1987, John Birt joined the BBC as deputy director-general, and in December 1992, he was named director-general. In his book, *The Harder Path*, he writes that he was shocked to see how little factual data there was about the fundamental operations of the BBC. He referred to the BBC's culture as a kind of imperialism, in which each regional commander across the organization amassed a whole fleet of assets regardless of need. "We could have covered Wimbledon, the World Cup, and a world war, and still have had unused resources to spare," remarked Birt, who also noted that staff utilisation was low and that in certain areas there was between 25 and 50 percent more staff than necessary. The net effect was a vast excess of facilities. A portion of the issue stemmed from the fact that the center paid for the buildings, overhead, and support services rather than charging specific programs for them. As a consequence, no one had the foggiest clue about the expense of producing a software. The corporation's revenue from the licensing fee increased by an average of 4% year over 60 years, allowing it to continue operating even in the face of inefficiencies until the mid-1980s. However, a new political environment in 1985 caused this to shift.

CONCLUSION

This investigation has walked the complex terrain of organizational transformation, from seeing the need for change to starting the change process. The complex interactions that impact how recognition is translated into a sincere want for change have been analyzed, exposing the difficulties that leaders have when trying to shake up their teams' comfort zones and create a sense of preparedness. Change managers' complex reactions to urgency and their crucial choices about whether to take a collaborative or directive approach have been shown.

Effective change initiation relies on having a strong guiding coalition that is purposefully put together to represent a sincere commitment to change. Furthermore, the focus on the development of early and strong bonds between change agents and stakeholders is consistent with the understanding and trust that are essential for successfully navigating the choppy seas of organizational transition. The understanding that initial impressions influence opinions and establish the tone for subsequent cooperation highlights how important it is to foster cooperative and positive dynamics right away.

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